151 P.3d 1185 (Cal. 2007)
In response to this portion of the Loftus declaration, the declaration submitted by plaintiff states: "Dr. Loftus has deliberately dumped into the record in her declaration here that Margie Cantrell told her that after recovering her memories in 1995' ... Plaintiff started sleeping with boys and doing drugs.' ... I am absolutely astonished as to the depths to which defendant Loftus will stoop. These are statements attributed to someone who was defrauded into saying anything to Dr. Loftus. The statements may have reflected concerns Ms. Cantrell had at the time, but they are false statements." Cantrell also submitted a declaration stating that she agreed to speak with Loftus only after Loftus had misrepresented her relationship with Corwin. In her declaration, however, Cantrell did not deny making the statements about plaintiff attributed to her by Loftus's declaration.
As discussed above, the Court of Appeal held that the allegations of the complaint and the declarations filed with the trial court relating to Loftus's alleged statement at the October 2002 conference were sufficient to establish a prima facie case with respect to two causes of action: (1) improper public disclosure of private facts, and (2) defamation. We turn first to the public-disclosure-of-private-facts cause of action.
In this court's decision in Shulman, supra, 18 Cal.4th 200, 214, 74 Cal. Rptr.2d 843, 955 P.2d 469, we set forth the elements of the public-disclosure-of-private-facts tort as follows: "(1) public disclosure, (2) of a private fact, (3) which would be offensive and objectionable to the reasonable person, and (4) which is not of legitimate public concern.'" In discussing the fourth element, we explained in *Shulman* that "lack of newsworthiness is an element of the private facts' tort, making newsworthiness a complete bar to common law liability." (Id. at p. 215, 74 Cal. Rptr.2d 843, 955 P.2d 469.)1
Considering the relevant facts revealed by the record in light of the elements of the public-disclosure-of-private-facts tort, we disagree with the Court of Appeal's conclusion that plaintiff established a prima facie case with regard to this tort. To begin with, we have very serious doubts whether either of the statements in question — that Jane Doe engaged in "destructive behavior that I cannot reveal on advice of my attorney," or that Jane Doe is in the Navy — constitutes disclosure of the kind of sufficiently sensitive or intimate private fact "which would be offensive and objectionable to the reasonable person" so as to support a cause of action under the public-disclosure-of-private-facts tort. (See, e.g., Coverstone v. Davies (1952) 38 Cal.2d 315, 323, 239 P.2d 876 [public-disclosure-of-private-facts tort applies to "the unwarranted publication by defendant of intimate details of plaintiffs' lives" (italics added)].)2 We need not decide that question here, however, because unlike the Court of Appeal we conclude that the facts disclosed — relating generally to how the experiences described in the case study may have affected Jane Doe's subsequent conduct and career as an adult — clearly are newsworthy, and for that reason cannot properly be the basis of such a tort action.
Our decision in Shulman discussed the "newsworthiness" standard at some length, and it is useful to review that discussion here. We explained that "courts have generally protected the privacy of otherwise private individuals involved in events of public interest by requiring that a logical nexus exist between the complaining individual and the matter of ... public interest.' [Citation.] The contents of the publication or broadcast are protected only if they have some substantial relevance to a matter of legitimate public interest.' [Citation.] Thus, recent decisions have generally tested newsworthiness with regard to such individuals by assessing the logical relationship or nexus, or the lack thereof, between the events or activities that brought the person into the public eye and the particular facts disclosed.... This approach accords with our own prior decisions, in that it balances the public's right to know against the plaintiff's privacy interest by drawing a protective line at the point the material revealed ceases to have any substantial connection to the subject matter of the newsworthy report. [Citation.] This approach also echoes the Restatement commentators' widely quoted and cited view that legitimate public interest does not include `a morbid and sensational prying into private lives for its own sake ....'" (Shulman, supra, 18 Cal.4th 200, 223-224, 74 Cal.Rptr.2d 843, 955 P.2d 469.)
Shulman also makes it clear that "[a]n analysis measuring newsworthiness of facts about an otherwise private person involuntarily involved in an event of public interest by their relevance to a newsworthy subject matter incorporates considerable deference to reporters and editors.... In general, it is not for a court or jury to say how a particular story is best covered." (Shulman, supra, 18 Cal.4th 200, 224-225, 74 Cal.Rptr.2d 843, 955 P.2d 469, fn. omitted.) "By confining our interference to extreme cases, the courts `avoid[] unduly limiting ... the exercise of effective editorial judgment." (Id. at p. 225, 74 Cal. Rptr.2d 843, 955 P.2d 469.)
Defendants claim that plaintiff in this case, unlike the plaintiff in Shulman, should not be viewed as "an otherwise private person involuntarily involved in an event of public interest," because plaintiff voluntarily consented to have the videotapes of her sessions with Corwin used for educational purposes and set forth in a published article. Plaintiff challenges this view, contending that she gave only limited consent and that the consent should not be treated as having broadly opened her life to intensive scrutiny.
We need not resolve that question because, even if we assume, as plaintiff contends, that plaintiff should be considered "an otherwise private person involuntarily involved in an event of public interest" within the meaning of the Shulman decision (Shulman, supra, 18 Cal.4th 200, 224, 74 Cal.Rptr.2d 843, 955 P.2d 469), we conclude that under the standard set forth in Shulman it is nonetheless clear that the statements here at issue were newsworthy. As discussed above, a number of the commentators whose articles about the Jane Doe case study were published with the Child Maltreatment article itself remarked that it would be important and of interest from an academic standpoint to learn the effects of the events described in the case study upon Jane's future development. In light of the prominence of the Jane Doe case study in the repressed memory field, we find that the disclosure of such facts was newsworthy. This is particularly true because the particular revelations at issue — that Jane Doe engaged in unspecified "destructive behavior" and "is now in the Navy" — were not of an "[i]ntensely personal or intimate" nature. (Cf. Shulman, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 226, 74 Cal.Rptr.2d 843, 955 P.2d 469 ["the balance of free press and privacy interests may require a different conclusion when the intrusiveness of the revelation is greatly disproportionate to its relevance. Intensely personal or intimate revelations might not, in a given case, be considered newsworthy, especially where they bear only slight relevance to a topic of legitimate public concern"].) Under these circumstances, we conclude that the record does not support a determination that plaintiff has established a prima facie case of improper disclosure of private facts based upon Loftus's alleged statement at the October 2002 professional conference.
As noted, in addition to determining that Loftus's alleged statement at the October 2002 conference could support a tort action for improper disclosure of private facts, the Court of Appeal held that this statement also could support a cause of action for defamation against Loftus. For the reasons discussed hereafter, we disagree.
The tort of defamation "involves (a) a publication that is (b) false, (c) defamatory, and (d) unprivileged, and that (e) has a natural tendency to injure or that causes special damage." (5 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law (10th ed. 2005) Torts, § 529, p. 782, citing Civ.Code, §§ 45-46 and cases.)
In concluding that the statement at issue could support a cause of action for defamation, the Court of Appeal held that "this statement is not an expression of opinion or a subjective professional judgment drawn from fully disclosed facts. The truth of the factual assertion that [plaintiff] is in the military is undisputed. However, when viewed in its totality, this challenged statement could reasonably be interpreted as implying that Taus's ongoing destructive behavior or the effects of past behavior make her unfit for military service."
As an initial matter, even if — contrary to Loftus's declaration — the two sentences in question were linked together in a single statement and even if we assume that the statement was reasonably susceptible of the defamatory meaning that Loftus intended to imply that plaintiff was unfit for military service, it appears very doubtful that such a statement properly could be viewed as a statement of fact (which could support a defamation action), rather than an expression of opinion (which cannot). (See, e.g., Gregory v. McDonnell Douglas Corp. (1976) 17 Cal.3d 596, 604, 131 Cal. Rptr. 641, 552 P.2d 425.)
