283 U.S. 359 (1931)
Yetta Stromberg, a nineteen-year-old United States citizen by birth, served as one of the supervisors at a summer camp for children between ten and fifteen years of age located in the foothills of the San Bernardino mountains.1
Stromberg led the children in their daily study that included history and economics lessons on class consciousness, the solidarity of the workers, and the theory that workers of the world are brothers.2 She was a member of the Young Communist League.3
Each day she supervised the raising of a camp-made red flag.4 It was a reproduction of the Soviet and Communist Party flag.5 The children stood at salute and recited a pledge of allegiance to the worker’s red flag and the cause of freedom for the working class.6
The camp maintained a library containing many books, papers, and pamphlets of radical communist propaganda.7 Some of these Stromberg owned and bore her name.8 None of the materials were used in teaching the children.9 No word of violence or anarchism or sedition was employed in her teaching of the children. There was no evidence to the contrary.
The information filed in the Superior Court of San Bernardino County charged Stromberg in the first count with willfully displaying a red flag in a public place and meeting place as a sign of opposition to organized government, an invitation to anarchistic action, and aid to seditious propaganda in violation of section 403-a of the California Penal Code.10 A second count charged conspiracy, but the state court later set aside the conviction on that count alone.11
After the trial court overruled Stromberg’s demurrer, she was tried and convicted on the first count.12 The District Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment in People v. Mintz, 290 Pac. 93.13 The California Supreme Court denied a hearing, and the United States Supreme Court granted review on appeal.14
At trial the court instructed the jury that it could convict if the flag was displayed for any one or more of the three purposes listed in the statute.15 The District Court of Appeal interpreted the three clauses separately while questioning the constitutionality of the first clause.16
Whether the first clause of California Penal Code section 403-a, prohibiting display of a flag as a sign of opposition to organized government, is invalid under the Fourteenth Amendment?17
The conception of liberty under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment embraces the right of free speech.18 A statute which upon its face, and as authoritatively construed, is so vague and indefinite as to permit the punishment of the fair use of this opportunity is repugnant to the guaranty of liberty contained in the Fourteenth Amendment.19
Yes. The state court construed the first clause to potentially include peaceful and orderly opposition to a government as organized and controlled by one political party by those of another political party equally high minded and patriotic, which did not agree with the one in power.20 It might also be construed to include peaceful and orderly opposition to government by legal means and within constitutional limitations.21
Stromberg supervised a daily flag-raising ceremony at the children's camp in which the children pledged allegiance to the worker's red flag and the cause of freedom for the working class.22 The clause as construed reaches protected political discussion and is therefore invalid on its face.23
The first clause of section 403-a is invalid under the Fourteenth Amendment.24
Related opinions on this issue
Justice McReynolds dissented on the ground that this Court may not pass upon any question in a cause coming from a state court which the record fails to show was there determined or duly presented for determination.25 The only federal matter ruled upon by the District Court of Appeal was the general demurrer to the information asking whether it adequately set forth an offense punishable without violating the Fourteenth Amendment.26 The District Court of Appeal held the statute divisible and concluded that because the petitioner stood charged with violating all inhibitions some of which were valid the conviction could not be upset.27
Justice Butler dissented on the ground that the record affirmatively shows appellant was not convicted for violation of the first clause.28 Shortly prior to trial the supreme court of California had held invalid a similar city ordinance and the record shows counsel and the trial court had that decision in mind.29 Defendant requested and the court gave instructions stating that inhabitants have the right to advocate peaceable changes in government.30 An organization peaceably advocating such changes may adopt a flag signifying its purpose.31 The display of such flag cannot be made unlawful.32
These instructions eliminated any possibility of conviction under the first clause and defendant waived any claim of error on the state’s instruction.33
Whether a general verdict convicting the defendant can be sustained when the jury was instructed that it could rest on any one of three statutory clauses and one clause may be invalid?34
If any one of the clauses which the state court has held to be separable was invalid it cannot be determined upon this record that the appellant was not convicted under that clause.35 The necessary conclusion from the manner in which the case was sent to the jury is that if any of the clauses in question is invalid under the Federal Constitution the conviction cannot be upheld.36
No. The verdict against the appellant was a general one that did not specify the ground upon which it rested.37 As there were three purposes set forth in the statute, and the jury were instructed that their verdict might be given with respect to any one of them independently considered, it is impossible to say under which clause of the statute the conviction was obtained.38
The state court rested its decision upon the second and third clauses after doubting the constitutionality of the first.39 Because the first clause is invalid upon its face the conviction which so far as the record discloses may have rested upon that clause exclusively must be set aside.40 The state’s attorney at trial emphatically urged upon the jury that they could convict under the first clause alone.41
The general verdict cannot be sustained and the conviction must be reversed.42
Related opinions on this issue
Justice McReynolds dissented on the ground that this Court may not pass upon any question in a cause coming from a state court which the record fails to show was there determined or duly presented for determination. The only federal matter ruled upon by the court below was the general demurrer to the Information.43 The District Court of Appeal held the statute divisible and that as petitioner stood charged with violating all of the inhibitions therein, some of which were certainly good, the conviction could not be upset even if one paragraph were invalid.44
The conclusion seems plainly right and the challenged judgment should be affirmed.45
Justice Butler dissented on the ground that fair consideration of both opinions shows that the defendant did not claim that the jury might have found her guilty of violating the first clause.46 The District Court of Appeal did not decide whether conviction under that clause was lawful.47 The validity of the first clause was discussed only on the question whether the other parts must fail if that part was unconstitutional.48
He concluded that the judgment below should be affirmed.49