483 U.S. 107 (1987)
In 1979, Seminole Electric Cooperative, Inc., a Florida corporation, borrowed over $1.1 billion from the Federal Financing Bank to construct a coal-fired power plant near Palatka, Florida.1 The loan was guaranteed by the Rural Electrification Administration.2 Construction of a 51-mile patrol road for the plant began in September 1979, but the original contractor faced difficulties obtaining suitable fill material in March 1981.3
William Conover, Seminole's procurement manager, contacted his friend Anthony Tanner, who owned a limerock mine, about using limerock overburden as fill.4 Seminole awarded contracts for fill material and road construction to Tanner's company in May 1981, paying approximately $1,041,800 and $548,000 respectively.5 Conover and Tanner had prior business dealings, including payments and a loan from Tanner to Conover.6
Federal authorities investigated the matter, leading to an indictment in June 1983 charging Conover and Tanner with conspiracy to defraud the United States and mail fraud.7 After a mistrial due to a hung jury, they were retried and convicted on most counts.8 The day before sentencing, Tanner filed a motion for a new trial based on information from juror Vera Asbul that several jurors consumed alcohol during lunch breaks and slept through afternoons.9 The District Court held a hearing but denied the motion to interview jurors, finding juror testimony inadmissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b), and denied the new trial motion.10 While the appeal was pending, petitioners filed another motion supported by an affidavit from juror Daniel Hardy detailing extensive alcohol, marijuana, and cocaine use by jurors during the trial.11 The District Court denied this motion as well. The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the convictions, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.12
Whether the District Court was required to hold an evidentiary hearing including juror testimony on drug and alcohol use by jurors during the trial?13
Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b) bars juror testimony concerning matters or statements during deliberations.14 It also bars testimony on the effect of anything on a juror's mind or emotions influencing assent to the verdict.15 The rule bars testimony on a juror's mental processes in connection with the verdict.16 An exception exists for extraneous prejudicial information or outside influence.17 The common-law rule against admitting juror testimony to impeach a verdict applies to internal matters such as juror intoxication.18 The legislative history of Rule 606(b) specifically considered and rejected a version that would have permitted testimony concerning the drunken condition of a fellow juror.19
No. Juror consumption of alcohol and drugs during trial constitutes an internal matter rather than an outside influence.20 The legislative history confirms that Congress rejected allowing juror testimony on intoxication during deliberations.21
The District Court properly excluded the affidavits from jurors Asbul and Hardy.22 It denied an additional evidentiary hearing after determining that nonjuror evidence was insufficient.23 This approach is consistent with the policy of protecting the finality of verdicts and the privacy of jury deliberations from postverdict scrutiny.24
The facts show that the District Court observed the jurors throughout the trial and saw no indication of intoxication or incompetence.25 Petitioners were afforded an opportunity to present nonjuror evidence at the hearing on the first new trial motion.26
The District Court did not err in denying the motion for a new trial without holding an evidentiary hearing that would include juror testimony on drug and alcohol use.27
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justices Brennan, Blackmun, And Stevens
Justice Marshall dissents from the holding that Rule 606(b) bars the juror testimony at issue.28 He maintains that the Rule applies only to matters occurring during deliberations.29 The Rule does not preclude testimony about objectively verifiable conduct such as alcohol and drug use during trial before deliberations begin.30
Justice Marshall further argues that drug and alcohol consumption qualifies as an outside influence under the Rule's exception.31 The Sixth Amendment right to a competent jury requires an evidentiary hearing to explore the serious allegations of juror misconduct.32 Those allegations were raised by the voluntary statements from jurors Asbul and Hardy.33
Whether petitioners' actions constituted a conspiracy to defraud the United States within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 371?34
18 U.S.C. § 371 criminalizes any conspiracy by two or more persons to defraud the United States or any agency thereof in any manner or for any purpose.35 A conspiracy to defraud the United States may be effected through the use of third parties.36 A conspiracy to defraud a private corporation that receives federal financial assistance does not by itself constitute a conspiracy to defraud the United States.37 This is true unless the intermediary performs official functions on behalf of the government under substantial ongoing federal supervision or delegation of a distinctly federal function.38
No. The broad theory that any fraud on Seminole constitutes fraud on the United States is rejected.39 The indictment charged petitioners with conspiring to defraud the United States both by impeding the REA's functions and by causing Seminole to make false representations to the REA about competitive bidding procedures.40 The evidence may support a conviction if petitioners conspired to manipulate Seminole to cause misrepresentations to be made to the REA.41 The Court accepts that fraud on the United States can be accomplished through innocent third parties.42
It rejects the government's broader argument that any conspiracy to defraud Seminole would itself be a conspiracy to defraud the United States merely because Seminole received federal assistance and some supervision from the REA.43
The case is remanded to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings to determine whether the evidence was sufficient to establish that petitioners conspired to cause Seminole to make misrepresentations to the REA.44
Whether the evidence was sufficient to support petitioners' mail fraud convictions if the conspiracy convictions were reversed?45
The mail fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1341, prohibits use of the mails in furtherance of a scheme or artifice to defraud.46 If the premise that petitioners' actions constituted a conspiracy to defraud the United States under § 371 is rejected on remand, the Court of Appeals must consider whether the evidence establishes a scheme to defraud Seminole under the mail fraud statute.
No. The Court of Appeals affirmed the mail fraud convictions on the basis that the § 371 convictions were valid.47 Because the sufficiency of the evidence on the charge of conspiring to cause misrepresentations to the REA was not passed on below, the mail fraud convictions may require separate analysis if the conspiracy convictions do not stand. The indictment alleged a scheme to defraud Seminole of its right to honest procurement free from deceit.48 Petitioners argued on appeal that the evidence did not establish such a scheme independent of the § 371 theory.49
The case is remanded to the Court of Appeals to consider petitioners' argument that the evidence did not establish a scheme to defraud Seminole under 18 U.S.C. § 1341 if the § 371 convictions are reversed.