308 U.S. 66 (1939)
Amelia Pelkes died testate in Spokane, Washington, in 1922, survived by her husband John Pelkes and her daughter Katherine Mason from a prior marriage.1 As part of her community estate she left 30,598 shares of Sunshine Mining Company stock.2 The shares were considered valueless and therefore were neither inventoried nor appraised.3 The order of distribution nevertheless assigned an undivided three-fourths interest to Pelkes and a one-fourth interest to Mason under an omnibus clause covering unknown property.4 Pelkes and Mason divided the inventoried assets between themselves without following the order of distribution.5 This gave rise to a dispute over the stock.6 Pelkes and his later assignee Evelyn H. Treinies maintained that Mason had released all interest in the shares in exchange for the partition.7 Mason contended that Pelkes had agreed to hold 15,299 shares in trust for her.8
In August 1934 Mason filed suit in the District Court of Shoshone County, Idaho, against Pelkes, Treinies, the Sunshine Mining Company, and others.9 She alleged ownership of the 15,299 shares under the oral trust. She sought an order directing the company to recognize her title and to pay her the accumulated dividends.10 After an appeal to the Supreme Court of Idaho, the Idaho District Court entered a final decree on August 18, 1936, that the stock and dividends belonged to Mason.11 This Court denied certiorari to the Idaho Supreme Court.12
Before entry of the first Idaho decree, Mason petitioned the Superior Court of Spokane County, Washington, in the probate proceedings for Amelia Pelkes' estate.13 She sought removal of Pelkes as executor for failure to file a report of distribution and for dissipation of the stock. Pelkes responded by cross-petition claiming ownership of the shares.14 The Washington Superior Court entered judgment on May 31, 1935, upholding Pelkes' full ownership.15 After the Idaho Supreme Court ruled against them, Pelkes and Treinies filed a separate action in the Washington Superior Court against Mason and others to quiet title to the stock.16 They alleged that the Idaho decree was invalid for lack of jurisdiction.
At that stage the Sunshine Mining Company, a Washington corporation, filed the present bill of interpleader in the United States District Court for the District of Idaho against Treinies and other Washington citizens on one side and Mason, her husband, and other Idaho citizens on the other side.17 The District Court entered a decree that was affirmed by the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. This Court granted certiorari to review the jurisdictional and res-judicata questions presented by the conflicting state-court judgments.18
Whether the United States district court had jurisdiction under the Act of January 20, 1936, over an interpleader action in which the stakeholder complainant was a citizen of the same state as one group of claimants?19
The constitutional grant of diversity jurisdiction covers interpleader suits when a stakeholder deposits the disputed property into the court registry and obtains discharge.20 This leaves a real controversy between claimants who are citizens of different states even if the stakeholder shares citizenship with one group.21
Yes. The Sunshine Mining Company, a Washington corporation, filed the bill of interpleader in the United States District Court for the District of Idaho against Evelyn H. Treinies and other Washington citizens claiming the stock on one side and Katherine Mason and other Idaho citizens claiming the stock on the other side. A real controversy existed between the adverse claimants who were citizens of different states, and that controversy could have been litigated directly between them in federal court.22
The deposit and discharge demonstrated the stakeholder's disinterestedness as between the claimants.23
The district court had jurisdiction under the Interpleader Act.24
Whether inclusion of a state-court judge, an estate administrator, and a court receiver as defendants in the interpleader violated the Eleventh Amendment?25
The Eleventh Amendment does not bar an interpleader action when the state itself has no interest in the proceeding and the final decree does not enjoin the state-court judge or receiver.26
No. The final decree entered by the district court did not enjoin the receiver or the judge of the Superior Court of Washington. Only Pelkes' administrator and Evelyn H. Treinies were enjoined from further prosecution of the Washington action to quiet title.27 The State of Washington possessed no interest in the stock or dividends that were the subject of the interpleader.28
Inclusion of those defendants did not violate the Eleventh Amendment.29
Whether Section 265 of the Judicial Code barred the district court from enjoining further prosecution of related suits in state courts?30
Section 265 of the Judicial Code, which generally forbids federal courts from staying state-court proceedings, yields to the later-enacted Interpleader Act that expressly authorizes injunctions against parties prosecuting suits in state courts concerning the interpleaded property.31
No. The Interpleader Act, enacted after Section 265, authorizes the district court to enjoin parties to the interpleader from further prosecuting any suit in state court on account of the property involved. Such authority is essential to the protection of the interpleader jurisdiction and constitutes a valid exercise of judicial power.32 Section 265 operates only as a limitation on general equity powers that Congress may vary to meet the requirements of federal litigation.33
Section 265 did not bar the district court from enjoining the state-court proceedings.34
Whether the Idaho District Court decree of August 18, 1936, was res judicata on the ownership of the Sunshine Mining Company stock and on the validity of the Washington Superior Court judgment of May 31, 1935?35
Yes. The Idaho District Court of Shoshone County, a court of general jurisdiction, determined after appeal to the Supreme Court of Idaho that the Washington Superior Court lacked jurisdiction over the stock controversy once the estate had been distributed and that the stock and dividends belonged to Katherine Mason.38 That determination resolved the basic question raised by Evelyn H. Treinies in the interpleader proceeding concerning exclusive jurisdiction in the Washington probate court.39
The issue of jurisdiction vel non of the Washington court therefore could not be relitigated in the interpleader action even though the question had been litigated and decided differently in the Washington proceedings.40
The Idaho decree was res judicata and binding on the parties.41