In any event, we conclude that plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case on the defamation claim in light of a factor not raised by the parties or considered by the Court of Appeal — the qualified privilege to which the statements in question are entitled under the so-called common-interest privilege established by Civil Code section 47, subdivision (c)(1). (See generally 5 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law, supra, Torts, §§ 591-594, pp. 867-874.)3
Civil Code section 47, subdivision (c)(1) provides in relevant part: "A privileged publication or broadcast is one made: [¶] ... [¶] (c) In a communication, without malice, to a person interested therein, (1) by one who is also interested...." In light of past California cases applying section 47, subdivision (c)(1), it is clear that the alleged defamatory statement here in question — a statement made by Loftus, a psychology professor and author, at a professional conference attended by other mental health professionals and that was related to the subject of the conference — falls within the reach of this statutory common-interest privilege. (See, e.g., Lundquist v. Reusser (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1193, 1204, 31 Cal.Rptr.2d 776, 875 P.2d 1279 ["The parties do not dispute that the allegedly defamatory statement at issue in the present case, made by defendants at a seminar to persons sharing a common interest in horse breeding, were made upon a `privileged occasion' for purposes of the common-interest privilege"]; Institute of Athletic Motivation v. University of Illinois (1980) 114 Cal.App.3d 1, 7-14, 170 Cal.Rptr. 411 [common-interest privilege applies to letter, criticizing plaintiff's "sports-specific" psychological testing, that was sent by university physical education professor to athletic organizations and sports magazines]; Katz v. Rosen (1975) 48 Cal.App.3d 1032, 121 Cal.Rptr. 853 [common-interest privilege applies to letter sent by defendant to local bar association complaining of plaintiff attorney's conduct]. See generally 2 Smolla, Law of Defamation (2d ed.1997) § 8.56, pp. 8-36 to 8-38; Eldredge, The Law of Defamation (1978) § 87, pp. 481, 484-485.)
Under Civil Code section 47, subdivision (c), defendant generally bears the initial burden of establishing that the statement in question was made on a privileged occasion, and thereafter the burden shifts to plaintiff to establish that the statement was made with malice. (Lundquist v. Reusser, supra, 7 Cal.4th 1193, 1202, 31 Cal.Rptr.2d 776, 875 P.2d 1279.) Because the evidence presented on the motion to strike clearly demonstrates that the statements at the October 2002 conference were made on a privileged occasion, plaintiff bore the burden of establishing a prima facie case that these statements were made with "[a]ctual malice." (Civ. Code, § 48a, subd. 4(d).) As we explained in Sanborn v. Chronicle Pub. Co. (1976) 18 Cal.3d 406, 413, 134 Cal.Rptr. 402, 556 P.2d 764: "`The malice necessary to defeat a qualified privilege is "actual malice" which is established by a showing that the publication was motivated by hatred or ill will towards the plaintiff or by a showing that the defendant lacked reasonable ground for belief in the truth of the publication and thereafter acted in reckless disregard of the plaintiff's rights [citations].'"
In our view, the evidence presented in the trial court on the motion to strike clearly is insufficient to establish a prima facie case of actual malice, that is, to establish that Loftus, in making the alleged statements at the October 2002 conference, acted out of hatred or ill will toward plaintiff or that Loftus lacked a reasonable basis for believing in the truth of her statements. It is undisputed that at the October 2002 conference, Loftus did not reveal either Jane Doe's identity or the details of the "destructive behavior" that plaintiff's foster mother had revealed to Loftus — circumstances that seemingly belie the claim that Loftus acted out of hatred or ill will toward plaintiff. Further, although in her declaration plaintiff explicitly denies engaging in the specific instances of destructive behavior that Loftus alleges she learned from plaintiff's foster mother, plaintiff acknowledges in that declaration that her foster mother may have had concerns that she (plaintiff) had engaged in such conduct. The declaration filed by plaintiff's foster mother, although taking issue with Loftus's conduct in other respects, does not deny that the foster mother made such statements to Loftus. Under these circumstances, we conclude that plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case that Loftus made the alleged defamatory statement in question out of hatred or ill will, or with reckless disregard for the truth of the statements.
Contrary to plaintiff's contention, the factors upon which plaintiff relies to support a claim of malice — principally Loftus's strongly held views on the repressed memory issue, Loftus's persistence in investigating the soundness of Corwin and Olafson's article despite plaintiff's objections, and Loftus's acknowledged displeasure with the ethical complaint that plaintiff filed against her with the University of Washington — are not sufficient to support a determination that Loftus acted with actual malice in making the alleged statements in question at the October 2002 professional conference. The qualified privilege embodied in Civil Code section 47, subdivision (c)(1) is intended to provide substantial protection to statements made on just such an occasion, and the circumstances relied upon by plaintiff fall far short of providing an adequate basis for finding that Loftus made these statements with actual malice. (Accord, Weingarten v. Block (1980) 102 Cal.App.3d 129, 144-151, 162 Cal.Rptr. 701.)
Accordingly, we conclude that plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case with regard to a cause of action for defamation based upon the statements alleged to have been made by Loftus at the October 2002 conference.
In sum, we conclude that the Court of Appeal erred in permitting plaintiff's action to go forward with respect to Loftus's alleged statements at the October 2002 conference, either as a cause of action for public disclosure of private facts or for defamation.
We next address the Court of Appeal's holding that plaintiff properly could pursue a cause of action for improper public disclosure of private facts based upon Loftus's disclosure of the initials of plaintiff's first and last names at a deposition in an unrelated case. As we explain, we conclude that the Court of Appeal erred in determining that plaintiff had established a probability of prevailing on such a claim.
The facts underlying this claim can be briefly summarized. During a deposition in an unrelated case in which Loftus had been retained as an expert witness, a question arose regarding Loftus's recent move from a professorship at the University of Washington to a position at the University of California at Irvine, and the plaintiff's counsel in that proceeding asked Loftus whether she knew the name of the person who had filed a complaint against her with the University of Washington. Loftus answered: "I do know her name, but I would rather protect her privacy." The deposition continued as follows:
"Q: Can you give me the initials?
"A: Well, she's called Jane Doe in the article.
"Q: I see.
"A: But her real initials are N.T.
"Q: Okay.
"A: I mean, I just didn't want her name floating around in a public record."
As noted, the Court of Appeal held that Loftus's disclosure of plaintiff's initials could support a claim for improper public disclosure of private facts. The court based its determination on its view that plaintiff's identity was not a matter of public interest, and because the revelation of plaintiff's initials was a "clue" to the true identity of Jane Doe, the Court of Appeal concluded that "a reasonable jury could find that disclosing this information was both offensive and objectionable."
For several reasons, we disagree with the Court of Appeal's conclusion that Loftus's disclosure of plaintiff's initials during the deposition properly can provide support for a tort cause of action for improper public disclosure of private facts. First, even if we assume that the appellate court was correct in concluding that the identity of the subject of the case study discussed in the Child Maltreatment article was not a matter of public interest — an issue that we need not, and do not, decide — we believe it is clear that the mere disclosure of plaintiff's initials could not properly be considered to constitute a public disclosure of her identity so as to support an action for public disclosure of private facts.4
Second, it is clear in any event that Loftus's disclosure of plaintiff's initials at the deposition cannot support a claim for improper disclosure of private facts because the deposition occurred on March 1, 2003, more than two weeks after plaintiff filed the initial complaint in the present case (on February 13, 2003) in which plaintiff herself provided her full name and identified herself as the person who had been identified as Jane Doe in the Child Maltreatment and Skeptical Inquirer articles. Thus, at the time of the deposition in question, plaintiff already had revealed her true identity, and Loftus's deposition answer clearly did not disclose a private fact whose revelation could be the basis for the imposition of liability under the public-disclosure-of-private-facts tort. (See, e.g., Sipple v. Chronicle Publishing Co. (1984) 154 Cal.App.3d 1040, 1047, 201 Cal.Rptr. 665 ["there is no liability when the defendant merely gives further publicity to information about the plaintiff which is already public"].)
Accordingly, the Court of Appeal erred in determining that Loftus's disclosure of plaintiff's initials during the deposition in question properly could provide support for a cause of action for public disclosure of private facts.
We next consider the Court of Appeal's holding that plaintiff properly could proceed with a cause of action for a distinct invasion-of-privacy tort — the tort of intrusion into private matters — based upon defendants' allegedly improper action in obtaining confidential court records.
In our decision in Shulman, supra, 18 Cal.4th 200, 231, 74 Cal.Rptr.2d 843, 955 P.2d 469, we explained that California decisions have adopted the formulation of the intrusion-into-private-matters tort set forth in section 652B of the Restatement (Second) of Torts: "One who intentionally intrudes, physically or otherwise, upon the solitude or seclusion of another or his private affairs or concerns, is subject to liability to the other for invasion of privacy, if the intrusion would be highly offensive to a reasonable person." In briefly encapsulating this formulation in Shulman, we stated that "the action for intrusion has two elements: (1) intrusion into a private place, conversation or matter, (2) in a manner highly offensive to a reasonable person." (Shulman, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 231, 74 Cal.Rptr.2d 843, 955 P.2d 469.) As explained in Shulman's full discussion of this tort, however, the opinion's concise two-part restatement of the elements of the tort was not intended to alter either the Restatement's requirement that the intrusion upon another's privacy be intentional, or the Restatement's recognition that the tort includes not only highly offensive intentional intrusions into another person's private place or conversation but also highly offensive intentional intrusions upon another person's private affairs or concerns. With regard to the latter point, the opinion in Shulman observed: "To prove actionable intrusion, the plaintiff must show the defendant penetrated some zone of physical or sensory privacy surrounding, or obtained unwanted access to data about, the plaintiff. The tort is proven only if the plaintiff had an objectively reasonable expectation of seclusion or solitude in the place, conversation or data source." (Id. at p. 232, 74 Cal. Rptr.2d 843, 955 P.2d 469, italics added.)
