10 Cal. 3d 490, 111 Cal. Rptr. 136, 516 P.2d 840 (1973)
In 1971, Ila Huntley, an 88-year-old widow receiving aid to the aged, and her 60-year-old son Howard Huntley, along with Bieuky Dykstra, a 78-year-old widow also receiving such aid, and her son Julius Dykstra, initiated a class action in the Superior Court of Sacramento County.1
They sought to enjoin state officials from enforcing provisions of the Welfare and Institutions Code that required adult children to contribute to the support of their parents receiving old age assistance according to a revised contribution scale.2
Howard Huntley alleged that the San Joaquin County Welfare Department had ordered him to pay $70 per month starting October 1, 1971, despite his and his 67-year-old wife's net monthly income of $656.25 as they prepared for retirement.3 Julius Dykstra, a truck driver, faced a demand for $75 monthly contributions while already paying $180 in child support and $145 in rent.4
On October 14, 1971, the superior court issued a statewide temporary restraining order preventing enforcement of Welfare and Institutions Code sections 12100 and 12101, as well as Civil Code section 206, against the plaintiffs and similarly situated individuals.5 State officials then petitioned the California Supreme Court for a writ of prohibition.6
The Old Age Security Law provides public assistance to aged needy persons.7 Following the Welfare Reform Act of 1971 the relatives' contribution scale was increased, with section 12101 setting the amounts adult children must contribute and section 12100 authorizing counties to collect from them.8 In response to a prior decision the Legislature amended Civil Code section 206 to impose a duty on children of persons in need, including those receiving aid to the aged, to maintain such persons to the extent of their ability.9
Whether an adult child of a recipient of aid to the aged under the Old Age Security Law may constitutionally be required to reimburse the state?
Under the equal protection guarantee, the state may not arbitrarily charge one class with the costs of public assistance programs.10
No. The established facts demonstrate that Ila Huntley and Bieuky Dykstra received aid to the aged while their adult sons Howard Huntley and Julius Dykstra faced county demands for monthly contributions of $70 and $75 respectively under the revised scales of sections 12100 and 12101 following the 1971 Welfare Reform Act.11 The court applied the rational relationship test after determining that no fundamental interest or suspect classification was at stake. The long-standing duty codified in Civil Code section 206, tracing to the Elizabethan Poor Law and amended in 1971 to cover persons in need receiving aid, supplied the rational basis by selecting adult children who had benefited from parental support during minority.12 The temporary restraining order issued by the Superior Court of Sacramento County on October 14, 1971, was therefore beyond the court's jurisdiction because the statutes pass constitutional muster.
An adult child may constitutionally be required to reimburse the state.13
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Mosk, J.
Justice Tobriner dissented on the ground that the majority's rational-relationship approach overruled the court's recent unanimous decision in County of San Mateo v. Boss and departed from Kirchner and its progeny by permitting the state to impose reimbursement without an independent preexisting duty.14 He argued that the 1971 amendment to section 206 was enacted as part of the challenged scheme and therefore could not supply the required independent duty.15 He further contended that the provisions invidiously discriminated against children of poor parents who themselves typically have modest incomes.16
Whether Civil Code section 206 as amended in 1971 provides a rational basis for the classification of those required to reimburse the state under the relatives' responsibility statutes?
A statutory classification satisfies equal protection under the rational-relationship test when it bears some rational relationship to a conceivably legitimate state purpose.
Yes. The facts establish that the Legislature amended Civil Code section 206 in 1971 to impose a duty on children of any person in need, expressly including recipients of aid to the aged, thereby aligning the class subject to reimbursement under sections 12100 and 12101 with those already obligated by the Civil Code.17 This classification rests on the historical and societal recognition that adult children who received support during minority should reciprocate when their parents become needy, a principle unchanged in substance since 1872 and consistent with the state's interest in offsetting welfare costs.18 The demands made on Howard Huntley and Julius Dykstra illustrate the application of this rational selection to specific adult children whose parents qualified for aid.19
Civil Code section 206 as amended provides a rational basis for the classification.20
Whether the relatives' responsibility statutes create a suspect classification on the basis of wealth or ancestry?
Strict scrutiny applies only when a statute touches a fundamental interest or creates a suspect classification such as race or wealth.
No. The established facts show that sections 12100 and 12101 apply uniformly to all adult children of parents receiving aid to the aged without regard to the children's own wealth, and the classification turns on the parent's status as a person in need rather than on ancestry in the racial sense.21 The court rejected the argument that the statutes discriminated on the basis of the parents' wealth, noting that the state legitimately limits aid to the needy and that the correlative duty falls on children by reason of parentage, not wealth.22 Because no suspect classification or fundamental interest was involved, the rational-relationship test governed and was satisfied by the preexisting support obligation recognized in Civil Code section 206.
The relatives' responsibility statutes do not create a suspect classification.
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Mosk, J.
Justice Tobriner maintained that the provisions worked an invidious discrimination against poor families because, as a practical matter, adult children of needy parents themselves command only modest incomes and are singled out to bear an additional burden simply because their parents remain alive and poor, perpetuating a dual system of family law that places special disabilities on the poor.23
Whether the duty of support under Civil Code section 206 is independent of the relatives' responsibility statutes in the Welfare and Institutions Code?
The rationality of relatives' responsibility statutes does not depend on subrogation of an individual duty under Civil Code section 206.24
Yes. The facts confirm that the 1971 amendment to Civil Code section 206 was enacted as part of the Welfare Reform Act yet created a general duty applicable whether or not the state actually grants aid, while sections 12100 and 12101 independently authorize county collection actions.25 The court held that the constitutional inquiry focuses on whether the class of adult children is otherwise under a duty of support, not on whether any particular child's individual obligation under section 206 has been factually established or subrogated.26 This framework upheld the demands made on Howard Huntley and Julius Dykstra without requiring case-by-case proof of an individual preexisting duty.
The duty of support under Civil Code section 206 supplies the necessary rational basis even though the statutes operate independently.27