582 U.S. 449 (2017)
The Trinity Lutheran Church Child Learning Center is a preschool and daycare center open year-round in Boone County, Missouri.1 It was established as a nonprofit in 1980.2 The Center merged with Trinity Lutheran Church in 1985 and operates on church property.3 It admits students of any religion with an enrollment of about ninety children ages two to five.4
In 2012 the Center applied to Missouri’s Scrap Tire Program.5 The program is run by the Department of Natural Resources.6 It offers competitive reimbursement grants to qualifying nonprofits for installing playground surfaces made from recycled tires.7 The Center sought funds to replace its coarse pea gravel surface with a pour-in-place rubber surface.8 The Center disclosed in its application that it was a ministry of the Church whose mission included allowing a child to grow spiritually.9
The Center ranked fifth among forty-four applicants.10 The Department maintained a strict policy of denying grants to any applicant owned or controlled by a church, sect, or other religious entity.11 The Department rejected the application in a letter explaining that Article I, Section 7 of the Missouri Constitution barred providing financial assistance directly to a church.12 The Department ultimately awarded fourteen grants that year.13
Trinity Lutheran Church sued the Director of the Department in federal district court.14 It alleged that the denial of the grant solely because of the applicant’s religious status violated the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment.15 Trinity Lutheran sought declaratory and injunctive relief.16
The district court granted the Department’s motion to dismiss.17 It likened the case to Locke v. Davey.18 The court held that the Free Exercise Clause did not require the State to make funds available under the Scrap Tire Program to religious institutions.19
A divided panel of the Eighth Circuit affirmed.20 The court concluded that the State could rely on an applicant’s religious status to deny the application even though awarding the grant would not violate the federal Establishment Clause.21 Judge Gruender dissented on the ground that Locke did not leave states with unfettered discretion to exclude the religious from generally available public benefits.22 Rehearing en banc was denied by an equally divided court.23
The Supreme Court granted certiorari sub nom. Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Pauley.24
Whether the Missouri Department of Natural Resources policy of denying a grant under the Scrap Tire Program to Trinity Lutheran Church solely because the applicant was a church violated the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment?25
The Free Exercise Clause protects religious observers against unequal treatment and subjects to the most exacting scrutiny laws that target the religious for special disabilities based on their religious status.26 Denying a generally available benefit solely on account of religious identity imposes a penalty on the free exercise of religion that can be justified only by a state interest of the highest order.27
Yes. The Department’s policy expressly discriminates against otherwise eligible recipients by disqualifying them from a public benefit solely because of their religious character.28 The Trinity Lutheran Church Child Learning Center, operating as a ministry of the Church on church property, ranked fifth among forty-four applicants but was denied the grant because the Department maintained a strict policy of denying grants to any applicant owned or controlled by a church.29 This policy puts Trinity Lutheran to a choice between participating in an otherwise available benefit program or remaining a religious institution.30
The Department has identified no compelling interest of the highest order to justify the discrimination. It relies instead on Missouri’s constitutional preference for greater separation of church and state.31
The Department’s policy violates the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment.32
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justice Gorsuch
Justice Thomas concurred in part in the judgment.33 He joined the Court’s opinion except for footnote 3.34 Thomas wrote separately to emphasize that the Court’s decision does not address or affect the constitutionality of state “no aid” provisions that prohibit the use of public funds to support religious institutions.35
Those provisions raise different questions not presented here.36 He stressed that the Free Exercise Clause generally prohibits laws that facially discriminate against religion, compelling this conclusion.37 Thomas noted that the Court in Locke permitted a State to disfavor religion by imposing what it deemed a relatively minor burden on religious exercise.38 This advanced the State’s antiestablishment interest in not funding the religious training of clergy.39
Because the Court today appropriately construes Locke narrowly and no party has asked to reconsider it, he joined nearly all of the Court’s opinion.4041
Joined by Justice Thomas
Justice Gorsuch concurred in part.42 He joined nearly all of the Court’s opinion. Gorsuch offered two modest qualifications to the opinion.43
He expressed doubts about the stability of any distinction between religious status and religious use.44 The Free Exercise Clause guarantees the free exercise of religion, not just inward belief.45 The government may not force people to choose between participation in a public program and their right to free exercise of religion, whether described as status or use.46
Justice Breyer concurred in the judgment.47 He agreed with much of the Court’s opinion and its result.48 Breyer emphasized the particular nature of the public benefit at issue in this case.49
The program is designed to secure or improve the health and safety of children through playground resurfacing.50 He saw no significant difference from providing ordinary police and fire protection to religious institutions.51 Breyer would leave the application of the Free Exercise Clause to other kinds of public benefits for another day.52
Joined by Justice Ginsburg
Justice Sotomayor dissented, joined by Justice Ginsburg.53 She argued that the Court profoundly changes the relationship between religious institutions and the civil government.54 The decision holds for the first time that the Constitution requires the government to provide public funds directly to a church.55
Sotomayor contended that the Free Exercise Clause has never been interpreted to require such funding.56 The Establishment Clause prohibits direct financial aid to religious institutions.57 Missouri has a compelling interest in ensuring that public funds are not used to support religious institutions.58
The decision will lead to a proliferation of lawsuits demanding public funds for religious institutions.59