As noted, plaintiff contended in the Court of Appeal that she had established a prima facie case for purposes of the intrusion-into-private-matters tort based upon defendants' action in collecting and utilizing private information concerning plaintiff contained in both public and confidential court files. The Court of Appeal recognized that plaintiff's claim is untenable insofar as it is based upon defendants' examination and disclosure of medical or other reports contained in court records that are open to the public, even if the information in the reports otherwise might be thought of as private information. (See, e.g., Gates v. Discovery Communications, Inc. (2004) 34 Cal.4th 679, 692, 21 Cal.Rptr.3d 663, 101 P.3d 552 ["`the States may not impose sanctions on the publication of truthful information contained in official court records open to public inspection'" quoting Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn (1975) 420 U.S. 469, 495, 95 S.Ct. 1029]; Shulman, supra, 18 Cal.4th 200, 231, 74 Cal.Rptr.2d 843, 955 P.2d 469.) The Court of Appeal went on to hold, however, that the record before the trial court could support a claim that defendants obtained private information from court records in Solano County relating to plaintiff's juvenile dependency file that were not open to the public, and the Court of Appeal found that a cause of action for intrusion into private matters could be based upon such alleged conduct.
In reaching the latter conclusion, the Court of Appeal relied upon a statement contained in a declaration filed by Harvey Shapiro, whose private investigation company, Shapiro Investigations, had been hired by Loftus to search court records in Solano County. In his declaration, Shapiro stated that one of his assistants had copied "voluminous public records" on file in the Solano County court. In concluding that this statement was sufficient to establish a prima facie case that defendants had obtained information from confidential court files, the Court of Appeal apparently assumed that the only court records in Solano County that contained information regarding plaintiff were confidential juvenile dependency records relating to her. Based on this assumption, the Court of Appeal determined that although Shapiro's declaration explicitly referred only to his assistant's examination of "public records," the declaration nonetheless would support a conclusion that defendants somehow had obtained copies of confidential court records in Solano County.
After the Court of Appeal filed its opinion, defendants sought rehearing in that court on the ground that the appellate court's conclusion on this issue was based on an erroneous premise. In conjunction with the rehearing petition, defendants requested that the Court of Appeal take judicial notice of voluminous records from a number of non-juvenile-dependency proceedings in Solano County — including a guardianship proceeding and a wrongful death action brought on plaintiff's behalf — that are properly open to the public and that contain substantial information relating to plaintiff. The Court of Appeal denied rehearing as well as the request for judicial notice.
After we granted review, defendants filed a motion requesting that this court take judicial notice of the records in question. Under Evidence Code section 452, a court may take judicial notice of the records of any court of this state, and the records in question are relevant to the question whether plaintiff has presented sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case that defendants improperly obtained private information about plaintiff from confidential court records. Accordingly, we have granted the motion to take judicial notice of the proffered court records.
In light of the court records from Solano County presented by defendants, we conclude that the Court of Appeal erred in suggesting that the Shapiro declaration itself would support a conclusion that defendants collected information about plaintiff from confidential court records. The Solano County records in question are court records that are open to the public and that contain numerous references to plaintiff's true identity and also identify Cantrell as plaintiff's foster mother. (The wrongful death action that is included in the Solano County court records was filed on behalf of plaintiff by Cantrell as plaintiff's guardian ad litem.) Plaintiff failed to present any evidence in opposition to the motion to strike that would indicate that Shapiro, his assistant, or anyone else improperly obtained access to confidential court files.
Under these circumstances, we conclude that the Court of Appeal erred in holding that plaintiff had established a prima facie case of intrusion into private matters based upon defendants' collection and dissemination of information contained in the Solano County court records.
Finally, we reach what appears to be plaintiff's most substantial claim — the claim that Loftus committed the tort of intrusion into private matters in obtaining personal information about plaintiff from plaintiff's former foster mother, Margie Cantrell, by intentionally misrepresenting her (Loftus's) relationship with Corwin. The Court of Appeal held that the evidence before the trial court was sufficient to permit this cause of action to go forward.
The facts relevant to this claim are contained in three declarations that were before the trial court: (1) a declaration of Cantrell, filed in conjunction with the opposition to the motion to dismiss; (2) a supplemental declaration of Loftus, filed in conjunction with the reply to the opposition; and (3) a declaration by Harvey Shapiro (the private investigator whose company was hired by Loftus, who arranged a meeting between Loftus and Cantrell), filed in support of the motion to dismiss. As we shall see, the version of the relevant events set forth in Cantrell's declaration sharply conflicts with the version described in the Loftus and Shapiro declarations.
In her declaration, Cantrell states that she was plaintiff's foster mother in the early 1990's during plaintiff's adolescence, that she met Corwin during this period and "knew that he and Nicole had a professional relationship related to her past history of child abuse and the painful breakup of her parents' marriage," and that she "found Dr. Corwin to be polite and respectful and considerate of Nicole's feelings." Cantrell further states that in late 1997 she was contacted by Loftus, who allegedly represented to Cantrell "that she was working with David Corwin, M.D. to help Nicole" and who asked Cantrell "to come down to an office located in town to answer a few questions." Cantrell states in her declaration that "[g]iven my past contacts with Dr. Corwin, and my understanding of Nicole's trust in him, I accepted the invitation in order to help Nicole in any way that I could."
Cantrell indicates in her declaration that when she arrived for the interview with Loftus, Loftus was seated in a room with a man. When Cantrell entered and introduced herself, "Dr. Loftus smiled and welcomed me, saying again that she was working with Dr. Corwin and was actually his supervisor in connection with the study of Nicole." According to Cantrell's declaration: "Dr. Loftus asked if she could record the interview on audiotape," and "relying entirely on [Loftus's] representations that she worked with Dr. Corwin," Cantrell agreed. The declaration continues: "The questioning lasted several hours I believe. During the course of the interview the questioning about Nicole seemed to become increasingly hostile. I became concerned and asked Dr. Loftus if she really worked with Dr. Corwin or something to that effect.... I recall that my confrontation caused a reaction on the part of both the man and the woman. I told them that I felt that they had not been honest with me and asked them what they were really doing. They did not respond. I became frightened.... I demanded that they turn the recording machine off. I believe that they did so.... I demanded that they give me the tape. They refused.... I left immediately, extremely upset."
Cantrell further states in her declaration that after subsequently learning from Corwin that Loftus was not associated with him, "I felt humiliated because I had been talking about Nicole's confidential matters with someone I was led to believe was bound to respect her confidentiality." Cantrell states that "[s]ince this incident, Nicole and I have become estranged," and that "I am informed that, because of the interview, Nicole believes that I am no longer trustworthy. This saddens me deeply." Cantrell further indicates that "I would never have consented to be interviewed by [Loftus] if she had disclosed her true identity and focus and would have said nothing about Nicole without Nicole's full knowing and voluntary consent."
After the Cantrell declaration was filed, Loftus filed a supplemental declaration that stated in relevant part: "I unequivocally deny that I ever represented myself to Ms. Cantrell — or anyone else — as working with David Corwin, M.D.' or that I in any way implied or suggested that I was his supervisor' or words to this effect. Ms. Cantrell may possibly have misunderstood me when I undoubtedly mentioned Dr. Corwin's interviews with Plaintiff. However, again, I in no way represented myself as associated with Dr. Corwin nor would I."
Loftus's supplemental declaration continues: "Further, as the interview with Ms. Cantrell was never tape-recorded — nor, to my knowledge, was a tape-recorder even present — the statements in the declaration ... that refer to a tape-recording simply make no sense. Finally, in her declaration, Ms. Cantrell declares that the interview became hostile' and that she became frightened' and that she was extremely upset' and that she left immediately.' This characterization of our interview is entirely inconsistent with my recollection of our lengthy interview that day which was concluded when Ms. Cantrell posed for photographs with Mr. Shapiro who she knew already and with me."
