1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18715 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)
In response to a jury verdict awarding $700,000 in compensatory damages, plus an additional award of back pay, for an employment discrimination case brought under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983, defendant Thomas Cooper moves for judgment as a matter of law pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(b). In the alternative, defendant moves for a new trial pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(a), or for a remittitur pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e). Plaintiff Vipin Trivedi asserts that defendant's motions for judgment as a matter of law and for a new trial were not timely filed, contests the substance of these motions, and requests an award of back pay.
For the reasons set forth below, I find that reasonable and fair-minded persons could have arrived at the same verdict on liability as the jury and, therefore, will not grant judgment as a matter of law. Additionally, I find that the jury's verdict on liability was so bound up with credibility assessments that I will not disturb those determinations by granting defendant's motion for a new trial. I do find, however, that the $700,000 award was excessive given the typical awards in this area and the evidence presented at trial. Therefore, plaintiff shall choose between a remitted damages award of $50,000 as the total judgment, without an additional award of back pay, or a new trial on liability and damages for the hostile work environment claim.
Mr. Trivedi, who is of East Asian Indian national origin, began work as a research scientist at the New York State Office of Mental Health in 1982. On March 28, 1995, Mr. Trivedi filed a claim in federal court under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983 and N.Y. Exec. Law § 296, alleging that because of his race or national origin his supervisor Mr. Cooper harassed him, failed to promote him, and retaliated against him for seeking legal assistance in connection with the discrimination. Mr. Trivedi sued Mr. Cooper and the New York State Office of Mental Health. The claims against the Office of Mental Health were dismissed before trial on Eleventh Amendment grounds. This Court conducted a jury trial from October 7-16, 1996.
At trial Mr. Trivedi asserted that Mr. Cooper assigned him menial tasks in the lab, prevented him from collaborating with other researchers, did not give him work that would lead to publication, prevented him from attending professional seminars and conferences, barred him from using the computer, and prevented him from using the library. The evidence showed that the menial tasks (for example, packing samples for shipment) took about two hours a week and that the professional staff in the office were the only people normally available to perform that work. While others as well as Mr. Trivedi performed work described as menial, Mr. Trivedi was the only research scientist doing it on a regular basis during substantial periods of time. Taken in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, the evidence also established that the kind of research work Mr. Trivedi performed was important but not highly creative and was unlikely to lead to publication or career advancement.
Mr. Trivedi did not travel as much as some co-workers to seminars or conferences; such travel, however, was funded by grants the researchers obtained for themselves. Mr. Trivedi's contentions regarding the computers and library were unsupported by other evidence: the computers and library were available for anyone to use and Mr. Trivedi did not need permission to use them. The most potent evidence of a hostile work environment, however, was Mr. Cooper's alleged use of racial slurs from 1986 onward in speaking to the plaintiff. Mr. Cooper denied making such statements.
Mr. Trivedi also maintained that Mr. Cooper refused on four occasions in the spring of 1994 to sponsor him for promotion -- a sponsorship that Mr. Trivedi stated was essential to receiving the promotion. Mr. Trivedi testified that in two of these conversations Mr. Cooper ridiculed his request by using racial epithets.
Mr. Cooper testified that Mr. Trivedi did not ask him in 1994 for support for a promotion and that there were two avenues to promotion: sponsorship by a supervisor and self-nomination, where an individual directly approaches the director of the facility to seek a promotion. It was fair to conclude, however, that without a supervisor's support self-nomination was futile.
Finally, Mr. Trivedi contended that Mr. Cooper retaliated against him for seeking legal assistance after Mr. Cooper learned of this action in January 1993 by giving him a poor evaluation in mid-1993. Mr. Cooper denied this, stating that Mr. Trivedi's work performance declined prior to 1993. In his 1991-92 evaluation, signed in August 1992, Mr. Cooper rated him only "effective," not "highly effective," as in previous evaluations. Mr. Trivedi's deteriorating performance in 1992 was dramatically demonstrated by his bizarre behavior at two counseling sessions in 1992.
At the first meeting in July 1992, Mr. Trivedi taped his mouth shut with gauze he wrapped around his head and refused to speak. At the second meeting in December 1992, he wadded his ears with cotton, wore a wool hat, pretended he could not hear, and displayed a sign with directions in case of fire. Mr. Trivedi explained these actions by saying that he did not want to say anything in the meetings because he no longer trusted Mr. Cooper and felt anything he said would be misrepresented. He asserted the behavior would force others to record the behavior rather than misquote him.
Mr. Cooper called two expert psychiatrists, Drs. Leonard Rubin and Mark Russakoff, to testify that Mr. Trivedi was mentally ill. Dr. Rubin testified that Mr. Trivedi's actions at the counseling sessions were a sign of "magical thinking," characteristic of people who have psychotic thought disorders and cannot distinguish fantasy from reality. Based on his 1995 examination, Dr. Rubin diagnosed Mr. Trivedi with delusional disorder. Dr. Russakoff, who attended the December 1992 counseling session, testified that Mr. Trivedi demonstrated signs consistent with manifestations of paranoid schizophrenia. Plaintiff did not introduce psychiatric evidence to dispute that testimony.
