341 U.S. 367 (1951)
William Brandhove brought this action in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California against Jack B. Tenney and other members of the Senate Fact-Finding Committee on Un-American Activities, the Committee itself, and San Francisco Mayor Elmer E. Robinson.1 The suit rested on sections 43 and 47(3) of Title 8 of the United States Code and alleged deprivation of rights secured by the Federal Constitution.2
The Tenney Committee was constituted by a resolution of the California Senate on June 20, 1947.3 On January 28, 1949, Brandhove circulated a petition among members of the State Legislature urging that no further funds be appropriated for the Committee.4 The petition charged that the Committee had used Brandhove to smear Congressman Franck R. Havenner as a "Red" during the 1947 San Francisco mayoral campaign and that the Republican machine and Mayor Robinson's campaign management had conspired with the Committee to that end.5
The Committee asked local prosecuting officials to institute criminal proceedings against Brandhove and summoned him to appear at a hearing on January 29, 1949.6 Testimony was taken from Mayor Robinson at the hearing.7 Brandhove appeared with counsel but refused to testify, resulting in a contempt prosecution in state court that was dropped after the jury failed to return a verdict.8 After the refusal, the Chairman quoted Brandhove's prior testimony, read a statement concerning his alleged criminal record, a newspaper article denying the truth of his charges, and a denial by the Committee's absent counsel.9
Brandhove alleged that the January 29 hearing was not held for a legislative purpose but was designed to intimidate and silence him and to deprive him of constitutional rights.10 He sought $10,000 in damages for legal counsel, traveling, hotel accommodations, and other expenses related to his defense in the contempt proceeding, plus punitive damages.11 The District Court dismissed the action without opinion.12 The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the complaint stated a cause of action against the Committee and its members but affirmed dismissal as to Robinson.13 The Supreme Court granted certiorari.14
Whether the 1871 Civil Rights legislation imposes civil liability on members of a state legislative committee for actions taken within the sphere of legislative activity?15
The 1871 Civil Rights legislation, now 8 U.S.C. §§ 43 and 47(3), does not impose civil liability on state legislators for acts done within the sphere of legitimate legislative activity.16 The tradition of legislative freedom protects legislators from deterrents to the uninhibited discharge of their duties.17
No. The established facts establish that the Tenney Committee was constituted by California Senate resolution on June 20, 1947, that Brandhove circulated a petition on January 28, 1949 charging the Committee with misconduct, and that the Committee responded by summoning Brandhove to the January 29 hearing, taking testimony from Mayor Robinson, and reading prior statements into the record after Brandhove refused to testify.18 These steps occurred inside the sphere of legislative activity because the Committee addressed challenges to its own work on a subject of legislative concern, and the privilege bars judicial inquiry into alleged unworthy motives.19
The 1871 legislation does not impose civil liability on the defendants.20
Related opinions on this issue
He agreed that the Civil Rights statutes were not intended to make legislators personally liable for damages to a witness injured by a committee exercising legislative power.21 He stressed that the holding does not validate the Committee's conduct.22
Brandhove could still challenge the constitutionality of the creating resolution or the Committee's actions in other proceedings such as a contempt prosecution.23 The resolution's broad language raises grave doubts about its constitutionality.24 He emphasized that the Court does not sanction legislative inquisition of the type apparently authorized.25
He agreed with the general principles of legislative immunity.26 He argued that when a legislative committee deprives a citizen of a constitutional right such as free speech by reprisal for exercising that right, it should not enjoy immunity under the civil rights legislation.27
The reason for immunity ends when a committee perverts its power for an illegal or corrupt purpose.28 No officer of government should be higher than the Constitution from which all rights and privileges of an office obtain.29
Whether the pleadings show that the defendants were acting in the sphere of legitimate legislative activity?30
Legislators are immune for actions within the sphere of legitimate legislative activity.31 The claim of unworthy purpose does not destroy the privilege.32 Courts determine only whether a committee's inquiry may fairly be deemed within its province without obvious usurpation of judicial or executive functions.33
Yes. The pleadings show that the Committee was investigating un-American activities, a problem within legislative concern, and that Brandhove raised serious charges concerning the work of the Committee by circulating his petition and indicating that evidence previously given by him was false.34 The Committee was therefore entitled to call the plaintiff before it and examine him, and the January 29 hearing fell inside the traditional legislative sphere.35
The pleadings show that the defendants were acting in the sphere of legitimate legislative activity.36