The Shapiro declaration, which was filed prior to Cantrell's declaration as an exhibit to defendants' initial motion to strike, provides additional information regarding the events leading up to Loftus's interview with Cantrell. In his declaration, Shapiro states that Cantrell first came to his office in July 1997, prior to and with regard to a matter totally unrelated to the matter in which he subsequently was hired by Loftus. In September 1997, Loftus contacted Shapiro and requested his help in identifying the Jane Doe referred to in the Corwin article, involving a case that Loftus believed may have originated in Solano County. Shapiro assigned one of his assistants to search public records at the Solano County Clerk's Office, and in searching relevant court records the assistant discovered a name (Margie Cantrell) that was familiar to the assistant. In a subsequent telephone conversation between Shapiro and Loftus, Loftus expressed interest in meeting Cantrell, and Shapiro's declaration states that "[s]erendipitously, Ms. Cantrell was in my office speaking to one of my staff, during my conference with [P]rofessor Loftus."
Shapiro's declaration continues: "When [P]rofessor Loftus asked if I could arrange a meeting between Professor Loftus and Ms. Cantrell, I immediately went to where Ms. Cantrell was speaking with one of my staff and asked Ms. Cantrell if she would be willing to discuss her work as a foster mother with a friend of mine.... Ms. Cantrell was delighted to speak about her work as a foster mother and agreed to meet within the next few days.... Several days later, on September 27, 1997, my assistant ..., [P]rofessor Loftus, and I met with Ms. Margie Cantrell, in my Fairfield, California office.... Ms. Cantrell was delighted to be interviewed, provided four hours of information and gave [P]rofessor Loftus a great many details, including names, addresses and such of and concerning Plaintiff Nicole Taus." Finally, the Shapiro declaration additionally states: "Subsequent to her interview, Ms. Cantrell returned to my office with photos and more information of and concerning Plaintiff Nicole Taus."
As these declarations reveal, there is a sharp conflict in the evidence in the record regarding whether Loftus represented herself to Cantrell as working with or associated with Dr. Corwin. Cantrell asserts that Loftus repeatedly made such a representation; Loftus vigorously denies making any such representation. At the present stage of the proceeding, we have no occasion to resolve this conflict. As we have explained above (ante, 54 Cal.Rptr.3d at pp. 798-799, 151 P.3d at pp. 1204-1205), under the standard set forth in past cases interpreting and applying section 425.16, an action may not be dismissed under this statute if the plaintiff has presented admissible evidence that, if believed by the trier of fact, would support a cause of action against the defendant. (See, e.g., Wilson v. Parker, Covert & Chidester, supra, 28 Cal.4th 811, 821, 123 Cal.Rptr.2d 19, 50 P.3d 733.) Accordingly, although it is certainly possible that a trier of fact could find that Cantrell's version of the asserted events has been distorted by her acknowledged desire to regain the lost trust and confidence of plaintiff (her former foster daughter), at this juncture our role is limited to determining only whether, if the trier of fact were to find that Loftus made the alleged misrepresentations to Cantrell in order to obtain personal information concerning plaintiff and obtained such information by virtue of those misrepresentations, this conduct would be sufficient to support a cause of action by plaintiff for the tort of intrusion into private matters.
As discussed above, in order to prevail on an intrusion-into-private-matters cause of action, a plaintiff must establish that the defendant intentionally intruded into a private place, conversation, or matter in a manner highly offensive to a reasonable person. (See, ante, 54 Cal.Rptr.3d at pp. 807-808, 151 P.3d at p. 1212; Shulman, supra, 18 Cal.4th 200, 231, 74 Cal. Rptr.2d 843, 955 P.2d 469.) Further, as explained in Shulman, "[t]o prove actionable intrusion, the plaintiff must show the defendant penetrated some zone of physical or sensory privacy surrounding, or obtained unwanted access to data about, the plaintiff. The tort is proven only if the plaintiff had an objectively reasonable expectation of seclusion or solitude in the place, conversation, or data source." (Id. at p. 232, 74 Cal.Rptr.2d 843, 955 P.2d 469.)
The initial question is whether the asserted facts demonstrate that Loftus intruded into a private place, conversation, or matter as to which plaintiff possessed a reasonable expectation of privacy. Loftus's alleged conduct did not involve entering a private place such as plaintiff's home or hospital room or tapping her phone, but rather interviewing her former foster mother (Cantrell), whose identity Loftus learned from publicly available court records. Defendants contend that plaintiff had no "objectively reasonable expectation of seclusion or solitude" in the "data source" here, because Cantrell was free to disclose sensitive and personal facts that she knew about plaintiff.
In support of this contention, defendants rely on, among other cases, Humphers v. First Interstate Bank of Oregon (1985) 298 Or. 706, 696 P.2d 527, a leading decision in this area authored by Justice Hans Linde. In Humphers, the plaintiff was a biological mother who had given up a daughter for adoption and had not generally revealed the matter to others, relying on state law providing confidentiality for such adoption records. When the daughter was 17 years of age, she sought and found the physician who had admitted her mother to the hospital. The physician agreed to help the daughter find her biological mother, revealed the mother's prior name to the daughter, and also prepared a false statement indicating that the physician had administered a medication to her mother that made it important for the daughter to locate her biological mother. Using the statement provided by the physician, the daughter was able to obtain the sealed medical records of the adoption, and then ultimately was able to locate her biological mother. The biological mother was very upset by this development, allegedly suffering emotional distress, humiliation, embarrassment, and an inability to function normally, and thereafter brought the action in question against the estate of her former physician (who had died in the interim), seeking to recover on a variety of causes of action, including one for breach of confidence and another for offensive intrusion upon her privacy, based upon the physician's disclosure of the mother's identity to her daughter.
In Humphers, the Oregon Supreme Court concluded that, on these facts, the mother could recover from the physician's estate for breach of confidence, but that a cause of action would not lie for improper intrusion. The court in Humphers held that although a defendant who was under a legal obligation not to reveal information — as was the physician in this case, because the information was confidential and privileged — could be held liable for breach of confidence, when information known by one person concerning another person is not protected under the law by any such rule of confidentiality, the person who reveals the information cannot be held liable for unauthorized intrusion upon privacy, because he or she is under no legal obligation to keep the information private. (See Humphers, supra, 298 Or. 706, 696 P.2d 527, 529-533.)
The decision in Humphers, supra, 298 Or. 706, 696 P.2d 527, is distinguishable from the present case in a significant respect. In Humphers, the intrusion-into-private-matters action was brought against the person who revealed the information (there, the physician), and the court's rejection of a cause of action for intrusion was based on a reluctance to define the intrusion tort so expansively as to impose liability upon a person simply for revealing information that the person was under no specific legal obligation to maintain confidential. (See id. at pp. 529-530, 532-533.) In the present case, by contrast, plaintiff is not suing Cantrell — the person who disclosed the personal information about her — but rather is suing an investigator who allegedly utilized a misrepresentation to obtain personal information concerning plaintiff from Cantrell. The rationale underlying the court's rejection of an intrusion cause of action in Humphers does not necessarily apply to the present setting. Indeed, the court in Humphers was careful to point out in its opinion that although "[t]he [intentional] use of a false medical document to gain access to the [mother's medical] records" might well give rise to liability, "[the plaintiff's daughter] is not a defendant here, and the complaint does not allege that she asked [the doctor] to prepare a false letter or knew that it was false." (Humphers, supra, 298 Or. 706, 696 P.2d 527, 533, fn. 13.)
Accordingly, although we agree, as Humphers and numerous other cases teach, that a person generally has no right to maintain an action for improper intrusion against a relative or close friend for voluntarily disclosing personal information about him or her to another, it does not necessarily follow that no violation of a person's reasonable expectation of privacy occurs when a third party — for example, a private investigator — obtains access to personal information about the person from his or her relatives or friends by utilizing improper and unanticipated means, particularly when such information would not have been disclosed by the relative or friend absent the third party's use of such means. As a matter of common experience, there is a significant difference between the disappointment one feels when a relative or friend reveals one's personal secrets, and the affront to one's personal integrity and individual dignity (see Shulman, supra, 18 Cal.4th 200, 231, 74 Cal.Rptr.2d 843, 955 P.2d 469) that results when a third party, with whom one has no personal relationship, uses improper and unauthorized means to obtain access to such personal, private information. As we pointed out in Sanders v. American Broadcasting Companies (1999) 20 Cal.4th 907, 916, 85 Cal.Rptr.2d 909, 978 P.2d 67, "privacy, for purposes of the intrusion tort, is not a binary, all-or-nothing characteristic. There are degrees and nuances to societal recognition of our expectations of privacy: the fact that the privacy one expects in a given setting is not complete or absolute does not render the expectation unreasonable as a matter of law." In Sanders itself, we held that an employee who lacked a reasonable expectation of complete privacy in workplace conversations because they could be seen and overheard by coworkers (but not by the general public) nonetheless could maintain a cause of action for intrusion into private matters against a television reporter who, in pursuit of a story, obtained employment in the workplace and thereafter covertly videotaped numerous workplace conversations. (20 Cal.4th at pp. 914-923, 85 Cal.Rptr.2d 909, 978 P.2d 67.)
