541 U.S. 615 (2004)
Officer Deion Nichols of the Norfolk, Virginia, Police Department observed petitioner Marcus Thornton driving a Lincoln Town Car.1 Thornton slowed down to avoid driving next to Nichols, who was in an unmarked police car. Nichols ran a check on petitioner's license tags, which revealed that the tags had been issued to a 1982 Chevy two-door and not to the Lincoln Town Car.2 Before Nichols had an opportunity to pull him over, petitioner drove into a parking lot, parked, and got out of the vehicle. Nichols saw petitioner leave his vehicle as he pulled in behind him.3
Nichols parked the patrol car, accosted petitioner, and asked him for his driver's license. He also told him that his license tags did not match the vehicle that he was driving.4 Petitioner appeared nervous, began rambling and licking his lips, and was sweating. Nichols asked petitioner if he had any narcotics or weapons on him or in his vehicle. Petitioner said no. Nichols then asked petitioner if he could pat him down, to which petitioner agreed.5
Nichols felt a bulge in petitioner's left front pocket and again asked him if he had any illegal narcotics on him. This time petitioner stated that he did, and he reached into his pocket and pulled out two individual bags, one containing three bags of marijuana and the other containing a large amount of crack cocaine.6
Nichols handcuffed petitioner, informed him that he was under arrest, and placed him in the back seat of the patrol car. He then searched petitioner's vehicle and found a BryCo 9-millimeter handgun under the driver's seat.7 A grand jury charged petitioner with possession with intent to distribute cocaine base, possession of a firearm after having been previously convicted of a crime punishable by a term of imprisonment exceeding one year, and possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime.8 Petitioner sought to suppress the firearm as the fruit of an unconstitutional search. The District Court denied petitioner's motion to suppress. A jury convicted petitioner on all three counts; he was sentenced to 180 months' imprisonment and 8 years of supervised release.9
Petitioner appealed the denial of the suppression motion. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the convictions.10 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider whether the rule of New York v. Belton applies when the officer first makes contact with the arrestee after the latter has stepped out of his vehicle.11
Whether the bright-line rule announced in New York v. Belton is confined to situations in which the police initiate contact with the occupant of a vehicle while that person is in the vehicle?12
The Fourth Amendment permits a vehicle search incident to a recent occupant’s arrest even if the arrestee is no longer in the car when the search is conducted.13
No. The Fourth Amendment permits a vehicle search incident to a recent occupant’s arrest even if the arrestee is no longer in the car when the search is conducted.14 The need for the rule does not depend on the arrestee being in the car at the moment the officer begins the search. The rule applies when the arrestee was a recent occupant of the vehicle.15 In this case Thornton had just alighted from his Lincoln Town Car in the parking lot moments before Nichols approached. He remained in close temporal and spatial proximity to the vehicle at the time of arrest and search.16
The concerns for officer safety and destruction of evidence are identical whether the suspect is arrested inside the car or immediately after exiting it.17 A bright-line rule that turns on the arrestee’s status as a recent occupant avoids the unworkable, fact-specific inquiries that would otherwise be required to determine reaching distance at the precise moment of arrest.18
The bright-line rule announced in New York v. Belton is not confined to situations in which the police initiate contact with the occupant of a vehicle while that person is in the vehicle.19
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justice Ginsburg
Justice Scalia concurs in the judgment but refuses to join the Court’s opinion.20 He explains that the search cannot be justified under Chimel once the arrestee is handcuffed and secured in the squad car. The risk that he would grab a weapon or evidentiary item from his car was remote in the extreme.21
He argues that Belton searches should be limited to cases in which it is reasonable to believe evidence relevant to the crime of arrest might be found in the vehicle.22 In this case the arrest was for a drug offense.23 It was reasonable to believe further contraband might be in the car from which Thornton had just alighted, so the search is valid on that narrower ground.24
Justice Ginsburg concurs in part and in the judgment.25 She agrees with the Court that the search of Thornton’s vehicle was lawful under the circumstances presented. However, she writes separately to express her view that the Belton rule should be limited to situations in which the arrestee is unsecured and within reaching distance of the passenger compartment at the time of the search.
She would not extend the doctrine to permit searches of a vehicle after the arrestee has already been handcuffed and placed in the back of a patrol car, as that eliminates the justification based on officer safety or evidence preservation under Chimel. The search of Thornton’s car was therefore not a valid search incident to arrest on the facts of this case.
Justice O'Connor joins all but footnote 4 of the Court’s opinion.26 She expresses dissatisfaction with the state of the law in this area.27 Lower court decisions seem now to treat the ability to search a vehicle incident to the arrest of a recent occupant as a police entitlement rather than as an exception justified by the twin rationales of Chimel.28
Although the approach Justice Scalia proposes appears to be built on firmer ground, she is reluctant to adopt it. This reluctance stems from the fact that neither the Government nor the petitioner has had a chance to speak to its merit.29
Joined by Justice Souter
Justice Stevens dissents.30 He contends that Belton was designed only for the narrow circumstance of an arrestee seated in or driving a vehicle when approached by police.31 When the arrestee is first accosted as a pedestrian, Chimel itself supplies all necessary guidance and there is no justification for extending Belton’s reach.32
He would reverse the judgment of the Fourth Circuit because the search of Thornton’s car after he had been secured in the patrol car exceeded the limits of a lawful search incident to arrest.33