6 N.Y. 697
This is an action to recover damages from the defendant for negligently putting up, labeling, and selling as and for the extract of dandelion — a simple and harmless medicine — a jar which in fact contained the extract of belladonna, a deadly poison; and by means of which the plaintiff Mary Ann Thomas, to whom a dose of dandelion had been prescribed by a physician, was greatly injured when a portion of the jar's contents was administered to her as dandelion.
The facts proved were briefly these: Mrs. Thomas, being in ill health, had dandelion prescribed by her physician. Her husband purchased what was believed to be the prescribed medicine at the store of Dr. Foord, a physician and druggist in Cazenovia, Madison County, where the plaintiffs reside.
A small quantity of the medicine thus purchased was administered to Mrs. Thomas, and it produced very alarming effects: coldness of the surface and extremities, feebleness of circulation, spasms of the muscles, giddiness, dilation of the pupils, and derangement of mind. She ultimately recovered, although for a time her life was thought to be in great danger. The medicine administered was belladonna and not dandelion.
The jar from which the medicine was taken was labeled "1/2 lb. dandelion, prepared by A. Gilbert, No. 108, John-street, N. Y. Jar 8 oz." It was sold as, and believed by Dr. Foord to be, the extract of dandelion. Dr. Foord purchased the article as extract of dandelion from Jas. S. Aspinwall, a druggist in New York. Aspinwall bought it of the defendant believing it to be extract of dandelion.
The defendant carried on a business at No. 108 John-street, New York, manufacturing and selling certain vegetable extracts for medicinal purposes and buying and selling others. The extracts manufactured by him were put up in jars for sale, and those purchased by him were put up in like manner. The jars containing extracts manufactured by him and those containing extracts purchased by him from others were labeled alike; both were labeled in the name "prepared by A. Gilbert."
Gilbert was a person employed by the defendant at a salary as an assistant in his business. The jars were labeled in Gilbert's name because Gilbert had previously been engaged in the same business on his own account at No. 108 John-street, and probably because Gilbert's labels rendered the articles more salable. The extract contained in the jar sold to Aspinwall, and by him to Foord, was not manufactured by the defendant but had been purchased by him from another manufacturer or dealer. Gilbert's labels were paid for by Winchester and used in his business with his knowledge and assent.
The defendant's counsel moved for a nonsuit on the following grounds:
That the action could not be sustained because the defendant was the remote vendor of the article in question, and there was no privity, connection, or transaction between him and the plaintiffs or either of them.
That the action sought to charge the defendant with the consequences of the negligence of Aspinwall and Foord.
That the plaintiffs were liable to, and chargeable with, the negligence of Aspinwall and Foord and therefore could not maintain this action.
That according to the testimony Foord was chargeable with negligence, and that the plaintiffs therefore could not sustain this suit against the defendant; if they could sustain a suit at all it would be against Foord only.
That this suit, being brought for the benefit of the wife and alleging her as the meritorious cause of action, cannot be sustained.
That there was not sufficient evidence of negligence in the defendant to go to the jury.
The judge overruled the motion for a nonsuit, and the defendant excepted.
The judge charged the jury, among other things, that if they found from the evidence that either Aspinwall or Foord was guilty of negligence in vending as and for dandelion the extract which was administered to Mrs. Thomas, or that the plaintiff Thomas or those who administered it to Mrs. Thomas were chargeable with negligence in administering it, the plaintiffs were not entitled to recover.
He further charged that if the plaintiffs were free from negligence and the defendant Winchester was guilty of negligence in putting up and vending the extracts, the plaintiffs were entitled to recover provided the extract administered to Mrs. Thomas was the same which had been put up by the defendant and sold by him to Aspinwall and by Aspinwall to Foord.
The judge further charged that if they found the defendant liable the plaintiffs were entitled to recover damages only for the personal injury and suffering of the wife and not for loss of service, medical treatment, or expense to the husband, and that the recovery should be confined to the actual damages suffered by the wife. The action was properly brought in the name of the husband and wife for the personal injury and suffering of the wife, and the case was left to the jury with proper directions on that point.
The case depends on the first point made by the defendant on his motion for a nonsuit: whether, the defendant being a remote vendor of the medicine and there being no privity or connection between him and the plaintiffs, the action can be maintained. If, in labeling a poisonous drug with the name of a harmless medicine for the public market, the defendant violated no duty to the public other than that which he owed to Aspinwall as his immediate vendee by virtue of his contract of sale, then the action could not be maintained. For example, if A. builds a wagon and sells it to B., who sells to C., and C. hires it to D., who is injured by A.'s gross negligence in building, D. cannot recover against A.; A.'s obligation arose solely out of his contract with B.
