334 U.S. 385 (1948)
In 1947 five Georgia residents engaged in commercial shrimp fishing and a Florida nonprofit corporation representing fish dealers filed suit in federal district court against South Carolina officials charged with enforcing state fishing laws.1 The plaintiffs sought to enjoin enforcement of several South Carolina statutes governing commercial shrimp trawling in the three-mile maritime belt off the South Carolina coast.2
The shrimp fishery extends along the Atlantic coast from North Carolina to Florida and involves migratory shrimp that move southward in late summer and fall before returning northward in spring.3 With no federal regulation in place, the four states most directly involved adopted separate conservation and licensing measures.4 These measures produced differing restrictions on non-resident fishing and led to reciprocal limitations that effectively partitioned the fishery at state lines.5
South Carolina statutes impose a tax of one-eighth cent per pound on green shrimp taken in the maritime belt, require non-resident boat owners to pay an annual license fee of $2,500 per boat while residents pay $25, condition issuance of non-resident licenses on proof that the applicant has paid South Carolina income taxes on profits from operations in the state during the preceding year, and direct that all licensed boats must dock at a South Carolina port, unload, pack, and stamp their catch before it may be shipped or transported to another state.6 The state also maintains an annual closed season from March 1 to July 1 and prohibits trawling in its inland waters.7
A three-judge federal district court upheld the statutes, denied injunctive relief, and dismissed the suit.8 The plaintiffs took a direct appeal, and the Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction.9 Some of the individual appellants had previously been convicted of shrimping out of season and in inland waters.10 The corporate plaintiff operates no fishing boats.11
Whether the individual and corporate appellants sufficiently demonstrated imminent irreparable injury and clean hands to warrant injunctive relief against enforcement of the South Carolina statutes?12
A plaintiff seeking to enjoin state statutes must demonstrate imminent irreparable injury for which there is no plain, adequate, and complete remedy at law and must come into court with clean hands.13
No. The corporate appellant operates no fishing boats and the record provides no indication of how the statutes affect it or cause irreparable injury, so it lacks standing.14 For the individual appellants, compliance with the license, tax, and docking statutes would require payment of large unrecoverable sums, defiance would risk heavy fines and imprisonment up to a year, and withdrawal from fishing would cause substantial uncompensated business losses, establishing irreparable injury.15 The prior convictions for out-of-season and inland shrimping bear no relation to the constitutionality of the challenged statutes and do not bar relief under the clean hands doctrine.16 For the income tax proof requirement, South Carolina law permits payment under protest followed by a state court suit to recover the amounts, supplying an adequate remedy at law.17
The District Court had jurisdiction over the claims of the individual appellants on all statutes except the income tax requirement.18
Whether South Carolina has jurisdiction to regulate shrimp fishing in the three-mile maritime belt off its coast?19
A state possesses sufficient interests in the shrimp fishery within three miles of its coast to exercise its police power to protect and regulate that fishery in the absence of conflicting federal legislation.20
Yes. The shrimp fishery is an integral resource extending from North Carolina to Florida with no federal regulation, and South Carolina maintains a closed season and inland trawling ban to conserve it.21 The Supreme Court in United States v. California recognized that states retain interests allowing regulation of activity in the marginal sea when no conflicting federal claim is asserted.22 The present record shows no such conflict, confirming that South Carolina may exercise its police power over shrimping in the three-mile belt.23
South Carolina has jurisdiction to regulate shrimp fishing in the three-mile maritime belt off its coast.24
Whether the one-eighth cent per pound tax on shrimp taken in the maritime belt violates the import-export or commerce clauses?25
Fish caught in the three-mile belt under state regulatory power are not imports, and a nondiscriminatory tax on the taking of shrimp before they enter interstate commerce does not violate the commerce clause.26
No. South Carolina's power to regulate fishing in the marginal sea means shrimp taken there are not imports in any realistic sense, and the statute on its face applies only to shrimp taken in state waters.27 The taxable event is the taking of shrimp, which occurs before the shrimp enter the flow of interstate commerce, and the tax does not discriminate against interstate shipments.28
The one-eighth cent per pound tax does not violate the import-export or commerce clauses.29
Whether the statute imposing license fees one hundred times higher on non-residents than residents violates the privileges and immunities clause or the equal protection clause?30
The privileges and immunities clause bars discrimination against citizens of other states unless there is a substantial reason for the discrimination beyond the mere fact of non-citizenship.31 The degree of discrimination must bear a close relation to that reason.32 Commercial shrimping in the marginal sea falls within the clause, and the ownership fiction does not justify expanding the McCready exception to migratory species.33
Yes. South Carolina's statute requires non-residents to pay $2,500 while residents pay $25, a disparity whose practical effect is virtually exclusionary as shown by the drop from 100 to 15 non-resident boats licensed after the amendment.34 No substantial reason exists, as the record shows no greater enforcement cost, larger boats, or different methods by non-residents.35 The migratory nature of the shrimp plus the absence of state ownership in the three-mile belt under United States v. California prevent extension of the McCready exception.36
The discrimination therefore violates the privileges and immunities clause.37
The non-resident license fee statute violates the privileges and immunities clause.38
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Frankfurter concurred in the judgment but rested the invalidity of the non-resident license fee on the commerce clause rather than the privileges and immunities clause.39 He viewed the privileges and immunities clause as presupposing the continued retention by the states of powers historically belonging to them, including the power to conserve resources for their own citizens, and warned against treating constitutional clauses as discrete rather than part of a coherent scheme.40 In his view, McCready v. Virginia reflected the common understanding that a state may utilize its resources on behalf of its own citizens, and the clause does not obliterate all special relations between a state and its citizens when the state acts within its borders without regulating interstate commerce.41
Whether the requirement that shrimp boats dock, unload, pack, and stamp their catch in South Carolina ports before shipping interstate burdens interstate commerce in violation of the commerce clause?42
Once a state permits shrimp to be taken and shipped in interstate commerce, it terminates its control and may not condition such shipments in a manner that burdens interstate commerce.43 A statute aimed directly at interstate shipments and that would block commerce for all practical purposes violates the commerce clause.44
Yes. A high proportion of shrimp caught off South Carolina is shipped in interstate commerce, and the docking, unloading, packing, and stamping requirements materially increase appellants' costs by forcing use of South Carolina facilities instead of their Georgia bases while diverting employment and business to South Carolina.45 South Carolina has not retained the shrimp for local consumption but has encouraged interstate shipments, so the Geer doctrine does not apply.46 The requirements are aimed directly at interstate commerce and would block it in practical effect.47
The docking and unloading requirement violates the commerce clause.48
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Rutledge agreed with the result and the Court's opinion subject to one qualification of the Fifth part.49 He emphasized that the requirement is aimed in terms directly at interstate commerce alone and thus is discriminatory in intent and effect.50 In his view the regulation is of such a character that, if applied, for all practical purposes it would block the commerce.51
The same considerations, he added, would nullify the license fees levied against nonresidents because their transportation of catches would be exclusively or practically exclusively in interstate commerce.52
Whether the income tax proof requirement for non-resident licenses provides an adequate remedy at law precluding injunctive relief?53
Yes. South Carolina law allows any taxpayer to pay a tax believed to be illegal under protest and then sue in state court to recover the amounts.56 The appellants made no showing that they could not raise their constitutional objections through this procedure, so they possess an adequate remedy at law for the income tax proof requirement.57
The income tax proof requirement is not subject to injunctive relief in federal court.58