As already noted, in discussing the intrusion-into-private-matters tort in Shulman, supra, 18 Cal.4th 200, 230-232, 74 Cal.Rptr.2d 843, 955 P.2d 469, we explained that the California decisions applying this tort have drawn heavily upon the description of the tort in section 652B of the Restatement Second of Torts. One of the illustrative examples accompanying this section makes clear that an action for intrusion properly can be based upon a defendant's obtaining personal information about the plaintiff from another person or entity by improper means. Illustration 4 of comment b to section 652B states: "A is seeking evidence for use in a civil action he is bringing against B. He goes to the bank in which B has his personal account, exhibits a forged court order, and demands to be allowed to examine the bank's records of the account. The bank submits to the order and permits him to do so. A has invaded B's privacy." (Rest.2d Torts, § 652B, com. b, pp. 378-379; see also, e.g., Zimmermann v. Wilson (3d Cir.1936) 81 F.2d 847, 849 [one of the cases upon which illustration 4 is based: "We rest on substance when we regard the right of Zimmermann and his wife ... as the real parties in interest, and their bankers and brokers as mere agents.... It is the information the bankers' books contain, and not the books in which that information is recorded, that is the property right ... this court protects by injunctive relief.... [W]e regard the search here asserted as a violation of the natural law of privacy in one's own affairs which exists in liberty loving people and nations"]; Swarthout v. Mutual Service Life Ins. Co. (Minn.Ct. App.2001) 632 N.W.2d 741, 745 [action for intrusion could be maintained against insurance company that, without the insured's permission, added the names of an additional physician and medical clinic to a medical release form signed by the insured, and that employed the altered form to obtain medical information from those additional sources]; Corcoran v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. (Mo.Ct.App.1978) 572 S.W.2d 212, 215-216 [actionable intrusion tort stated where defendant obtained plaintiff's phone bill from the telephone company by deception and opened the bill without plaintiff's permission].)
Although none of the foregoing cases involved an instance in which a defendant utilized a misrepresentation or some other improper means to obtain private information about a person from a relative or friend (rather than, for example, from a bank or telephone company), nothing in those cases suggests that a person forfeits his or her reasonable expectation of privacy in the "private affairs or concerns" that the intrusion tort was designed to protect (Rest.2d Torts, § 652B) by, for example, storing private papers or sharing very personal information with a relative or close friend. Although in such an instance the person assumes the risk, for purposes of the intrusion tort, that the relative or friend may betray his or her confidence by voluntarily disclosing the information, there is no reason to conclude that the person does not retain a reasonable expectation of privacy that may be violated when a third party defendant, by intentionally engaging in improper and unforeseen conduct, gains unauthorized and unwanted access to such information from such a relative or friend. Just as the plaintiff in Sanders v. American Broadcasting Companies, supra, 20 Cal.4th 907, 85 Cal.Rptr.2d 909, 978 P.2d 67, retained a reasonable expectation of privacy that was violated when his conversations with coemployees in a nonpublic workplace were covertly videotaped by an undercover journalist, and just as a person retains a reasonable expectation of privacy that is violated when a third party defendant, by wiretapping a phone conversation or surreptitiously recording an in-person conversation, gains access to private information that the person has chosen to share with another person, a person similarly retains a reasonable expectation of privacy that may be violated when a third-party defendant, by engaging in improper and unforeseen conduct, gains access to private information about the person from the person's relative or friend.
As a general matter, of course, a person's relatives and close friends frequently are privy to a great deal of the person's most private personal and family secrets — including, for example, potentially embarrassing and harmful information concerning the person's medical condition, the person's sexual activities and orientation, whether the person has been subjected to sexual or physical abuse either within his or her family or otherwise, and the person's youthful indiscretions or misbehavior. Unlike a person's appearance or activities that occur in a public place (see, e.g., Aisenson v. American Broadcasting Co. (1990) 220 Cal.App.3d 146, 162-163, 269 Cal.Rptr. 379), and unlike personal information about a person that is contained in a public record open to inspection by the general public as a matter of law (Rest.2d Torts, § 652B, com. c., pp. 379-380; Gates v. Discovery Communications, Inc., supra, 34 Cal.4th 679, 692, 21 Cal.Rptr.3d 663, 101 P.3d 552), personal information about a person that happens to be known by the person's relatives or close friends is not information that has entered the public domain. A person's interest in preserving the privacy of such information — the very interest the intrusion tort was designed to protect — would be substantially undermined if a would-be investigator could employ any means whatsoever to extract or obtain such private information from a relative or close friend.
To put forth a few extreme examples, it is clear that a person's reasonable expectation of privacy would be violated if a private investigator — who was determined to obtain private information about the person that was otherwise unavailable to the investigator — broke into the home of a relative or close friend of the target of the investigation and copied a diary or other private papers that the target had left with the relative or friend for safekeeping, or, alternatively, physically threatened, blackmailed, wiretapped, hypnotized, or administered a drug to such a relative or friend to obtain private information about the target that the relative or friend would not have voluntarily disclosed. (See, e.g., Sheets v. Salt Lake County (10th Cir.1995) 45 F.3d 1383, 1388 [holding that the plaintiff husband had a reasonable expectation of privacy in entries in his wife's diary that related to him: "The fact that Mr. Sheets did not author the information does not prohibit him from having a distinct privacy interest in the dissemination of information written about the personal aspects of his life.... [¶] ... We find that information conveyed to one's spouse or that one's spouse has observed about one's character, marriage, finances, and business to be personal in nature and subject to a reasonable expectation of privacy"].)5 Although in each of those instances the relative or friend would be able to pursue his or her own distinct tort cause of action against the private investigator, in many cases the most serious harm or damage will have been incurred by the person whose private information was the target of and the impetus for the intrusive misconduct, and the intrusion-into-private-matters tort is specifically intended to provide a remedy to the person who has sustained an invasion of his or her privacy by virtue of the misconduct. (Accord, Zimmermann v. Wilson, supra, 81 F.2d 847, 849 ["We rest on substance when we regard the right of Zimmermann and his wife ... as the real parties in interest, and their bankers and brokers as mere agents.... It is the information the bankers' books contain, and not the books in which that information is recorded, that is the property right ... this court protects by injunctive relief"].)
In the present case, Loftus was seeking to obtain from Cantrell, plaintiff's former foster mother, personal information about plaintiff relating both to plaintiff's memory of ostensible sexual abuse to which plaintiff had been subjected as a child by her mother, and to the effect of plaintiff's asserted recovery of that memory on plaintiff's subsequent behavior and emotional well-being — certainly the type of information as to which a person ordinarily would possess a reasonable expectation of privacy. (In this regard, it is relevant to recall that at the time Cantrell agreed to speak to Loftus about these matters, the fact that plaintiff was the "Jane Doe" referred to in Corwin and Olafson's 1997 Child Maltreatment article, or, indeed, the circumstance that plaintiff assertedly had been sexually abused as a child, was not a matter of general or public knowledge.) Furthermore, as revealed by Loftus's declaration, through her questioning of Cantrell, Loftus was able to obtain access to previously undisclosed information concerning plaintiff's alleged promiscuity and drug use following her 1995 session with Corwin — again, the kind of very personal and potentially embarrassing or detrimental information as to which a person ordinarily would possess a reasonable expectation of privacy.
Of course, unlike some of the hypothetical scenarios described above, in the present case Loftus did not obtain access to this very personal information about plaintiff by breaking into Cantrell's home or by wiretapping her telephone, but instead obtained the information by questioning Cantrell. Because plaintiff had agreed to permit Corwin to use her case study at educational seminars and in an article published in a scientific journal — albeit without identifying plaintiff by name — it may well be that plaintiff could not have had an objectively reasonable expectation that an investigator or academic researcher, like Loftus, would not discover her identity and pose probing questions to Cantrell relating to such personal matters. In any event, because, as explained below, as a matter of law Loftus's simple engagement in such questioning would not constitute "highly offensive" conduct (see post, 54 Cal.Rptr.3d at p. 818, 151 P.3d at p. 1220), it is clear that plaintiff would have no cause of action under the intrusion tort if, in response to such questioning by Loftus, Cantrell freely and voluntarily revealed this personal information about plaintiff to Loftus.
According to Cantrell's declaration, however, Loftus did not simply approach Cantrell with questions about plaintiff, but instead misrepresented her (Loftus's) relationship with Corwin (a psychiatrist with whom plaintiff had a friendly and trusting professional relationship) — stating that she (Loftus) was Corwin's associate or supervisor — in order to persuade Cantrell to disclose personal information about plaintiff to Loftus. If Loftus engaged in such behavior, we cannot say, as a matter of law, that such questionable and unorthodox action constitutes conduct that plaintiff reasonably should have foreseen or anticipated. Instead, we believe a jury could find that plaintiff reasonably expected that an investigator would not seek and obtain access to such personal information about her from a relative or friend by falsely posing as an associate or supervisor of a mental health professional in whom plaintiff had confided.
