211 A.3d 274 (Md. 2019)
On June 25, 2015, Patrick Joseph Thomas, a 58-year-old resident of Worcester County, Maryland, sold four bags of heroin stamped "banshee" to Colton Lee Matrey, a 23-year-old man who had been abusing heroin for approximately four and a half years.1
Colton had moved from Pennsylvania to his mother's home in Ocean Pines, Maryland, in February 2015.2
That evening Colton withdrew $40 from his mother's debit card, repeatedly called Thomas 27 or 28 times between 11:45 p.m. and 12:07 a.m., and sent multiple text messages pleading for heroin before driving to meet Thomas around midnight.3
Colton returned home shortly after the purchase.4
Early on June 26 his mother, Tammy Matrey, and his girlfriend discovered him unresponsive and locked in the bathroom.5
Emergency personnel pronounced him dead at the scene.6
Officers recovered four empty "banshee" bags near his body, a syringe in his pocket, and additional heroin paraphernalia in his bedroom.7
The Office of the Chief Medical Examiner later determined that Colton died of alcohol and narcotic (free morphine) intoxication.8
Detectives traced the transaction through Colton's phone records, a note in his wallet listing Thomas's name and number, and a search warrant executed on Thomas's residence on July 2, 2015.9
Officers seized 60 identical "banshee" bags containing heroin, hundreds of empty stamped bags, and Thomas's cell phone showing Colton as a contact.10
Thomas admitted during interrogation that he had sold Colton four bags of "banshee" heroin that night.
Thomas admitted during interrogation that he traveled to Delaware every two to three days to obtain five bundles of heroin.11
Thomas admitted during interrogation that he personally used 12 bags per day.12
The State charged Thomas with distribution of heroin, reckless endangerment, and involuntary manslaughter.13
Thomas entered a hybrid plea in which the parties agreed to the ultimate facts while preserving challenges to legal sufficiency.14
The trial court convicted Thomas on all counts.15
The Court of Special Appeals reversed the manslaughter conviction.16
The Court of Appeals granted certiorari to review the sufficiency of the evidence for gross negligence involuntary manslaughter and causation.17
Whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain a conviction for gross negligence involuntary manslaughter against a heroin distributor whose customer fatally overdosed after ingesting the heroin?18
Gross negligence involuntary manslaughter requires the State to prove that the defendant's conduct amounted to a wanton and reckless disregard for human life.19 This constitutes a gross departure from the conduct of an ordinarily prudent person under the circumstances and creates a high degree of risk to human life.20
Yes. The established facts show that Thomas was a systematic distributor who resupplied every two to three days, personally used twelve bags daily, and sold the remainder for profit while knowing the community was consumed with heroin overdoses.21 Thomas sold four bags to a desperate young addict who called twenty-seven or twenty-eight times in minutes and met at midnight, without determining purity or other substances the customer might ingest.22 These facts establish a gross departure from prudent conduct that posed a high risk of death.23
The evidence was sufficient to sustain the conviction for gross negligence involuntary manslaughter.24
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justice Greene And Justice Getty
Justice Hotten dissented from the majority's conclusion that the evidence supported a gross negligence involuntary manslaughter conviction.25 She argued that the State failed to establish the requisite causal relationship between the mere sale of heroin and the subsequent fatal overdose.26 In her view, the sale was not part of a continuous transaction with the death because consumption occurred at a different time and place without Thomas present.27
She further contended that policy determinations about whether to criminalize such conduct as a murder-related offense should be left to the General Assembly, which had repeatedly declined to enact legislation creating such liability.28 For these reasons, she would have affirmed the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals.29
Whether distribution of heroin can serve as the basis for a gross negligence involuntary manslaughter conviction regardless of whether the underlying offense is classified as malum in se or malum prohibitum?30
Yes. The established facts involve distribution of heroin, and the court applied the gross negligence standard directly to those facts without relying on any presumption from the offense classification.33 The court held that the State bears the full burden of proving wanton and reckless disregard even when the act is malum in se, and the classification does not alter the requirement to prove gross negligence.34
Distribution of heroin can serve as the basis for a gross negligence involuntary manslaughter conviction regardless of whether the underlying offense is classified as malum in se or malum prohibitum.35
Whether the heroin distributor was both the actual and legal cause of the customer's death?36
Yes. The established facts show that Colton ingested only the four bags of heroin sold by Thomas along with alcohol.39 The medical examiner determined death resulted from alcohol and narcotic intoxication with free morphine at a lethal level, and no other drugs contributed.40 But for the heroin Thomas supplied Colton would not have died, and ingestion was a reasonably foreseeable result of selling the drug to a known addict.41
Thomas was both the actual and legal cause of Colton's death.42
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justice Greene And Justice Getty
Justice Hotten dissented on causation grounds.43 She concluded that the causal chain was broken because Thomas sold the heroin at one location and time while Colton injected it later in his own home without Thomas's involvement or knowledge of other substances.44 The sale was not part of a continuous transaction with the death, and therefore the evidence could not sustain a finding of legal but-for causation.45
She would have affirmed the intermediate appellate court's reversal of the manslaughter conviction.46