334 N.W.2d 811 (N.D. 1983)
In the early morning hours of August 7, 1981, Janice Leidholm stabbed her husband Chester Leidholm to death at their farm home near Washburn in McLean County, North Dakota.1 The couple had attended a gun club party in Washburn the evening before where both consumed large amounts of alcohol.2 An argument developed during the return trip to the farm and continued after they arrived home just after midnight, with Chester shouting and Janice crying.3
During the fighting Janice attempted to telephone Deputy Sheriff Dave Vollan but Chester prevented the call by shoving her away and pushing her down.4 The argument moved outside where Chester repeatedly pushed Janice to the ground each time she tried to rise.5 After the couple re-entered the home and went to bed, Janice waited until Chester fell asleep, retrieved a butcher knife from the kitchen, and stabbed him, causing his death from shock and loss of blood within minutes.6
Janice Leidholm was charged with murder.7 A McLean County jury found her guilty of manslaughter and the court sentenced her to five years' imprisonment in the State Penitentiary with three years suspended.8 She appealed the judgment of conviction.9
At trial the State introduced testimony describing the couple's history of alcohol abuse and violence. A Breathalyzer test result showed Janice's blood-alcohol content at .17, and a blood sample analysis showed Chester's blood-alcohol content at .23. Expert testimony was presented on battered woman syndrome and Janice offered a proposed jury instruction addressing that condition.10 Before trial she moved for a change of venue citing local newspaper coverage and renewed the motion after voir dire; both motions were denied.11 She also moved for judgment of acquittal after the State's case in chief, relying on notes from interviews conducted by Dr. Thakor that were admitted as State's Exhibit 17.12
The trial court instructed the jury on self-defense by directing it to apply the standard of a reasonably prudent person regardless of sex.13 It refused to give the proposed battered woman syndrome instruction, included language on the duty to retreat from a dwelling, and instructed the jury on manslaughter as a lesser included offense of murder.14
Whether the trial court correctly instructed the jury on self-defense?15
Under North Dakota law, a jury evaluating a claim of self-defense must apply a subjective standard of reasonableness that views the circumstances from the standpoint of the accused, taking into account the accused's own physical and psychological characteristics rather than the perspective of a hypothetical reasonable person.16
No. The trial court instructed the jury that the circumstances must have been such as to produce in the mind of reasonably prudent persons, regardless of their sex, similarly situated, the reasonable belief that the other person was then about to kill her or do serious bodily harm to her.17 The established facts show that Janice Leidholm had endured a marriage marked by alcohol abuse and violence, that expert testimony on battered woman syndrome was introduced, and that she offered a proposed instruction highlighting the psychological effects of that condition.18 Because the subjective standard requires the jury to place itself in the shoes of a person with Janice Leidholm's characteristics, and to assess whether those characteristics would induce an honest and reasonable belief that deadly force was necessary, the objective instruction given by the trial court misstated the governing rule.
The trial court's self-defense instruction constituted reversible error.19
Whether the trial court erred by refusing to give the proposed jury instruction on battered woman syndrome?20
When a correct subjective self-defense instruction is given, a separate instruction on battered woman syndrome is unnecessary because the subjective standard already directs the jury to consider expert testimony describing the psychological effects of the syndrome in determining the existence and reasonableness of the accused's belief.21
No. The proposed instruction correctly stated that battered woman syndrome is not itself a defense and that evidence of the condition may be considered in evaluating self-defense.22 The established facts reveal that expert testimony on the syndrome was received at trial and that the jury was required under the proper subjective standard to evaluate Janice Leidholm's state of mind in light of that testimony.23 Because the proposed instruction added nothing material to a correctly framed self-defense charge, the trial court's refusal to give it was not error.24
The trial court did not err in refusing the proposed battered woman syndrome instruction.25
Whether the trial court's instruction on the duty to retreat from a dwelling violated constitutional provisions when the assailant was a cohabitant?26
The statutory duty to retreat does not violate equal protection, due process, or privileges and immunities when the assailant is a cohabitant because the subjective standard of reasonableness already permits the jury to find that an accused honestly and reasonably believed retreat was unsafe.27
No. The trial court included language tracking the statutory exception for retreat from a dwelling when the assailant is a cohabitant.28 The established facts demonstrate that Janice Leidholm and Chester Leidholm shared the farm home where the stabbing occurred and that the argument involved repeated physical confrontations inside and outside the residence.29 Under the subjective standard the jury could still conclude that Janice Leidholm honestly and reasonably believed she could not retreat safely, rendering any constitutional objection to the cohabitant distinction without merit.30
The trial court's instruction on the duty to retreat did not violate constitutional provisions.31
Whether the trial court erred by instructing the jury that manslaughter is a lesser included offense of murder?32
Whenever a self-defense instruction is given, the jury must also be instructed on manslaughter and negligent homicide because the distinction between self-defense and those offenses turns solely on whether the accused's belief in the necessity of force was reasonable, reckless, or negligent.33
No. The trial court instructed the jury on manslaughter as a lesser included offense.34 The established facts show that Janice Leidholm asserted self-defense and that the jury therefore had to decide whether her belief was reasonable or unreasonable.35 Because an unreasonable belief in the necessity of force results in liability for manslaughter or negligent homicide depending on the degree of fault, the manslaughter instruction was required and properly given.36
The trial court did not err in instructing the jury on manslaughter as a lesser included offense.37
Whether the trial court abused its discretion by denying the motion for change of venue?38
A motion for change of venue is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be reversed absent a showing of abuse of discretion that prejudiced the defendant.39
No. The trial court denied the pretrial motion for change of venue and renewed the motion after voir dire.40 The established facts indicate that the court examined local newspaper coverage and the responses of prospective jurors during voir dire before concluding that a fair and impartial jury could be seated.41 Because the record supports the trial court's determination that no general atmosphere of prejudice existed at the time the motions were made, the denial did not constitute an abuse of discretion.42
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for change of venue.43
Whether the trial court erred by denying the motion for judgment of acquittal at the close of the State's case in chief?44
A defendant is presumed sane, and evidence is insufficient to raise a reasonable doubt on the issue of sanity unless it shows that a mental disease or defect existed at the time of the alleged crime.45
No. The trial court denied the motion for judgment of acquittal that relied on State's Exhibit 17, the notes of Dr. Thakor.46 The established facts show that the exhibit contained a diagnosis of depressive neurosis made after the offense and statements indicating that Janice Leidholm remembered the episode in detail.47 Because the notes did not raise a reasonable doubt that a mental disease or defect existed at the time of the stabbing, the State was not required to prove sanity in its case in chief, and the motion was properly denied.
The trial court did not err in denying the motion for judgment of acquittal.48