As we explained in Sanders v. American Broadcasting Companies, supra, 20 Cal.4th 907, 918, 85 Cal.Rptr.2d 909, 978 P.2d 67, "[p]rivacy, for purposes of the intrusion tort[,] must be evaluated with respect to the identity of the alleged intruder and the nature of the intrusion." Taking those factors into account, we believe that a jury reasonably could find that if, as Cantrell asserts, Loftus obtained private, personal information about plaintiff by misrepresenting herself to Cantrell as Corwin's associate or supervisor, Loftus's conduct violated plaintiff's reasonable expectation of privacy. (Accord Sanders, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 926, 85 Cal.Rptr.2d 909, 978 P.2d 67 ["Because ... the reasonableness of a privacy expectation must be assessed in reference to the identity of the intruder and the nature of the claimed intrusion, the proper question for the jury to decide was, indeed, whether plaintiff could reasonably expect he would not be secretly videotaped in his internal workplace interactions by a representative of the mass media"].)6
The question remains whether a trier of fact properly could determine that the alleged conduct here at issue constituted "highly offensive conduct" that can be the basis for tort liability, or whether, as a matter of policy, such conduct should be considered, as a matter of law, not highly offensive for purposes of the intrusion tort.
In discussing this general subject in Shulman, supra, 18 Cal.4th 200, 236-237, 74 Cal.Rptr.2d 843, 955 P.2d 469, our decision explained that the use of ""routine... reporting techniques,"' such as asking questions of people with information (including those with confidential or restricted information') could rarely, if ever, be deemed an actionable intrusion." (Shulman, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 237, 74 Cal. Rptr.2d 843, 955 P.2d 469; accord, e.g., Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co. (1979) 443 U.S. 97, 103, 99 S.Ct. 2667, 61 L.Ed.2d 399 [the First Amendment protects the right of journalists to obtain information using "routine newspaper reporting techniques"].) At the same time, we observed in Shulman that "violation of well-established legal areas of physical or sensory privacy — trespass into a home or tapping a personal telephone line, for example — could rarely, if ever, be justified by a reporter's need to get the story.... [¶] Between these extremes lie difficult cases...." (Shulman, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 237, 74 Cal.Rptr.2d 843, 955 P.2d 469.)
As already noted, in the present case the investigative conduct of Loftus at issue consisted of asking questions of a person who possessed information concerning plaintiff rather than intruding into plaintiff's home or tapping her phone. As the passage from Shulman, supra, 18 Cal.4th 200, 237, 74 Cal.Rptr.2d 843, 955 P.2d 469, quoted above makes clear, Loftus would not be subject to liability under the intrusion tort if she simply posed questions concerning plaintiff to Cantrell — even questions probing into highly personal matters relating to plaintiff — and Cantrell voluntarily had provided such information. As we have seen, however, Cantrell's declaration asserts that Loftus did not simply inquire about plaintiff but rather misrepresented her (Loftus's) relationship with Corwin — stating she was Corwin's associate or supervisor — in order to obtain sensitive information concerning plaintiff. Loftus, as we have noted, emphatically denies making any such misrepresentation, but in view of the procedural posture of this case we are limited to determining only whether, if a jury were to find that Loftus made such a misrepresentation to Cantrell, tort liability could be imposed on Loftus for improper intrusion on plaintiff's privacy.
An amicus curiae brief filed in this court on behalf of a number of news media entities and organizations cautions against permitting a cause of action for intrusion to be based solely on uncorroborated allegations made — by a "source" interviewed by a reporter or other investigator — that assert the reporter or investigator obtained information from the source through misrepresentation. The amicus curiae brief argues that in many instances in which a reporter utilizes information obtained from a source to write an article that the source ultimately is unhappy with, the source may claim, after the fact, that the reporter — to obtain the information disclosed in the article — failed to be forthright in disclosing his or her motives, position, or point of view to the source.7 The brief maintains that permitting a subject about whom unflattering information has been obtained from a third party source to sue the reporter or investigator for offensive intrusion into the subject's privacy on the basis of such a claim of misrepresentation would have an undesirable chilling effect on the gathering and publication of newsworthy material.8 The amicus curiae brief points to a number of cases that have rejected a cause of action for intrusion based on information revealed by a third party, even in circumstances in which the plaintiff alleged that a reporter or investigator employed some sort of fraud or subterfuge to obtain the information. (See, e.g., Desnick v. American Broadcasting Co. (7th Cir.1995) 44 F.3d 1345, 1351-1355; Rifkin v. Esquire Publ'g (C.D.Cal.1982) 1982 U.S.Dist.LEXIS 18405.)
The concerns raised by the amicus curiae brief appear quite reasonable and clearly demonstrate the danger and inadvisability of adopting a broad rule under which any type of misrepresentation by a reporter, investigator, or scholar to obtain information would be considered sufficient to support a cause of action for intrusion into private matters.
At the same time, however, we believe it is important to recognize that there are at least some types of misrepresentations that are of such an especially egregious and offensive nature — and are quite distinguishable from the types of ruses that ordinarily may be employed in gathering news — that they properly may be considered "beyond the pale" for purposes of the intrusion tort, even when the misrepresentation is made to friends or relatives of the subject of an inquiry who are under no legal obligation not to reveal private information about the subject of the inquiry. For example, consider an instance in which an unscrupulous or overly ambitious investigative reporter or private investigator, interested in discovering whether a public official (or any other person) has a particular medical condition or is taking a specific medication, makes a telephone call to a spouse, adult child, or close friend of the official, pretends to be an emergency room physician or paramedic, and asks the relative or friend to disclose the medical information ostensibly to assist in the treatment of the official. Even though (1) a public official's right of privacy is limited in many respects, (2) the information in question, because of the official's position, might well be considered "newsworthy" for publication purposes, and (3) the relative or friend might be under no legal obligation to keep the information confidential, we believe a jury reasonably could find that this type of misrepresentation is "highly offensive" to a reasonable person and that the subject of the inquiry had an "objectively reasonable expectation of seclusion or solitude in the ... data source" (Shulman, supra, 18 Cal.4th 200, 232, 74 Cal.Rptr.2d 843, 955 P.2d 469) that was violated by the investigator's use of such a tactic to obtain private information from a relative or friend who would not have divulged the information but for the flagrant nature of the misrepresentation.
The alleged misrepresentation at issue in the present case, of course, is not as egregious as that described in the foregoing hypothetical example, but the asserted misrepresentation in question nonetheless is of a particularly serious and potentially offensive nature that does share a number of the troubling aspects of that hypothetical. As noted, Cantrell's declaration states that Loftus misrepresented herself as associated with — indeed even the supervisor of — Corwin, a psychiatrist in whom Cantrell knew plaintiff had confided and with whom plaintiff had an on-going, friendly professional relationship. Cantrell states in her declaration that Loftus's asserted misrepresentation led Cantrell to believe that Loftus "was bound to respect [plaintiff's] confidentiality" and that she (Cantrell) "never would have consented to be interviewed by [Loftus] if [Loftus] had disclosed her true identity and focus and [that she (Cantrell)] would have said nothing about [plaintiff] without [plaintiff's] full knowing and voluntary consent." And Loftus's declaration discloses that in the course of her interview with Cantrell, Cantrell revealed a number of highly private matters regarding plaintiff that a parental figure who cared about her foster child's welfare ordinarily would not be expected to disclose to a stranger — for example, that in 1995, shortly after apparently recovering her memories of her childhood sexual abuse, plaintiff "started sleeping with boys and doing drugs."
In our view, intentionally misrepresenting oneself as an associate or colleague of a mental health professional who has a close personal relationship with the person about whom one is seeking information would be a particularly serious type of misrepresentation, and one significantly different from the more familiar practice of a news reporter or investigator in shading or withholding information regarding his or her motives when interviewing a potential news source. Special legal protection is provided to information communicated in the course of a physician-patient or psychotherapist-patient relationship (Evid.Code, §§ 994, 1014), and even if plaintiff's relationship with Corwin was not of a nature that would bring information revealed to Corwin within an evidentiary privilege, the relationship bore a close similarity to such a relationship. Misrepresentations of this nature by either a reporter or an academic investigator could undermine legitimate professional relationships and would be especially troublesome, because they would take advantage of the desire and willingness of relatives and friends to provide assistance to professionals who they believe will use any personal information that is revealed to help the subject of the inquiry.
