560 U.S. 702 (2010)
In Florida, the State owns in trust for the public the land permanently submerged beneath navigable waters and the foreshore, making the mean high-water line the ordinary boundary between private beachfront property and state-owned land.1 Littoral owners hold special rights with regard to the water and foreshore, including the right to receive accretions and relictions to their property.2
In 1961, Florida’s Legislature passed the Beach and Shore Preservation Act, which sets procedures for beach restoration and nourishment projects to deposit sand on eroded beaches.3 A local government may apply to the Department of Environmental Protection for funds and permits, and when placing fill on the State’s submerged lands, authorization from the Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund is required.4 Once a beach restoration is determined to be undertaken, the Board sets an erosion control line that replaces the fluctuating mean high-water line as the boundary between privately owned littoral property and state property, after which the common law ceases to increase upland property by accretion.
In 2003, the city of Destin and Walton County applied for permits to restore 6.9 miles of beach within their jurisdictions that had been eroded by several hurricanes.5 The project would add about 75 feet of dry sand seaward of the mean high-water line.6 The Department issued a notice of intent to award the permits, and the Board approved the erosion-control line.7
Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc., a nonprofit corporation formed by people who own beachfront property bordering the project area, brought an administrative challenge to the proposed project.8 After the challenge proved unsuccessful and the Department approved the permits, the corporation challenged the action in state court under the Florida Administrative Procedure Act.9 The District Court of Appeal for the First District set aside the Department’s final order and certified a question to the Florida Supreme Court.10
The Florida Supreme Court answered the certified question in the negative and quashed the First District’s remand.11 Petitioner sought rehearing on the ground that the Florida Supreme Court’s decision itself effected a taking of the Members’ littoral rights contrary to the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, but the request for rehearing was denied.12 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the case.13
Whether the decision of a State’s court of last resort took property without just compensation in violation of the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment?14
No. The Florida Supreme Court’s decision did not eliminate any established property right of the Members.17 Florida law as it stood before the decision allowed the State to fill its submerged land, and the resulting exposure of previously submerged land was treated like an avulsion for purposes of ownership, with the right to accretions subordinate to the State’s right to fill.18
The 2003 project added sand seaward of the mean high-water line after hurricanes eroded the beach.19 The Florida Supreme Court applied the avulsion doctrine from Martin v. Busch without creating a new rule.20 The erosion-control line fixed the boundary permanently, but this was consistent with prior principles that the littoral right to accretion does not extend to land added by State filling.21
The court merely clarified that the doctrine of avulsion applied to State-created restoration rather than recharacterizing private property as public.22 No established right was abolished and no taking occurred under the Takings Clause.23
The Florida Supreme Court’s decision did not effect a taking of the Members’ littoral rights.24
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Breyer agrees that no unconstitutional taking of property occurred in this case and joins Parts I, IV, and V of the opinion.25 He declines to join Parts II and III because the plurality unnecessarily addresses whether courts may effect a taking and what standard would apply.26 He warns that deciding those questions would invite a host of federal takings claims.27
Such claims would involve state property law issues of considerable complexity that are primarily the subject of state law.28 Federal judges lack the familiarity with state property rules that state judges possess, creating a risk of undue federal interference in matters of significant state interest.29
Justice Kennedy joins Parts I, IV, and V and agrees that the Florida Supreme Court’s decision did not amount to a taking.30 He writes separately to note difficulties with recognizing a judicial takings doctrine.31 He observes that the Due Process Clause would likely prevent courts from eliminating established property rights by judicial decree.32
A judicial takings doctrine could paradoxically empower rather than constrain judges by removing traditional limits on altering property definitions.33 He also identifies practical problems concerning the proper timing for raising such a claim and the remedy available if a taking were found.34
Whether the Beach and Shore Preservation Act unconstitutionally deprives upland owners of littoral rights without just compensation?35
A state statute effects a taking if it recharacterizes as public property what was previously private property, but legislation consistent with background principles of state property law, such as the doctrine of avulsion, does not eliminate established rights.36
No. The Beach and Shore Preservation Act does not unconstitutionally deprive upland owners of littoral rights.37 The Act authorizes beach restoration projects that set a fixed erosion-control line replacing the mean high-water line, but this mechanism aligns with Florida’s established treatment of avulsive events caused by State filling of submerged lands.38
The 1961 legislation preserves all common-law riparian rights other than the right to accretions after the line is recorded.39 The project approval process requires a showing that the project will not unreasonably infringe on those rights.40 The Florida Supreme Court correctly determined that the Act’s operation in this case did not abolish any vested littoral right superior to the State’s authority.41
The Act’s procedures and the resulting boundary fix are consistent with preexisting state law principles rather than a legislative elimination of property.42 The Act does not effect a taking.43
The Beach and Shore Preservation Act does not unconstitutionally deprive upland owners of littoral rights without just compensation.44