388 U.S. 293 (1967)
On August 23, 1961, Dr. Paul Behrendt was stabbed to death in the kitchen of his home in Garden City, Long Island.1 His wife, also a physician, followed him to the kitchen and jumped at the assailant, who knocked her to the floor and stabbed her eleven times.2 Police recovered a shirt from the kitchen floor containing keys in a pocket that they traced to petitioner, and they arrested him on the afternoon of August 24.3
Mrs. Behrendt was hospitalized for major surgery to save her life.4 The following day, August 25, police without affording petitioner time to retain counsel brought him to her hospital room around noon, handcuffed to one of five officers accompanied by two members of the district attorney's staff.5 Petitioner was the only Negro in the room.6 An officer asked Mrs. Behrendt whether he "was the man" and directed petitioner to repeat a few words for voice identification, after which she identified him from her hospital bed.7
At trial Mrs. Behrendt and the officers testified to her hospital-room identification, and she also made an in-court identification of petitioner.8 He was convicted of murder and sentenced to death.9 The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction without opinion.10
Petitioner sought federal habeas corpus relief in the District Court for the Southern District of New York, claiming among other grounds that admission of the identification testimony violated his rights under the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments.11 The district court dismissed the petition.12 A panel of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit initially reversed after reaching the identification issue, but the court sitting en banc vacated the panel decision and affirmed the dismissal.13
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and consolidated the case for argument with United States v. Wade and Gilbert v. California.14
Whether the rules announced in United States v. Wade and Gilbert v. California, requiring the exclusion of identification evidence tainted by exhibiting the accused to identifying witnesses before trial in the absence of counsel, are to be applied retroactively?15
In determining whether a new constitutional rule of criminal procedure should be applied retroactively, courts consider the purpose served by the new standards, the extent of reliance by law enforcement on the old standards, and the effect on the administration of justice of retroactive application.16
No. The purpose of the Wade and Gilbert rules is to minimize the possibility of mistaken identification by assuring the presence of counsel at pretrial confrontations, but unlike the absence of counsel at trial, confrontations can often be conducted fairly without counsel.17 Law enforcement authorities relied on the prior rule that counsel was not required, and retroactive application would disrupt the administration of justice by necessitating hearings in numerous cases to determine taint and harmless error.18
The Wade and Gilbert rules do not apply retroactively to confrontations conducted before the date of those decisions.19
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Black dissents from the holding that the petitioner must remain in prison without the benefit of the new rule.20 He argues that once the Court determines what the Constitution says, it lacks the power to legislate a timetable for when the provisions become effective by weighing countervailing interests.21 Denying the benefit of the rule perpetrates rank discrimination against those already convicted.22
He would hold that every person in jail under convictions based on unconstitutional evidence should be given the advantage of the newly announced constitutional rules.23
Whether on the facts of the particular confrontation involved in this case the petitioner was denied due process of law in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment?24
A claimed violation of due process of law in the conduct of a confrontation depends on the totality of the circumstances surrounding it.25
No. The showing of Stovall to Mrs. Behrendt in an immediate hospital confrontation was imperative because she was the only person who could possibly exonerate him, no one knew how long she might live, and the usual police station lineup was out of the question under the circumstances.26
On the facts of this case the petitioner was not denied due process of law in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.27
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Black dissents from the holding that a general claim of unfairness at the lineup is open to all persons to allege and prove.28 He maintains that the Due Process Clause does not authorize the Court to look at the totality of the circumstances of each identification. The Court determines in its own judgment whether the circumstances comport with notions of decency and fairness.29 This approach substitutes the Court's view for the Constitution's text.30
The Due Process Clause means defendants are entitled to a trial governed by the laws in existence at the time of the crime and trial.31