Because of these special and unusual considerations, we believe that if a trier of fact were to find that Loftus engaged in the particular type of misrepresentations alleged by Cantrell, the conduct properly could be found "highly offensive" for purposes of the intrusion-into-private-matters tort and liability could be imposed upon Loftus.9
Thus, we conclude that in light of the particular nature of the misrepresentation attributed to Loftus by the Cantrell declaration, the Court of Appeal properly determined that the evidence presented by plaintiff is sufficient to establish a prima facie case under the intrusion-into-private-matters tort.10
For the reasons discussed above, we conclude that the Court of Appeal erred in holding that plaintiff's action should be permitted to go forward with regard to (1) Loftus's alleged statements at the October 2002 conference relating to Jane Doe's position in the military, (2) Loftus's disclosure of plaintiff's initials at the March 2003 deposition, and (3) defendants' alleged action in obtaining information from confidential court records. At the same time, we also conclude that the Court of Appeal correctly determined that plaintiff's action for improper intrusion into private matters could proceed based upon the claim that Loftus obtained personal and sensitive information regarding plaintiff from her former foster mother by misrepresenting herself as an associate of Corwin, a psychiatrist with whom plaintiff had a close professional relationship.
Finally, although we have determined that defendants' motion to strike the complaint pursuant to the anti-SLAPP statute properly was denied as to one facet of one of the numerous causes of action alleged in the complaint, it is apparent when the determinations of the Court of Appeal and this court are viewed as a whole that the overwhelming majority of plaintiff's claims properly should have been struck in the trial court under the anti-SLAPP statute. Under these circumstances, and consistent with the fundamental purpose of the anti-SLAPP statute to minimize the chilling of conduct undertaken in furtherance of the constitutional right of free speech, we conclude that it is appropriate to award defendants their costs on appeal.
The judgment rendered by the Court of Appeal is reversed in part and affirmed in part, and the matter is remanded to that court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Defendants are awarded their costs on appeal.
WE CONCUR: KENNARD, WERDEGAR, CHIN, and CORRIGAN, JJ.
I agree with the majority in every respect except one: I respectfully disagree that Taus has an action against Loftus for the tort of intrusion into private matters (hereafter sometimes the intrusion tort), based on Loftus's alleged misrepresentations to Taus's foster mother, Margie Cantrell, in order to obtain supposedly private information about Taus. As explained below, Taus had no reasonable expectation that Cantrell would keep information she had observed about Taus's behavior private. Therefore, Taus should not be able to sue Loftus for unlawful intrusion. As also explained below, to the extent Taus preferred that Cantrell only speak to an investigator who held certain agreeable views, that preference could not be called an expectation of privacy, and the enforcement of that preference through tort law is antithetical to free academic inquiry.
As discussed at greater length by the majority, plaintiff Taus became a case study in the recovered memory of sexual abuse through the work of psychiatrist Dr. David Corwin, who videotaped an interview in which Taus appears to recover the memory of sexual abuse disclosed on an earlier videotaped confession. Corwin described in considerable detail Taus's case, albeit preserving her anonymity by referring to her as Jane Doe, in an article in the May 1997 issue of Child Maltreatment, entitled Videotaped Discovery of a Reportedly Unrecallable Memory of Child Sexual Abuse: Comparison With a Childhood Interview Videotaped 11 Years Before (2 Child Maltreatment 91 (hereafter the Child Maltreatment article)). The article printed a transcript of interviews between Corwin and Taus regarding the asserted recovered memory, and the article and interview revealed the most private and intimate details of the sexual abuse Taus's mother allegedly inflicted on her and Taus's reaction to that abuse. (See maj. opn., ante, 54 Cal.Rptr.3d at pp. 782-783, 151 P.3d at p. 1191.) Other related articles in the same issue of Child Maltreatment posed follow-up research questions related to the case study, including "whether this experience has produced substantial changes in her life, for better or for worse." (Maj. opn., ante, 54 Cal. Rptr.3d at p. 783, 151 P.3d at p. 1192.)
During one of the interviews and in the same published article, Cantrell, who is referred to in the article as "foster mother," was also interviewed, and disclosed her observations of some highly personal and intimate facts about Taus's life, including her psychological condition, her relationship to her parents, and her adjustment to her new home. As Cantrell stated: "When Jane first approached our family to come and live with us she had been in several group homes, foster homes, her dad had become ill and she had to be placed somewhere. This was real traumatic for Jane.... When she first moved in, she was tragically headstrong. She had come to a point where you could not tell her anything. She didn't have rules or regulations and wouldn't succumb to any. Jane had basically decided to do everything all by herself, and no one was going to tell her what, why, or anything anymore ... and Jane ... just want[ed] to give up, ... she said, I'm too chicken to commit suicide, but I just want out, I just, I want out, I can't take it anymore, because I don't know what happened to me when I was a little girl." Cantrell continued that she initiated Jane getting back in touch with her mother: "Mother cried, and Jane cried, and Jane said It felt so good to have her hug me. I could tell that it was my mom.'" She then recounted how the relationship grew, but then, after her father's death, some things began to go wrong. "Jane experienced a few things that really upset her, and for no reason the mother would get really irate at her, and then just walk out of her life, and not call, and not come back. And Jane felt like a failure again, like something she had done, so Jane needed to know that there was nothing she had done." Cantrell opined during the interview that seeing the second video had been beneficial: "I think this has been a beautiful closure."
Elizabeth Loftus, a psychology professor long critical of the idea of recovered memory, did research on this case and coauthored an article skeptical of Corwin's conclusions entitled Who Abused Jane Doe? The Hazards of the Single Case History (May/June 2002) 26 Skeptical Inquirer 24, 37. Loftus was able, through lawful means, to discover that Taus was the Jane Doe of the Child Maltreatment article, in part because Corwin used Taus's first name and the city where she spent some of her childhood during a videotaped interview shown at a number of professional meetings. Loftus was able to contact and interview Taus's mother and Cantrell.
It is the latter interview that is central to Taus's intrusion cause of action. As explained by the majority, Cantrell stated in a declaration that Loftus misrepresented herself at the outset of the interview as working with Dr. Corwin and being "his supervisor in connection with the study of [Taus]." She asked to audiotape the interview, and as the questioning became increasingly hostile, Cantrell asked if Loftus "really worked with Dr. Corwin or something to that effect," and eventually broke off the interview. Cantrell asked for the audiotape but was refused and left "extremely upset." Loftus, in a declaration, adamantly denied making the above representations and denied audiotaping the interview. Although Cantrell's declaration does not make clear what she revealed to Loftus about Taus, Loftus's declaration states "that Jane Doe's foster mother told me during my interview of her that shortly after apparently recovering her memories in 1995, Plaintiff started sleeping with boys and doing drugs. Plaintiff also snuck out of the house at night. And she apparently left the care of her foster mother." Based on this information, but without revealing the specifics mentioned in her declaration, Loftus stated at an academic conference that after the supposed recovered memory episode, "Jane Doe engaged in destructive behavior that I cannot reveal on advice of my attorney."
All further statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure unless otherwise indicated.
Defendants vigorously challenge the Court of Appeal’s position on this point, maintaining that plaintiff, by repeatedly consenting to have the videotapes and transcripts of her conversations with Corwin publicly disclosed and used extensively in educational seminars and set forth in Corwin and Olafson’s Child Maltreatment article, cannot properly be viewed as a “private figure” but rather must be properly considered a “limited public figure” for constitutional free speech purposes even though Corwin did not reveal plaintiff’s real name. As discussed below, we do not believe it is necessary to decide in this case whether plaintiff’s voluntary actions with respect to the publication and use of her interviews with Corwin rendered her a limited public figure for constitutional purposes. (See post, pp. 45-46, fn. 16.) At the same time, however, we believe it is prudent to express reservations regarding the Court of Appeal’s unequivocal endorsement of plaintiff’s claim to be a “private person” who “cannot reasonably be characterized as a person who was in the public eye.…” In our view, there is at the very least a strong argument that free speech considerations would support treating plaintiff as a limited public figure in light of (1) her voluntary consent to Corwin’s public use of videotapes revealing her face and voice, and (2) the prominent role that her case study attained in the ongoing controversy regarding the repressed memory theory.
The authors of the Child Maltreatment article then stated: “The clearest conclusion from this debate is that much remains to be learned about human memory, how both traumatic and nontraumatic memories are preserved, how they can become unavailable to the person who experienced them, how they are sometimes discovered, and how they can become contaminated mixtures of both accurate and inaccurate information. Many questions remain unanswered concerning the false memory phenomenon as well. Who are the most susceptible to developing these false beliefs, and under what conditions are false memories most likely to occur? Once established, what is the stability of these false beliefs over time? Perhaps the most important question, and probably the most elusive to definitively answer, is whether differences can be observed between apparent recollections that have little grounding in reality and those that are more factual.” (Child Maltreatment article, supra, at pp. 91-92.)
