532 U.S. 162 (2001)
In December 1993, Lindsey Owings reported to the Walker County, Texas, Sheriff's Office that his home had been burglarized and that his wife Margaret and their 16-month-old daughter Kori Rae were missing.1 Respondent Raymond Levi Cobb, who lived across the street from the Owings, was questioned by investigators acting on an anonymous tip but denied involvement.2 In July 1994, while under arrest for an unrelated offense, Cobb gave a written statement confessing to the burglary but denying knowledge relating to the disappearances.3 He was subsequently indicted for the burglary, and attorney Hal Ridley was appointed to represent him in August 1994.4
Shortly after Ridley's appointment, investigators obtained permission from Ridley to question Cobb about the disappearances, but Cobb continued to deny involvement.5 Investigators repeated this process in September 1995, again with Ridley's permission and again with the same result.6 In November 1995, while free on bond in the burglary case and living with his father in Odessa, Texas, Cobb's father contacted the Walker County Sheriff's Office to report that Cobb had confessed to killing Margaret Owings during the course of the burglary.7 Odessa police took Cobb into custody, administered Miranda warnings, which Cobb waived, and obtained a detailed confession in which Cobb described stabbing Margaret in the stomach, dragging her body to a wooded area, returning for the baby, digging a hole, and burying both victims before leading police to the location of the bodies.8
Cobb was convicted of capital murder for murdering more than one person in the course of a single criminal transaction and sentenced to death.9 On appeal to the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, Cobb argued that his confession should have been suppressed because his right to counsel had attached when Ridley was appointed in the burglary case.10 The Court of Criminal Appeals reversed the conviction by a divided vote and remanded for a new trial. The court held that once the right to counsel attaches to the offense charged, it also attaches to any other offense that is very closely related factually to the offense charged.11 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider whether the Sixth Amendment right to counsel extends to crimes that are factually related to those that have actually been charged.12
Whether the Sixth Amendment right to counsel extends to uncharged offenses that are factually related to a charged offense?13
The Sixth Amendment right to counsel is offense specific. It cannot be invoked once for all future prosecutions, for it does not attach until a prosecution is commenced, that is, at or after the initiation of adversary judicial criminal proceedings—whether by way of formal charge, preliminary hearing, indictment, information, or arraignment.14 The right does not extend to uncharged offenses, even those that are factually related to a charged offense.15 When the right attaches, it encompasses offenses that would be considered the same offense under the Blockburger test.16
No. In the present case, respondent Raymond Levi Cobb had been indicted for burglary of the Owings residence and was represented by counsel Hal Ridley on that charge.17 While in custody, he was questioned about the murders of Margaret and Kori Rae Owings without having been charged with those offenses.18 The Supreme Court applied the Blockburger test. It determined that burglary and capital murder are not the same offense under Texas law.19 Burglary requires entry into or continued concealment in a habitation or building.20 Capital murder requires murder of more than one person during a single criminal transaction.21 Since the offenses are distinct, the Sixth Amendment right to counsel had not attached to the murder charge at the time of the confession.22
The confession was therefore admissible at Cobb's capital murder trial.23
The Sixth Amendment right to counsel does not extend to uncharged offenses that are factually related to a charged offense.24
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Scalia And Thomas, Jj.
Justice Kennedy joined the opinion of the Court but wrote separately to emphasize that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel is offense specific and does not extend to uncharged offenses.25 He observed that the facts illustrate the difficulty of a rule that invalidates a confession given by suspects who have received proper Miranda warnings and waived them.26 Kennedy questioned the utility of the rule from Michigan v. Jackson, noting that it supersedes the suspect's voluntary choice to speak with investigators.27
He argued that there is little justification for not applying the same reasoning as in Patterson v. Illinois to the Jackson rule.28
Joined by Ginsburg And Breyer, Jj.
Justice Stevens dissented from the majority opinion.29 He argued that the Court's holding today represents a significant narrowing of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel.30 In his view, once the right to counsel has attached with respect to a charged offense, it should also attach to any factually related offenses that arise out of the same criminal transaction.31
Stevens believed this broader attachment would better safeguard the rights of defendants facing multiple related charges.32
Joined by Ginsburg And Breyer, Jj.
Justice Souter joined Justice Stevens' dissent.33 He agreed that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel should extend to factually related offenses to prevent the kind of police questioning that occurred in this case.34 Souter stressed that allowing interrogation on uncharged but related crimes undermines the purpose of the right to counsel.35
Joined by Stevens, Souter, And Ginsburg, Jj.
Justice Breyer dissented in a detailed opinion joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg.36 He argued that the majority's adoption of the Blockburger test for defining offense in the Sixth Amendment context undermines the protections of the right to counsel.37 Breyer contended that offense should include factually related aspects of a single course of conduct, as this better serves the Sixth Amendment's objectives.38
He pointed out that the majority's rule would permit police to question charged defendants about related but uncharged crimes without notifying counsel.39 This approach is inconsistent with the role of counsel as a medium between the defendant and the government.40 Breyer noted that the closely related test used by lower courts is more consistent with prior cases like Moulton and Brewer.41 It is easier to apply in practice than Blockburger.42 He concluded that the Texas court correctly found the burglary and murders closely related and that the police should have spoken to counsel before questioning Cobb.43