137 S. Ct. 1645 (2017)
In 2001, land developer Steven Sherman paid $2.7 million to purchase nearly 400 acres of land in the town of Chester, New York.1 He planned to build a housing subdivision called MareBrook, complete with 385 housing units, a golf course, an onsite restaurant, and other amenities.2 Sherman applied for approval of his plan and thus began a journey through the Town's ever-changing labyrinth of red tape.3
In 2012, Sherman filed this suit against the Town in New York state court.4 The suit concerned the decade's worth of red tape put in place by the Town and its regulatory bodies.5 According to Sherman, the Town obstructed his plans for the subdivision and forced him to spend around $5.5 million to comply with the Town's demands.6 All of this left him financially exhausted and on the brink of personal bankruptcy.7 Sherman brought nine federal- and state-law claims against the Town, including a regulatory takings claim under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.8 The Town removed the case to a Federal District Court, which dismissed Sherman's takings claim as unripe.9 The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed the ripeness determination and remanded for the case to go forward.10 Sherman died in 2013, and his estate replaced him as the plaintiff.11
On remand, real estate development company Laroe Estates, Inc. filed a motion to intervene of right under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a)(2).12 Laroe alleged that in 2003 it had entered into an agreement with Sherman regarding the MareBrook property.13 Under this agreement, Laroe was to make $6 million in payments to Sherman, secured by a mortgage on all of the development, and Sherman was to sell Laroe parcels of land within the proposed subdivision when the MareBrook plan was approved.14 While this agreement was in place and Sherman continued his futile quest for regulatory approval, Laroe paid Sherman more than $2.5 million.15 In 2013, TD Bank commenced a foreclosure proceeding on Sherman's property.16 In an effort to save the deal, Laroe and Sherman entered into a new agreement.17 That agreement provided that the purchase price of the property would be the $2.5 million that Laroe had already advanced Sherman plus any amount Sherman had to pay to settle with TD Bank.18 The settlement did fail, and TD Bank took over the property.19 But Laroe never terminated its agreement with Sherman.20
Laroe asserted that under New York law it is the equitable owner of the real property at issue in Sherman's suit. Along with its other intervention-related pleadings, Laroe filed an intervenor's complaint asserting a regulatory takings claim that was substantively identical to Sherman's.21 Laroe's complaint sought, among other things, a judgment against the Town awarding Laroe damages, namely compensation for the taking of Laroe's interest in the subject real property.22 The District Court denied Laroe's motion to intervene.23 The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed.24 The Supreme Court granted certiorari.25
Whether a litigant seeking to intervene as of right under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a)(2) must meet the requirements of Article III standing if the intervenor wishes to pursue relief not requested by a plaintiff?26
A litigant seeking to intervene as of right under Rule 24(a)(2) must meet the requirements of Article III standing if the intervenor wishes to pursue relief not requested by a plaintiff.27 To establish Article III standing, a plaintiff seeking compensatory relief must have (1) suffered an injury in fact, (2) that is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct of the defendant, and (3) that is likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.28 The plaintiff must demonstrate standing for each claim he seeks to press and for each form of relief that is sought.29
Yes. The same principle applies to intervenors of right.30 For all relief sought, there must be a litigant with standing, whether that litigant joins the lawsuit as a plaintiff or an intervenor of right.31 Laroe filed a motion to intervene of right under Rule 24(a)(2).32
It also filed an intervenor's complaint asserting a regulatory takings claim that was substantively identical to Sherman's and seeking a judgment awarding Laroe damages for the taking of its interest in the subject real property.33 If Laroe seeks a money judgment of its own running directly against the Town, then it seeks damages different from those sought by Sherman and must establish its own Article III standing to intervene.34
An intervenor of right must demonstrate Article III standing when it seeks additional relief beyond that requested by the plaintiff.35
Whether Laroe Estates, Inc. seeks relief different from that sought by Steven Sherman?36
If Laroe wants only a money judgment of its own running directly against the Town, then it seeks damages different from those sought by Sherman and must establish its own Article III standing to intervene. The record is unclear on that point and the Court of Appeals did not resolve that ambiguity.37
No. The record leaves the question ambiguous.38 Laroe's complaint requests a judgment awarding damages to Laroe. Sherman requests compensation for the taking of his interest in the property.39 At some points during argument Laroe indicated it seeks the same damages as Sherman but at other points suggested separate awards might be necessary, leaving the question ambiguous.40
The Court of Appeals is to address on remand the question whether Laroe seeks different relief than Sherman.41