In view of our conclusion that the statutory qualified privilege established by Civil Code section 47, subdivision (c) applies in the present context, we need not reach the question whether, as defendants vigorously contend, plaintiff — by virtue of her repeated consent to have her background and videotaped interviews publicly disclosed and utilized by Dr. Corwin in professional conferences and other educational settings — should be considered a limited public figure so as to bring into play a constitutionally based qualified privilege under the First Amendment of the federal Constitution.
Although the holding in Sheets rested upon the scope of the federal constitutional right of privacy rather than of the common law intrusion tort, we believe the court’s conclusion in Sheets nonetheless is relevant to the issue before us. In our view, there is no reason to suggest that the scope of an individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy that is protected by the common law intrusion-into-privacy tort is less extensive than the scope of the reasonable expectation of privacy that qualifies for constitutional protection under the federal Constitution. The common law intrusion tort was developed to provide a remedy for highly offensive intrusions upon privacy that otherwise would go unredressed (see generally Prosser, Privacy (1960) 48 Cal. L.Rev. 383, 389-392), and, as a matter of logic and reason, this common law remedy properly should apply to intrusions upon privacy that do not necessarily rise to the level of a federal constitutional violation. Accordingly, in our view the decision in Sheets properly can be seen as providing support for the general proposition that, for purposes of the intrusion tort, a person may possess a reasonable expectation of privacy in personal information about him or her that is known to the person’s close relatives or friends — a reasonable expectation of privacy that may be violated when such information improperly is obtained by a third party.
Second, even if a jury were to find that plaintiff’s separation from Cantrell diminished plaintiff’s reasonable expectation that Cantrell would not voluntarily disclose private information about her to others, it would not follow that a jury could not find that Loftus’s conduct nonetheless violated plaintiff’s reasonable expectation of privacy. As explained above, even if plaintiff could not have had a reasonable expectation that Cantrell would not voluntarily disclose such information, a jury could find that plaintiff reasonably could expect that an unrelated investigator — like Loftus — would not engage in the unorthodox and improperly intrusive conduct of persuading Cantrell to reveal personal information about her by intentionally misrepresenting herself as an associate of Corwin (a psychiatrist trusted by plaintiff and to whom plaintiff already had disclosed information related to her memories of the sexual abuse she ostensibly had suffered as a child).
A number of journalistic codes of ethics caution that “surreptitious methods of gathering information” should be avoided “except when traditional open methods will not yield information vital to the public.” (Society of Prof. Journalists, Code of Ethics (1996) [as of Feb. 26, 2007]; see also Radio-Television News Directors Assn., Code of Ethics of Prof. Conduct [“Professional electronic journalists should [¶] … [¶][u]se surreptitious newsgathering techniques … only if there is no other way to obtain stories of significant public importance and only if the technique is explained to the audience”] [as of Feb. 26, 2007]; Steele, When Might It Be Appropriate to Use Deception/Misrepresentation/ Hidden Cameras in Newsgathering? (Feb. 1, 1995) for Poynter Institute Ethics Series [listing, as one of the necessary prerequisites to the use of deception or misrepresentation in newsgathering, “[w]hen the information obtained is of profound importance. It must be of vital public interest, such as revealing great ‘system failure’ at the top levels, or it must prevent profound harm to individuals”] [as of Feb. 26, 2006].)
In the present case, of course, Loftus has denied engaging in any misrepresentation to obtain information from Cantrell (or anyone else), but defendants assert that even if Loftus made a misrepresentation to Cantrell, Loftus’s actions should be considered, as a matter of law, not highly offensive, in light of plaintiff’s consent to Corwin’s use of her case study in educational seminars and a published article. Even if plaintiff’s consent to the public use of her case study rendered her a limited public figure, however, that status would not in itself justify the use of the particular type of misrepresentation here at issue; as discussed above, even “all purpose” public figures (see Khawar v. Globe Intemat., Inc. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 254, 263, 79 Cal.Rptr.2d 178, 965 P.2d 696) such as public officials are entitled to be protected from having investigators conduct inquiries into their private information by pretending to be the public figure’s physician or psychiatrist. (Ante, 54 Cal. Rptr.3d at pp. 819-820, 151 P.3d at pp. 1221-1222.)
Furthermore, although it is conceivable that there may be some circumstances in which the need for information is so vital that resort to even the type of very questionable investigative tactic here at issue could not properly be found to be highly offensive to a reasonable person, we believe it is clear that this case does not fall within that narrow category. Here, although the additional information concerning plaintiff that Loftus sought to obtain from Cantrell was newsworthy, there was no profound or overriding public need that, as a matter of law, justified resort to the particular type of potentially insidious stratagem that, according to Cantrell, was utilized by Loftus in this case. (Accord, Shulman, supra, 18 Cal.4th 200, 240, 74 Cal.Rptr.2d 843, 955 P.2d 469 [“the fact that a reporter may be seeking ‘newsworthy’ material does not in itself privilege the investigatory activity”].)
First, contrary to the concurring and dissenting opinion’s suggestion (post, 54 Cal. Rptr.3d at pp. 828-829, 151 P.3d at pp. 1229-1230), we have explained above that the information about plaintiff that Loftus sought to obtain and succeeded in obtaining from Cantrell — information relating to the ostensible sexual abuse to which plaintiff had been subjected as a child by her mother and to the detrimental effect of plaintiff’s asserted recovery of that memory on plaintiff’s subsequent behavior and emotional well-being — is the type of information as to which a person would possess a reasonable expectation of privacy (ante, 54 Cal.Rptr.3d at p. 816, 151 P.3d at p. 1219) and is information “that a parental figure who cared about her foster child’s welfare ordinarily would not be expected to disclose to a stranger.” (Ante, at p. 820, 151 P.3d at 1222.) Although the concurring and dissenting opinion points to another passage in our opinion to suggest a contrary conclusion, that passage does not support the concurring and dissenting opinion’s reading. In that separate passage, after explaining that the record in this case does not support the claim that Cantrell was estranged from plaintiff at the time Loftus interviewed Cantrell, we state that “even if a jury were to find that plaintiff’s separation from Cantrell diminished plaintiff’s reasonable expectation that Cantrell would not voluntarily disclose private information about her to others, it would not follow that a jury could not find that Loftus’s conduct nonetheless violated plaintiff’s reasonable expectation of privacy.” (Ante, p. 817, fn. 19, 151 P.3d at p. 1220, fn. 19, first italics added.) Contrary to the implication of the concurring and dissenting opinion, this passage does not indicate we have concluded that plaintiff did not possess a reasonable expectation of privacy in the information Loftus obtained from Cantrell. As explained, we conclude that plaintiff did possess a reasonable expectation of privacy with regard to such deeply personal information.
Second, in analyzing the reasonable-expectation-of-privacy prong of the intrusion tort, the concurring and dissenting opinion fails to take into account this court’s explicit recognition in Sanders, supra, 20 Cal.4th 907, 918, 85 Cal.Rptr.2d 909, 978 P.2d 67, that “[p]rivacy for purposes of the intrusion tort must be evaluated with respect to the identity of the alleged intruder and the nature of the intrusion.” (Italics added.) In Sanders, in rejecting a claim that the trial court had erred in its instructions to the jury on the reasonable-expectation-of-privacy element, we explained that “[t]he disputed instructions merely focused the jury’s inquiry on the question whether it was reasonable for plaintiff to expect, in the circumstances of his particular workplace, that an interaction would not be subject to covert videotaping by a television news producer. Because, as we have explained, the reasonableness of a privacy expectation must be assessed in reference to the identity of the intruder and the nature of the claimed intrusion, the proper question for the jury to decide was, indeed, whether plaintiff could reasonably expect he would not be secretly videotaped in his internal workplace interactions by a representative of the mass media.” (20 Cal.4th at p. 926, 85 Cal.Rptr.2d 909, 978 P.2d 67, italics added.) In light of this clear explanation in Sanders, we believe it is entirely appropriate and consistent with governing precedent to describe the relevant reasonable-expectation-of-privacy question in this case as whether plaintiff reasonably could expect that an investigator would not seek and obtain access to personal information relating to her memory of childhood sexual abuse from her foster mother “by falsely posing as an associate or supervisor of a mental health professional in whom plaintiff had confided.” (Ante, 54 Cal.Rptr.3d at p. 817, 151 P.3d at p. 1220.) In questioning the opinion’s analysis of this point, the concurring and dissenting opinion omits any discussion of the relevant portion of Sanders.