Similarly, if a smith defectively shoes a horse and the person hiring the horse from the owner is thrown and injured as a consequence, the smith is not liable because his duty grew only out of his contract with the owner. This was the ground of the decision in Winterbottom v. Wright: A.'s duty to keep the coach in good condition was a duty to the postmaster general with whom he contracted, not to the driver employed by the owners of the horses.
The present case, however, stands on a different ground. The defendant was a dealer in poisonous drugs, and Gilbert was his agent in preparing them for market. The death or great bodily harm of some person was the natural and almost inevitable consequence of selling belladonna under a false label. Gilbert, the defendant's agent, would have been punishable for manslaughter if Mrs. Thomas had died from the falsely labeled medicine. Every person who by culpable negligence causes the death of another, though without intent to kill, is guilty of manslaughter. A chemist who negligently sells laudanum in a phial labeled as paregoric and thereby causes a death is guilty of manslaughter. The law so highly values human life that it admits of no justification wherever life has been lost and the carelessness or negligence of one person has contributed to the death of another, and the rule applies where death is occasioned by the negligent act or by a negligent omission of duty.
Although the defendant Winchester may not be criminally answerable for the negligence of his agent, there can be no doubt of his civil liability, in which the act of the agent is regarded as the act of the principal. In respect to the wrongful and criminal character of the negligence complained of, this case differs widely from the cases relied upon by the defendant. No such imminent danger existed in those cases. In the present case the sale of the poisonous article was made to a dealer in drugs and not to a consumer; the injury therefore was not likely to fall on the dealer but much more likely on a remote purchaser, as actually happened. The defendant's negligence put human life in imminent danger.
It cannot be said that there was no duty on the defendant to avoid creating that danger by the exercise of greater caution, or that such care was owed only to his immediate vendee whose life was not endangered. The defendant's duty arose out of the nature of his business and the danger to others incident to its mismanagement.
Nothing but mischief like that which actually happened could have been expected from sending a poison falsely labeled into the market, and the defendant is justly responsible for the probable consequences of the act. The duty of exercising caution did not arise out of the defendant's contract of sale to Aspinwall. The wrong done was in putting the poison, mislabeled, into the hands of Aspinwall as an article of merchandise to be sold and afterwards used as the extract of dandelion by some person then unknown.
The defendant's contract of sale to Aspinwall does not excuse the wrong done to the plaintiffs; it was part of the means by which the wrong was effected. The plaintiffs' injury and their remedy would have stood on the same principle if the defendant had given the belladonna to Dr. Foord without price, or if he had placed it in Foord's shop without his knowledge under circumstances likely to lead to its sale on the faith of the label. The distinction recognized in Longmeid v. Holliday is that where an act of negligence is imminently dangerous to the lives of others the negligent party is liable to the injured person whether there is a contract between them or not; in other cases the negligent party is liable only to the party with whom he contracted.
On the trial the defendant insisted that Aspinwall and Foord were themselves guilty of negligence in selling the article for what it was represented to be on the label and that the suit, if sustainable at all, should have been brought against Foord. The judge charged that if they or either of them were guilty of such negligence the verdict must be for the defendant, and left the question of their negligence to the jury, who found for the plaintiffs on that point. If the case had depended on that issue, it was properly left to the jury. But that issue does not prevent the defendant from being liable here.
The defendant, by affixing the label to the jar, represented its contents to be dandelion and to have been "prepared" by his agent Gilbert. The word "prepared" on the label must be understood to mean that the article was manufactured by him, or that it had passed through some process under his hands that would give him personal knowledge of its true name and quality. Whether Foord would have been justified in selling the article on the faith of the defendant's label is an open question in an action by the plaintiffs against him; the court expresses no opinion on that point.
But it is clear that the defendant cannot set up as a defense that Foord sold the contents as represented. The label conveyed distinctly that the contents were extract of dandelion and that the defendant knew them to be such; so far as the defendant is concerned, Foord was under no obligation to test the truth of the representation. The judge's submission to the jury of the question of Foord's and Aspinwall's negligence cannot be complained of by the defendant.
Gridley, J., was not present when the cause was decided. All the other members of the court concurred in the opinion delivered by Chief Justice Ruggles.
Judgment affirmed.
Gardiner, J., concurred in affirming the judgment on the ground that selling belladonna without a label indicating that it was a poison was declared a misdemeanor by statute (2 R. S. 694, § 23), but he expressed no opinion upon the question whether, independent of the statute, the defendant would have been liable to these plaintiffs.