167 N.W.2d 912 (Iowa 1969)
Richard Paul Lawrence was indicted by a grand jury in Linn County, Iowa, for the crime of murder in violation of section 690.1 of the Code of 1966, alleged to have been committed on or about December 20, 1966.1 Following his plea of not guilty, a jury trial commenced on June 5, 1967. On June 13, 1967, the jury returned a verdict finding Lawrence guilty of murder in the second degree.2 After the court overruled his motion for a new trial on June 20, Lawrence was sentenced on June 22 to a term of 90 years in the Iowa State Penitentiary at Fort Madison.3 He filed a timely notice of appeal on August 14, 1967.4
The appeal raised three assignments of error, the first concerning exclusion of the public from the courtroom during the reading of the instructions to the jury.5 After final arguments concluded shortly after noon on June 13, a recess was taken until 12:30 p.m. During this recess, the trial judge instructed the bailiff to prevent spectators from entering the courtroom during the reading of the instructions.6 Due to a misunderstanding, the bailiff excluded all members of the public, including a newspaper reporter, even though several attempted to enter and vacant seats remained available.7 The instructions were read between 12:30 and 12:59 p.m. The verdict was returned at 8:59 that evening.8 Neither defense counsel nor the defendant noticed the exclusion at the time, and the judge informed the attorneys of the incident by telephone on June 16.9
Appellant seems to concede there is statutory authority for the county attorney to subpoena witnesses under the provisions of section 769.19 of the Code.10 There is nothing before us to indicate the county attorney used the power granted to him under this statute to discover, but rather used it for its intended purpose, perpetuation of evidence, and, in the absence of a showing to the contrary by the party asserting the objection, the actions of the county attorney are presumed proper.11 The sentencing to 90 years formed the third ground of the assignments of error.12
Whether the exclusion of the public from the courtroom during the reading of the jury instructions violated the defendant's right to a public trial?13
The constitutional right to a public trial under Article I, Section 10 of the Iowa Constitution extends to the entire trial from impaneling of the jury through return of the verdict, including the reading of instructions, and arbitrary exclusion of the public without legitimate reason violates that right.14
Yes. The established facts demonstrate that after final arguments concluded shortly after noon on June 13, 1967, a recess was taken and the trial judge instructed the bailiff to exclude spectators during the reading of the instructions.15 Due to misunderstanding the bailiff barred all members of the public, including a newspaper reporter, from entering even though vacant seats remained available and several persons attempted entry.16
The instructions were read between 12:30 and 12:59 p.m. The court itself found no justifiable reason existed for the exclusion during this portion of the trial.17
This exclusion from a major segment of the proceedings contravenes the guarantee that the public trial right encompasses the reading of instructions.18
The exclusion violated the defendant's right to a public trial.19
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Snell, Stuart, And Mason, Jj.
Chief Justice Garfield dissented from the reversal on the public trial claim.20 He maintained that the brief exclusion during the mechanical reading of instructions resulted solely from a misunderstanding between the judge and bailiff.21 Counsel for both sides remained unaware of any exclusion until days later.22
Copies of the instructions were filed publicly in the clerk's office.23 Garfield argued that in a practical sense the defendant received a public trial.24 The majority's cited precedents involved far broader exclusions.25
The limited nature of the incident here produced no reasonable possibility of prejudice to the defendant.26
Whether a defendant claiming denial of a public trial must affirmatively show prejudice from the exclusion, or whether prejudice is implied or presumed?27
A violation of the constitutional right to a public trial necessarily implies prejudice to the defendant, relieving the defendant of any burden to affirmatively demonstrate actual prejudice; the state must overcome the inference of prejudice.28
No. The established facts establish that the defendant registered a timely objection upon learning of the exclusion.29 The state made no effort to demonstrate lack of prejudice from barring the public during the reading of instructions.30 Because it would be difficult or impossible for a defendant to point to definite personal injury from the absence of spectators during that segment, the violation itself supplies the required implication of prejudice.31 The state therefore bore the burden to rebut the inference but failed to do so.32
The defendant need not affirmatively show prejudice; it is implied from the violation.33
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Snell, Stuart, And Mason, Jj.
Chief Justice Garfield rejected the majority's approach to prejudice.34 He noted that neither defendant nor his experienced counsel noticed the exclusion at the time.35 The trial judge found no prejudice after examining the record.36
The instructions were available for public inspection in the clerk's office.37 Garfield concluded that the incident was a mere technical error under Iowa Code section 793.18 that did not affect substantial rights.38 No actual prejudice was claimed or suggested.39
The majority improperly applied a conclusive presumption of prejudice to a factual situation far removed from the sweeping exclusions in the cases it relied upon.40
Whether the county attorney's issuance of subpoenas to witnesses after indictment under section 769.19 of the Code constituted improper discovery?41
Section 769.19 of the Iowa Code authorizes the county attorney to subpoena witnesses after indictment for perpetuation of evidence, and absent evidence that the power was used for discovery the actions are presumed proper.42
No. Appellant seems to concede there is statutory authority for the county attorney to subpoena witnesses under the provisions of section 769.19 of the Code.43 There is nothing before us to indicate the county attorney used the power granted to him under this statute to discover, but rather used it for its intended purpose, perpetuation of evidence, and, in the absence of a showing to the contrary by the party asserting the objection, the actions of the county attorney are presumed proper.
The subpoenas did not constitute improper discovery.44
Whether the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing the defendant to a term of 90 years?45
In light of our holding in the preceding division, little consideration need be given the other assignments.46
No. The established facts show that after overruling the motion for new trial the court sentenced the defendant to ninety years in the penitentiary for second-degree murder.47 Because the judgment must be reversed on the public trial claim, the court gave little consideration to the sentencing assignment and did not reach the question whether the term imposed constituted an abuse of discretion.48
The sentencing issue was not reached due to reversal on the public trial claim.49