126 Haw. 133, 267 P.3d 1238 (2011)
In 2003, Steigman and her family were guests of the Ohana Surf Hotel in Honolulu, which was operated by Outrigger Enterprises, Inc.1
On the afternoon of March 6, Steigman and her family got caught in a rainstorm and returned to their hotel room to dry off.2 Steigman went on the lanai to get a chair, slipped, slid across the balcony, and sustained injury to her foot when it got trapped under the lanai railing.3
Steigman filed this lawsuit against Outrigger alleging negligence.4 At trial, an expert witness testified that the lanai’s surface did not have the friction coefficient required by industry standards for exterior surfaces.5 Steigman’s daughter testified that the lanai had a glossy surface, so it was difficult to determine by sight alone whether it was wet or dry.6 Steigman also presented evidence that an Outrigger employee had suffered a similar slip-and-fall accident on a lanai at the hotel, and therefore Outrigger knew of the dangerous condition.7 Throughout the trial, Outrigger argued that Steigman’s injury was caused solely by Steigman’s own negligence because the wet lanai presented a known or obvious danger of being slippery, and she chose to confront that danger.8
The trial court gave a Restatement-based jury instruction on known or obvious dangers over Steigman’s objection that it conflicted with the comparative negligence statute.9 The jury answered “no” to the first question on the special verdict form asking whether Outrigger was negligent.10 The trial court entered a final judgment in favor of Outrigger and ordered Steigman to pay Outrigger $29,722.30 for costs.11 The ICA affirmed the judgment in a Summary Disposition Order on November 16, 2010.12 Steigman filed a timely application for writ of certiorari, which this court accepted on March 23, 2011.13
Whether, as a matter of law, the known or obvious danger defense is inconsistent with Hawaii’s comparative negligence statute?14
HRS § 663-31 provides that contributory negligence shall not bar recovery in any action to recover damages for negligence resulting in injury if such negligence was not greater than the negligence of the person against whom recovery is sought.15 Any damages allowed shall be diminished in proportion to the amount of negligence attributable to the person for whose injury recovery is made.16 The known or obvious danger defense operates as a complete bar to recovery whenever a plaintiff is injured by a danger that is known or obvious to the plaintiff.17
Yes. The known or obvious danger defense conflicts with HRS § 663-31 because it completely bars recovery even when the plaintiff's negligence is not greater than the defendant's.18 This holds true even when the defendant may have been primarily at fault.19 Steigman slipped on the lanai after a rainstorm.20
She presented expert testimony that the surface lacked the required friction coefficient under industry standards.21 There was also evidence that an Outrigger employee had previously suffered a similar fall.22 Yet the defense would have denied any comparison of fault and barred her claim outright.23 The legislative purpose of allowing recovery when the plaintiff is not the primary cause of the accident therefore cannot be fulfilled when the defense is applied to these facts.24
The known or obvious danger defense is inconsistent with Hawaii’s comparative negligence statute and is no longer viable as a complete bar in premises liability actions.25
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Acoba concurred in the result.26 He stressed that the known or obvious danger defense is incompatible with HRS § 663-31 because it totally bars a plaintiff's recovery whenever the plaintiff is contributorily negligent in any degree.27 He further reasoned that the defense does not comport with the general duty of reasonable care owed by a landowner or occupier to all persons reasonably anticipated to be upon the premises regardless of legal status.28
The doctrine must therefore be abrogated in its entirety.29
Whether, as applied in her case, the jury instruction on the known or obvious danger defense was properly given?30
No. Because the known or obvious danger defense is inconsistent with HRS § 663-31, the Restatement-based instruction given by the trial court was improper.33 The court gave the instruction solely because it was raining and Steigman knew it was raining.34 Yet the established facts show that the lanai surface failed industry friction standards.35 Outrigger had prior notice of similar falls.36
These facts should have been weighed under comparative negligence rather than used to bar recovery as a matter of law.37
The jury instruction on the known or obvious danger defense was not properly given.38