539 U.S. 607 (2003)
In 1998, a California grand jury indicted Marion Stogner for sex-related child abuse offenses allegedly committed between 1955 and 1973.1 At the time of the alleged offenses, California law imposed a three-year statute of limitations on such prosecutions. That period had run more than twenty-two years before the indictment was returned.2
In 1993, California enacted Penal Code section 803(g), which permitted prosecution of sex-related child abuse crimes after the original limitations period had expired.3 The statute required that a victim first report the allegation to police, that independent evidence clearly and convincingly corroborate the allegation, and that the prosecution commence within one year of the report.4 A 1996 amendment made explicit that the provision revived causes of action previously barred by the statute of limitations.5
Stogner moved to dismiss the indictment on the ground that revival of the time-barred charges was unconstitutional. The trial court granted the motion and dismissed the charges.6 The California Court of Appeal reversed, relying on a prior decision of the California Supreme Court that had upheld the statute.7
Stogner sought further review, again arguing that the 1993 statute could not constitutionally be applied to him. The California Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeal's judgment.8 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider the constitutional question presented by the revival of the previously time-barred prosecution.9
Whether California's 1993 statute extending the statute of limitations for sex-related child abuse crimes violates the Ex Post Facto Clause when applied to revive a previously time-barred prosecution?10
Yes. The 1993 statute was enacted long after Stogner's alleged offenses between 1955 and 1973.14 It revived the prosecution after the original three-year limitations period had expired more than twenty-two years earlier.15 By permitting conviction where the limitations defense had already attached, the law disadvantages the accused in the precise manner the second Calder category forbids.16
California's 1993 law violates the Ex Post Facto Clause when applied to revive a previously time-barred prosecution.17
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Rehnquist, C. J., And Scalia And Thomas, Jj.
Justice Kennedy dissents on the ground that a law extending a limitations period does not increase punishment for past conduct.18 It simply allows the State to seek punishment that was always available under the law in effect at the time of the crime.19 The limitations period is a procedural rule, not a substantive limit on punishment.20
He maintains that the majority misapplies Calder's second category because the statute does not aggravate the crime or make it greater than it was when committed.21 The elements of the offense remain the same.22 The proof required remains the same.23
Only the time within which the State may seek to prove its case has changed.24 Kennedy further argues that the law represents a measured response to the problem of delayed reporting by child abuse victims.25 It required independent, reliable corroboration of the victim's testimony.26
This safeguard protects against the dangers of stale evidence and faded memories.27 He concludes that the Ex Post Facto Clause should not be read to prohibit such a measured response to a serious social problem.28