450 U.S. 248 (1981)
In January 1972, the Texas Department of Community Affairs hired Joyce Burdine as an accounting clerk in its Public Service Careers Division.1 Burdine possessed several years of experience in employment training at the time of her hiring.2 She was promoted to Field Services Coordinator in July 1972.3 After her supervisor resigned in November 1972, Burdine assumed additional duties and applied for the vacant Project Director position, which remained unfilled for six months.4
The Public Service Careers Division received complete funding from the United States Department of Labor.5 In February 1973, the Department notified TDCA Executive Director B. R. Fuller that it would terminate the division the following month due to inefficiencies.6 TDCA officials, including Burdine, persuaded the Department to continue funding on the condition that a permanent Project Director be appointed and the staff reorganized.7 Fuller then hired a male employee from another division as Project Director. In reducing the staff, Fuller terminated Burdine along with two other employees while retaining male employee Walz as the only professional in the division.8 Burdine had maintained her application for the Project Director position and requested to remain with TDCA.9 She was soon rehired by TDCA in another division at the same salary as the Project Director position, with subsequent promotions maintaining parity.10
Burdine filed suit in the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas.11 She alleged that the failure to promote her and her termination were based on gender discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.12 Following a bench trial, the District Court found that neither decision involved gender discrimination, crediting Fuller's testimony that the decisions resulted from consultations and a nondiscriminatory evaluation of qualifications.13 The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the District Court's finding on the promotion decision but reversed on the termination.14 It held that the defendant had not met its burden under the standards it had previously announced.15 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a conflict among the circuits regarding the defendant's evidentiary burden.16
Whether, after the plaintiff has proved a prima facie case of discriminatory treatment under Title VII, the burden shifts to the defendant to persuade the court by a preponderance of the evidence that legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for the challenged employment action existed?17
The burden that shifts to the defendant is to rebut the presumption of discrimination by producing evidence that the plaintiff was rejected, or someone else was preferred, for a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason. The defendant need not persuade the court that it was actually motivated by the proffered reasons. It is sufficient if the defendant's evidence raises a genuine issue of fact as to whether it discriminated against the plaintiff. The explanation provided must be legally sufficient to justify a judgment for the defendant. If the defendant carries this burden of production, the presumption raised by the prima facie case is rebutted, and the factual inquiry proceeds to a new level of specificity.18
No. The Court of Appeals required TDCA to prove by a preponderance that legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons existed and that Walz was better qualified.19 Fuller's testimony explained the terminations as necessary to improve efficiency by eliminating friction among staff.20 This satisfied only the burden of production.21
The defendant bears only the burden of production to articulate legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons, not the burden of persuasion by a preponderance of the evidence.22
Whether the defendant in a Title VII case must prove by objective evidence that the person hired or promoted was more qualified than the plaintiff?23
The defendant is not required to prove by objective evidence that the person hired or promoted was more qualified than the plaintiff. Title VII does not demand that an employer give preferential treatment to minorities or women. The statute does not require the employer to hire the minority or female applicant whenever that person's objective qualifications were equal to those of a white male applicant. The employer has discretion to choose among equally qualified candidates, provided the decision is not based upon unlawful criteria. The fact that a court may think that the employer misjudged the qualifications of the applicants does not in itself expose him to Title VII liability.24
No. The Court of Appeals erred by requiring TDCA to prove by objective evidence that Walz was more qualified than Burdine.25 Fuller hired a male from another division as Project Director and retained Walz while terminating Burdine.26 The District Court credited Fuller's testimony regarding consultations among trusted advisers and a nondiscriminatory evaluation of the relative qualifications of the individuals involved.27
Title VII prohibits discrimination but leaves the employer discretion to select among candidates so long as the decision is not based on unlawful criteria.28 The facts here show that Burdine was rehired at equivalent salary and responsibility.29
The defendant need not prove by objective evidence that the person retained or hired was more qualified than the plaintiff.30