98 S.Ct. 1099, 435 U.S. 349, 55 L.Ed.2d 331
In July 1971, Ora Spitler McFarlin, the mother of fifteen-year-old Linda Kay Spitler, presented to Judge Harold D. Stump of the DeKalb County Circuit Court in Indiana a document captioned Petition To Have Tubal Ligation Performed On Minor and Indemnity Agreement.1 The petition, drafted by an attorney, stated under oath that Linda was somewhat retarded though attending public school, had associated with older youth and stayed out overnight, and that sterilization would be in her best interest to prevent unfortunate circumstances.2 Judge Stump approved the petition the same day by signing a statement as Judge, DeKalb Circuit Court, that incorporated the indemnity agreement protecting the physician and hospital.3
On July 15, 1971, Linda entered DeKalb Memorial Hospital after being told she would undergo an appendectomy.4 The following day a tubal ligation was performed, and she was released several days later without knowledge of the procedure's true nature.5 Approximately two years later, after marrying respondent Leo Sparkman, Linda discovered the sterilization when she was unable to become pregnant.6
The Sparkmans filed suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana against McFarlin, her attorney, Judge Stump, the physicians who performed and assisted in the operation, and the hospital.7 The complaint sought damages for alleged violations of Linda's constitutional rights and asserted pendent state claims for assault and battery, medical malpractice, and loss of potential fatherhood.8 The district court dismissed the federal claims on the ground that Judge Stump was the only state actor and was absolutely immune from suit under the doctrine of judicial immunity.9
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed the district court's judgment.10 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider the correctness of that ruling.11
Whether a judge of a court of general jurisdiction is entitled to absolute immunity from damages liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for approving a parent's petition for the sterilization of a minor?12
Judges of courts of superior or general jurisdiction are not liable to civil actions for their judicial acts, even when such acts are in excess of their jurisdiction, and are alleged to have been done maliciously or corruptly.13 This principle was established in Bradley v. Fisher and applied to § 1983 claims in Pierson v. Ray.14 A judge is subject to liability only when he has acted in the clear absence of all jurisdiction.15
Yes. The facts establish that Judge Stump presided over the DeKalb County Circuit Court, a court of general jurisdiction under Ind. Code § 33-4-4-3 that encompassed original exclusive jurisdiction in all cases at law and in equity.16 Ora Spitler McFarlin presented the petition for tubal ligation on her minor daughter Linda. Judge Stump approved it the same day by signing as Judge, DeKalb Circuit Court, incorporating the indemnity agreement. The district court correctly held that this approval fell within his jurisdiction.17 No Indiana statute or case law in 1971 prohibited a circuit court from considering such a petition.18 Parents held statutory authority to consent to medical treatment of minors.19 The Court of Appeals erred by applying an unduly restrictive view of jurisdiction.20 The absence of a specific sterilization statute for non-institutionalized minors did not strip the court of its broad authority.21 Therefore Judge Stump's actions, even if erroneous or procedurally flawed, remained protected by absolute immunity under the doctrine.22
The facts further confirm that the petition was presented to Judge Stump in his official capacity.23 He exercised the authority vested in him as circuit judge.24 The resulting sterilization occurred without Linda's knowledge.25 These circumstances fall squarely within the protection afforded to judicial officers to ensure fearless decision-making without fear of personal liability.26 The Supreme Court held in reversing the Seventh Circuit.27
Judge Stump is entitled to absolute judicial immunity from damages liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.28
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Justice Stewart dissented on the ground that Judge Stump's approval of the petition was not a judicial act at all.29 He emphasized that in Indiana a parent could arrange medical treatment without judicial approval.30 Statutory sterilization procedures applied only to institutionalized persons through administrative boards with later court review.31
Because no Indiana judge had ever been asked to approve such a parental request, the act lacked the attributes of a judicial proceeding.32 There was no case, no litigants, no appeal, and no principled decision-making.33 Stewart concluded that the total absence of normal judicial process placed the conduct beyond the pale of judicial immunity.34
