572 U.S. 650 (2014)
On the early morning of December 31, 2008, in Bellaire, Texas, police officer John Edwards observed a black Nissan SUV turn quickly onto a residential street and park in front of a house.1 Edwards attempted to enter the vehicle's license plate number into his squad car's computer but entered an incorrect character, which matched a stolen vehicle of the same make and color.2 Edwards then exited his cruiser, drew his service pistol, and ordered Robert Tolan and his cousin Anthony Cooper, who had exited the vehicle, to the ground, accusing them of stealing the car.3 Tolan and Cooper complied, lying face down on the front porch of the home where Tolan lived with his parents.4
Hearing the commotion, Tolan's parents emerged from the house in their pajamas.5 Tolan's father identified Tolan and Cooper as family members and stated that they lived at the residence, while Tolan's mother explained that the vehicle belonged to the family.6 Edwards radioed for assistance, and Sergeant Jeffrey Cotton arrived shortly thereafter.7 Cotton drew his pistol and ordered Tolan's mother to stand against the garage door.8
The parties dispute what occurred next, with Tolan's mother and cousin testifying that Cotton grabbed her arm and slammed her against the garage door with sufficient force to cause bruises lasting several days, while Cotton testified that she flipped her arm up and told him to get his hands off her. Tolan testified that upon seeing his mother being pushed, he rose to his knees. Edwards and Cotton testified that Tolan rose to his feet.9 Tolan exclaimed from about 15 to 20 feet away, "get your fucking hands off my mom."10 The parties agree that Cotton then fired three shots at Tolan without verbal warning, one of which struck Tolan in the chest, collapsing his right lung and piercing his liver. Tolan survived but suffered a life-altering injury that ended his professional baseball career.11
In May 2009, Tolan, Cooper, and Tolan's parents filed suit in the Southern District of Texas under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging among other things that Cotton used excessive force against Tolan.12 After discovery, the District Court granted summary judgment to Cotton.13 The Fifth Circuit affirmed the judgment.14 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the case.15
Whether the Fifth Circuit failed to adhere to the requirement that the evidence of the nonmovant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor, when ruling on a motion for summary judgment in this case?16
In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the evidence of the nonmovant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.17 Courts may not resolve genuine disputes of fact in favor of the party seeking summary judgment, and this rule applies with equal force in qualified immunity cases where the clearly established prong is at issue.18
Yes. The Fifth Circuit credited Cotton's account that the porch was fairly dark and lit only by a decorative gas lamp, but Tolan's evidence showed two floodlights on the driveway, motion-activated lights in front of the house, and that Tolan was not in darkness at the time of the shooting. The court also credited Cotton's testimony that Tolan's mother was very agitated, while Tolan's evidence showed she was neither aggravated nor agitated when she explained the car belonged to the family.19 The Fifth Circuit further credited Edwards and Cotton's testimony that Tolan rose to his feet in a crouch or charging position, but Tolan's evidence showed he rose only to his knees, was not going anywhere, and did not jump up.
Finally, the court treated Tolan's exclamation as a verbal threat, but Tolan's evidence showed he was not screaming and a jury could infer the words were a son's plea rather than an overt threat of harm.
The Fifth Circuit erred in granting summary judgment because it weighed the evidence and resolved disputed factual issues in favor of Cotton rather than viewing the record in the light most favorable to Tolan.20
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Alito concurred in the judgment.21 He noted that the case presented a routine question of whether the evidence in the summary judgment record was just enough or not quite enough to support a grant of summary judgment.22 The Court of Appeals had invoked the correct standard.23
He expressed concern that granting certiorari here would substantially alter the Court's practice of rarely granting review for mere misapplication of a properly stated rule to the facts of a particular case.24 On the merits, he agreed that genuine issues of material fact existed and that summary judgment should not have been granted.25