480 U.S. 386, 107 S. Ct. 1187, 94 L. Ed. 2d 405 (1987)
In 1983, a grand jury in Rockingham County, New Hampshire, indicted David Champy for aggravated felonious sexual assault.1 Respondent Bernard Rumery, a friend of Champy, telephoned Mary Deary, who was the victim and expected principal witness against Champy.2 Deary reported to Newton Police Chief David Barrett that Rumery was attempting to persuade her to drop the charges.3
On May 11, 1983, Rumery spoke with Deary again.4 According to police records, Deary told Barrett that Rumery had threatened her, saying she would "end up like" two women recently murdered in Lowell, Massachusetts, if she proceeded with the Champy case.5 Barrett arrested Rumery and charged him with witness tampering in violation of New Hampshire law, a Class B felony.6
Rumery retained experienced criminal defense attorney Stephen Woods.7 Woods contacted Deputy County Attorney Brian Graf and warned that the charges would be dismissed and a civil suit would follow.8 After discussions, Graf and Woods agreed that Graf would dismiss the charges if Rumery executed a release of any claims against the town of Newton, its officials, and Deary.9
Woods drafted the release-dismissal agreement.10 He discussed it with Rumery for about an hour, and three days later Rumery signed it on June 6, 1983.11 The criminal charges against Rumery were then dismissed.12
Ten months later, on April 13, 1984, Rumery filed a complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the United States District Court for the District of New Hampshire against the town and its officers.13 He alleged violations of his constitutional rights through arrest, false imprisonment, and the witness tampering charge.14 The defendants moved to dismiss based on the release, and the district court granted the motion after finding the agreement voluntary.15
The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reversed, holding that release-dismissal agreements are unenforceable as against public policy.16 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the conflict among the circuits.17
Whether a court properly may enforce an agreement in which a criminal defendant releases his right to file an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in return for a prosecutor's dismissal of pending criminal charges?18
A promise is unenforceable if the interest in its enforcement is outweighed in the circumstances by a public policy harmed by enforcement of the agreement.19 Release-dismissal agreements are enforceable when they are voluntary, free from prosecutorial misconduct, and serve legitimate public interests such as protecting witnesses and conserving prosecutorial resources.20
Yes. The established facts show that Rumery, a sophisticated businessman, was represented by experienced counsel who discussed the agreement with him for an hour, and Rumery considered it for three days before signing.21 The prosecutor had a legitimate reason related to his duties: protecting Mary Deary, the victim in the related sexual assault case, from the trauma of testifying.22 There is no evidence of duress, fraud, or unfounded charges.23
These facts satisfy the elements of voluntariness and public interest under the governing standard.24
The release-dismissal agreement is enforceable, and the district court correctly dismissed the § 1983 action.25
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Justice O'Connor joined the majority but wrote separately to stress that release-dismissal agreements must be evaluated case by case.26 She placed the burden on defendants to prove that any such agreement was voluntary and served the public interest rather than resulting from overreaching.27 She identified relevant factors including whether the defendant was counseled, the seriousness of the charge, and the existence of a legitimate criminal justice objective.28
In this case she concluded the agreement was enforceable because Rumery was represented by counsel, the prosecutor acted to protect the sexual assault victim from further trauma, and no evidence of misconduct existed.29
Whether release-dismissal agreements are per se unenforceable as contrary to public policy?30
Although release-dismissal agreements may in some cases threaten important public interests, the mere possibility of harm does not justify a per se rule of invalidity.31 Such agreements can further legitimate interests including the conservation of prosecutorial resources and the protection of witnesses from trauma.32
No. The Court of Appeals adopted an overly broad per se rule based on concerns about coercion and prosecutorial misconduct, but these concerns do not warrant invalidating all such agreements.33 The facts demonstrate that this agreement was the product of a voluntary choice by Rumery and served a valid prosecutorial purpose without any indication of misconduct.34
Release-dismissal agreements are not per se unenforceable; their validity must be determined on a case-by-case basis.35
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall, And Blackmun
Justice Stevens dissented on the ground that the inherent imbalance of power between prosecutor and defendant renders release-dismissal agreements inherently suspect even when the defendant makes a knowing choice.36 He argued that such agreements exact a price unrelated to the defendant's conduct and allow prosecutors to represent conflicting interests of the public, police, and witnesses simultaneously.37 Because the prosecutor already enjoys absolute immunity, Stevens saw no need to enforce the agreements at the expense of meritorious § 1983 claims.38
He would have affirmed the Court of Appeals and held this agreement unenforceable to protect the federal interests embodied in § 1983.39