Justice Powell joined Justice Stewart's dissent and emphasized that Judge Stump's ex parte approval without notice, hearing, or guardian ad litem precluded any possibility for the vindication of respondents' rights elsewhere in the judicial system.35 He explained that the rationale for absolute judicial immunity established in Bradley v. Fisher rests on the availability of alternative forums and methods, such as appeals, to vindicate private rights when judges err.36 When a judge's conduct eliminates all such avenues, as occurred here, the underlying assumption of the immunity doctrine becomes inoperative.37
Powell concluded that because no normal judicial process was followed, Judge Stump was entitled to no judicial immunity from suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.38
Whether approval of a petition for sterilization of a minor constitutes a judicial act for purposes of the judicial immunity doctrine?39
Yes. The established facts show that Judge Stump was presented with a petition relating to the affairs of a minor.43 A type of matter state judges of general jurisdiction not infrequently address, such as petitions to settle a minor's claim.44 Mrs. McFarlin submitted the document to him on the advice of counsel precisely because he served as circuit judge.45 He signed the approval expressly as Judge, DeKalb Circuit Court.46 Even though the proceeding was ex parte, lacked a docket number, and omitted notice or a guardian ad litem, these procedural deficiencies do not convert the act into a nonjudicial one.47 The Court of Appeals' contrary conclusion misconceived the doctrine by focusing on informality rather than the core attributes of judicial function and capacity.48
The record further demonstrates that the parties treated the approval as an exercise of judicial authority.49 The district court correctly recognized that Judge Stump was the only state actor whose conduct could support a § 1983 claim.50 Because the act satisfied both prongs of the judicial-act test, absolute immunity attached.51
Approval of the petition constituted a judicial act protected by absolute immunity.52
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Justice Stewart maintained that the approval was not a judicial act because judges do not normally approve parental decisions for surgical treatment or sterilization.53 He pointed out that Indiana law authorized parents to consent to medical care without court involvement.54 Sterilization of institutionalized persons followed an administrative route with later judicial review.55
The complete lack of any case, litigants, or appellate process confirmed that the conduct fell outside the concept of a judicial act whose protection rests on public interest in independent decision-making.56
Whether a circuit court judge acts in the clear absence of all jurisdiction when approving a petition for sterilization of a minor in the absence of a specific authorizing statute?57
A judge is deprived of immunity only when he has acted in the clear absence of all jurisdiction.58 The scope of jurisdiction must be construed broadly.59 An act is not stripped of immunity merely because it was in error, done maliciously, or in excess of authority.60 This rule comes from Bradley v. Fisher.61
No. The facts establish that the DeKalb County Circuit Court possessed broad statutory jurisdiction over all cases at law and in equity and over matters not assigned exclusively to another tribunal.62 No Indiana statute or precedent in 1971 barred a court of general jurisdiction from entertaining a parent's petition for sterilization of a minor.63 Parents retained authority to consent to surgical treatment.64 The Court of Appeals' reliance on later case law such as A. L. v. G. R. H. was misplaced because that decision addressed only the merits of parental authority, not the court's jurisdiction to consider the petition.65 Judge Stump therefore acted within the outer boundaries of his jurisdiction even if his approval was legally erroneous.66
Because the absence of a specific authorizing statute did not equate to a clear absence of all jurisdiction, the immunity doctrine applied and shielded Judge Stump from liability.67
Judge Stump did not act in the clear absence of all jurisdiction.68
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Powell stressed that the absence of any appellate avenue resulting from the ex parte procedure undermined the premises of judicial immunity.69 He explained that Bradley v. Fisher accepted the costs to aggrieved individuals because the judicial system itself provided other means, such as appeals, for protecting individual rights.70 When a judge's conduct eliminates all such avenues, as occurred here through the ex parte approval without notice or hearing, the underlying assumption of the immunity doctrine is inoperative.71
Powell concluded that Judge Stump was entitled to no judicial immunity from suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.72