374 A.2d 20 (N.J. 1977)
Joseph Canola and three confederates entered a jewelry store to commit an armed robbery.1 The store owner and his employee resisted the crime and engaged in a physical skirmish with one of the robbers. A second robber began shooting, and the owner returned fire, fatally wounding both the owner himself and one of the robbers, Lloredo.2
Canola and two other surviving participants were indicted on two counts of murder, one count of robbery, and one count of being armed during the robbery.3 The murder counts charged the deaths of the store owner and the co-felon Lloredo respectively.4 After a jury trial Canola was convicted on both murder counts and sentenced to concurrent terms of life imprisonment.5
The Appellate Division unanimously affirmed the conviction for the murder of the store owner. A majority of that court also upheld the conviction for the murder of the co-felon Lloredo, but Judge Handler dissented from that portion of the decision.6 Because of the dissent the case reached the Supreme Court of New Jersey as of right.7
Whether a participant in an armed robbery may be convicted of felony murder for the death of a co-felon killed by the robbery victim?8
The felony-murder doctrine in New Jersey, as set forth in N.J.S.A. 2A:113-1, holds a felon liable for murder only when the felon or an accomplice commits the killing during the perpetration of the felony.9 Liability does not extend to deaths caused by victims or third parties resisting the crime under the agency theory of causation.10
No. The established facts show that Canola and his confederates were committing an armed robbery when the store owner and employee resisted, leading to gunfire in which the owner fatally shot the co-felon Lloredo.11 The killing was not performed by Canola or any of his accomplices but by the robbery victim himself. Under the agency theory of the felony-murder rule, this breaks the required causal link between the felons' actions and the death.12
A participant in an armed robbery may not be convicted of felony murder for the death of a co-felon killed by the robbery victim.13
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Pashman, J.
Justice Sullivan concurs in the result only.14 He emphasizes that the legislative intent of N.J.S.A. 2A:113-1 is to hold the criminal liable for any killing which ensues during the commission of a felony, even though the felon or a confederate did not commit the actual killing.1516
The practical result of the majority holding, in his view, is that even though some innocent person or a police officer be killed during the commission of an armed robbery, the felon would bear no criminal responsibility of any kind for that killing as long as it was not at the hand of the felon or a confederate.17 The only exception he would recognize is the death of a co-felon, which could be classified as a justifiable homicide and not within the purview of the statute.18 He urges the Legislature to act promptly to clarify the situation resulting from the majority opinion.
If it does not extend the felony murder statute to encompass a killing during the commission of a felony not at the hand of the felon or confederate, it should at least provide that the felon be chargeable with manslaughter for such killing.1920
Chief Justice Hughes dissents from the opinion of the majority here and would affirm the decision of the Appellate Division for the precise reasons stated in its majority opinion.21 He believes that the 'ensues clause' can have no other logical or legislatively intended meaning than to extend criminal liability, in a causative sense, to death which ensues or is proximately caused by initiation and furtherance of the felony.2223 Hughes adopts the proximate cause theory.
Under that theory, when a felon sets in motion a chain of events which were or should have been within his contemplation when the motion was initiated, the felon and those acting in concert with him should be held responsible for any death which by direct and almost inevitable consequences results from the initial criminal act.24 In his view, resistance whether by victim or police, and even unintended or accidental deaths which occur in the confused res gestae of violent felony, can hardly be deemed outside the contemplation of the initiator of such criminal violence.25
Whether the 'ensues clause' of N.J.S.A. 2A:113-1 extends felony murder liability to a death caused by a person resisting the felony rather than by the felon or an accomplice?26
The 'ensues clause' in N.J.S.A. 2A:113-1 does not expand the felony-murder rule beyond the traditional agency theory to impose liability for killings by third parties.27 It clarifies the scope for accidental homicides and accomplice liability within the res gestae of the felony but requires the killing to be by the felon or agents.28
No. The facts establish that Lloredo's death ensued from the robbery but was caused by the store owner's return fire, not by Canola or his confederates.29 The court interprets the ensues clause as not mandating proximate cause liability for third-party killings, consistent with historical application and policy against expanding the rule.30
The 'ensues clause' of N.J.S.A. 2A:113-1 does not extend felony murder liability to a death caused by a person resisting the felony rather than by the felon or an accomplice.31
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Pashman, J.
Justice Sullivan concurs in the result only. He emphasizes that the legislative intent of N.J.S.A. 2A:113-1 is to hold the criminal liable for any killing which ensues during the commission of a felony, even though the felon or a confederate did not commit the actual killing.
The only exception he would recognize is the death of a co-felon, which could be classified as a justifiable homicide and not within the purview of the statute. He urges the Legislature to act promptly to clarify the situation resulting from the majority opinion.
If it does not extend the felony murder statute to encompass a killing during the commission of a felony not at the hand of the felon or confederate, it should at least provide that the felon be chargeable with manslaughter for such killing.
Chief Justice Hughes dissents from the opinion of the majority here and would affirm the decision of the Appellate Division for the precise reasons stated in its majority opinion. He believes that the 'ensues clause' can have no other logical or legislatively intended meaning than to extend criminal liability, in a causative sense, to death which ensues or is proximately caused by initiation and furtherance of the felony. Hughes adopts the proximate cause theory.
Under that theory, when a felon sets in motion a chain of events which were or should have been within his contemplation when the motion was initiated, the felon and those acting in concert with him should be held responsible for any death which by direct and almost inevitable consequences results from the initial criminal act. In his view, resistance whether by victim or police, and even unintended or accidental deaths which occur in the confused res gestae of violent felony, can hardly be deemed outside the contemplation of the initiator of such criminal violence.