392 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889 (1968)
On October 31, 1963, Cleveland police detective Martin McFadden, a 39-year veteran assigned to downtown Cleveland for 30 years, observed John W. Terry and Richard Chilton standing on the corner of Huron Road and Euclid Avenue.1
McFadden took up a post of observation 300 to 400 feet away.2 He watched as the two men walked back and forth along Huron Road, pausing repeatedly to look in the window of a store before conferring with each other. This pattern repeated roughly a dozen times over ten to twelve minutes.3
A third man, Katz, joined them briefly before departing, after which Terry and Chilton followed the same path.4 By this time McFadden had become thoroughly suspicious that the men were casing the store for a robbery and feared they might be armed.5
McFadden approached the three men in front of Zucker's store, identified himself as a police officer, and asked their names.6 When they mumbled responses, he grabbed Terry, spun him around, patted down the outer clothing of his overcoat, and felt a pistol in the left breast pocket.7
He removed a .38-caliber revolver from Terry's pocket and ordered the men into the store, where he similarly frisked Chilton and discovered another revolver while finding no weapons on Katz.8 Terry and Chilton were arrested and charged with carrying concealed weapons.9
Prior to trial they moved to suppress the revolvers as the product of an unlawful search.10 The trial court denied the motion after hearing McFadden's testimony, finding that the officer had reasonable cause to believe the defendants were acting suspiciously and that the frisk was necessary for his protection.11 After the denial, Terry and Chilton waived jury trial, were convicted, and sentenced to one to three years in the penitentiary.12 The Ohio Court of Appeals affirmed, the Supreme Court of Ohio dismissed the appeal, and the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.13
Whether a police officer's stop and frisk of a person without probable cause to arrest constitutes a search and seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment?14
The Fourth Amendment provides that the right of the people to be secure in their persons against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated.15 A police officer seizes a person when he accosts an individual and restrains his freedom to walk away, and a careful exploration of the outer surfaces of a person's clothing is a search.16
Yes. Officer McFadden grabbed petitioner Terry, spun him around, and patted down the outer surfaces of his clothing in an attempt to find weapons.17 This action restrained Terry's freedom to walk away and constituted a search of his person.18 The facts show that the officer's conduct amounted to a seizure and search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment even though it did not rise to the level of a traditional arrest.19
The stop and frisk constituted a search and seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.20
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Harlan agrees with the Court's ultimate holding but emphasizes that a police officer's right to make an on-the-street stop and frisk for weapons is bounded by the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.21 He stresses that such activities must be reasonable under the circumstances as the officer credibly relates them in court.22 Harlan explains that the right to frisk depends upon the reasonableness of a forcible stop to investigate a suspected crime.23
Where such a stop is reasonable the right to frisk must be immediate and automatic if the reason for the stop is an articulable suspicion of a crime of violence.24 He would affirm the conviction on the ground that McFadden's right to interrupt Terry's freedom of movement arose only because circumstances warranted forcing an encounter to prevent or investigate a crime.25
Justice White joins the opinion of the Court but reserves judgment on some of the Court's general remarks about the scope and purpose of the exclusionary rule.26 He believes the opinion goes further than necessary in discussing the scope of the Fourth Amendment.27 White notes that there is nothing in the Constitution which prevents a policeman from addressing questions to anyone on the streets.28
Given the proper circumstances such as those in this case, the person may be briefly detained against his will while pertinent questions are directed to him.29 He adds that temporary detention warranted by the circumstances chiefly justifies the protective frisk for weapons.30
Justice Douglas dissents on the ground that the Fourth Amendment requires probable cause before any search or seizure.31 He agrees that petitioner was seized within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment and that frisking was a search, but finds it a mystery how that search and seizure can be constitutional unless there was probable cause to believe a crime had been committed, was being committed, or was about to be committed.32 Douglas argues that the opinion opens up a new and frightening field of police activity by allowing stops and frisks on mere suspicion rather than probable cause.33
He states that to give the police greater power than a magistrate is to take a long step down the totalitarian path.34
Whether such a stop and frisk is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment when the officer observes suspicious conduct suggesting the person may be armed and dangerous?35
The Fourth Amendment permits a reasonable search for weapons when an officer has reasonable suspicion that a person is armed and presently dangerous, even in the absence of probable cause for arrest.36 The officer's action must be justified at its inception and reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that justified the interference.37
Yes. McFadden observed Terry and Chilton pacing back and forth, looking in the store window roughly a dozen times over ten to twelve minutes, conferring after each trip, and following a third man after he left.38 These specific and articulable facts led McFadden to suspect they were casing the store for a robbery and might be armed.39 The frisk was limited to a pat-down of outer clothing for weapons, which was reasonably related to the circumstances.40
The stop and frisk was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.41
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Harlan emphasizes that the right to frisk depends upon the reasonableness of a forcible stop to investigate a suspected crime.42 Where such a stop is reasonable, the right to frisk must be immediate and automatic if the reason for the stop is an articulable suspicion of a crime of violence.43 He notes that there is no reason why an officer rightfully but forcibly confronting a person suspected of a serious crime should have to ask one question and take the risk that the answer might be a bullet.44
Harlan would make it perfectly clear that the right to frisk in this case depends upon the reasonableness of a forcible stop to investigate a suspected crime, and he joins the opinion of the Court on that basis.45
Justice White notes that there is nothing in the Constitution which prevents a policeman from addressing questions to anyone on the streets.46 Given the proper circumstances such as those in this case, the person may be briefly detained against his will while pertinent questions are directed to him. He observes that the person stopped is not obliged to answer, answers may not be compelled, and refusal to answer furnishes no basis for an arrest although it may alert the officer to the need for continued observation.47
White reserves judgment on some of the Court's general remarks about the scope and purpose of the exclusionary rule.48
Justice Douglas dissents on the ground that the Fourth Amendment requires probable cause before any search or seizure. He agrees that petitioner was seized and that frisking was a search but finds no probable cause shown for the crime of carrying concealed weapons.49 Douglas argues that the opinion of the Court opens up a new and frightening field of police activity by allowing stops and frisks on mere suspicion rather than probable cause.50
He states that police officers have been permitted to effect arrests or searches without warrants only when the facts within their personal knowledge would satisfy the constitutional standard of probable cause.51 He adds that the line between reasonable suspicion and harassment is too thin.52