At the close of plaintiff's case defendant moved for a directed verdict on two of the three claims, retaliation and failure to promote. In his post-trial motion, he moves for judgment as a matter of law as to all three claims.
On October 15, 1996, the jury found that Mr. Cooper created a racially hostile work environment, failed to promote the plaintiff, and retaliated against the plaintiff. The jury awarded Mr. Trivedi $700,000 in compensatory damages for pain and suffering for the hostile work environment claim, determined that Mr. Trivedi was entitled to back pay for the failure to promote claim, and awarded $1 in nominal damages for the retaliation claim. On October 16, 1996, the jury concluded that Mr. Trivedi was not entitled to punitive damages.
Plaintiff asserts that defendant did not timely file his motions. Plaintiff argues that pursuant to Rule 50(b) a party must renew its motion for judgment as a matter of law or make a motion for a new trial no later than ten days after the entry of judgment. The Second Circuit has held that a district court has no discretion to extend this ten-day period. In this case, however, since the judgment has not yet been entered, the clock has not yet started to run and defendant had not exceeded the ten-day limit when he filed his papers on November 12, 1996.
Defendant moves for judgment as a matter of law as to all three claims. Defendant waived his right to make such a motion for the hostile work environment claim because he did not preserve this right during trial by moving for a directed verdict at the end of plaintiff's case. The rule is well established that a motion for directed verdict at the close of all the evidence is a prerequisite for judgment as a matter of law.
With respect to the retaliation and failure to promote claims, defendant preserved his right to renew the motion. In ruling on such a motion, the court must deny it unless, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, the evidence is such that without weighing credibility or otherwise considering the weight of the evidence there can be but one conclusion that reasonable persons could reach. A motion for judgment as a matter of law should be granted only when there is either a complete absence of evidence supporting the verdict or such an overwhelming amount of evidence in favor of the movant that reasonable and fair-minded persons could not arrive at a verdict against it.
To determine liability in this case the jury had to make credibility findings, particularly between the plaintiff and defendant. The jury's verdict indicates it concluded the plaintiff was credible. Given the jury's finding of credibility, there was a sufficient basis for the verdict. Consequently, I do not find the verdict to be the result of sheer surmise or conjecture, nor do I find that no reasonable person could have arrived at it. Therefore, I will not grant judgment as a matter of law on either the failure to promote or retaliation claim.
Plaintiff also requests a new trial on all three claims pursuant to Rule 59. The Court may grant a new trial if it is convinced that the jury's verdict was against the weight of the evidence or that the jury reached a seriously erroneous result. The court is free to weigh the evidence itself and need not view it in the light most favorable to the verdict winner, but where resolution depends on assessment of witness credibility it is proper for the court to refrain from setting aside the verdict.
I find that the jury verdicts on the failure to promote and retaliation claims were not against the weight of the evidence and therefore will not disturb those determinations. The issue of whether the verdict on the hostile work environment claim is against the weight of the evidence is a much closer question.
The evidence strongly suggested that the plaintiff suffered from mental illness and fabricated or imagined the discrimination. The testimony of Drs. Rubin and Russakoff that Mr. Trivedi suffered from delusional disorder or paranoia was unrebutted. The plaintiff did not present expert testimony to rebut those opinions, relying instead on non-expert arguments that the experts had insufficient contact with him or that the experts' opinions depended on the assumption that discriminatory acts had not occurred.
There was strong record evidence corroborating the experts' opinions. The most dramatic evidence was the plaintiff's aberrant behavior at the two counseling sessions. The plaintiff did not deny that he had behaved as described but sought to explain the behavior as a rational response to a belief that he could no longer trust the defendant not to distort his words. In addition, the nature and content of plaintiff's handwritten writings attached to his annual evaluation forms were further support for the experts' conclusions. The allegations at trial -- for example, repeated public use of demeaning racial epithets over many years with no witnesses identified, and claims that access to computers and the library were blocked -- were not supported by other evidence.
It is somewhat ironic that the plaintiff's most compelling argument to rebut the evidence of his mental condition was the defendant's decision not to terminate the plaintiff, which the defendant explained as motivated by concern for preserving funding for the research slot. Given the seriously disruptive nature of the plaintiff's described mental condition, the jury could find that explanation inadequate.
Nonetheless, I find that while the evidence at trial strongly supports the defendant's claim that the jury's verdict on the hostile work environment was against the weight of the evidence and seriously erroneous, because the resolution of that claim depended critically on the jury's credibility assessments of the parties it would be inappropriate for the Court to grant a new trial on that claim.
Remittitur is the process by which a court compels a plaintiff to choose between reduction of an excessive verdict and a new trial. Before ordering remittitur the court must determine whether the verdict is excessive; if it shocks the judicial conscience the court should remit the award to the maximum amount that would not be excessive. While the jury has broad discretion to calculate damages, there is an upper limit and whether that has been surpassed is a question of law.
To determine whether the award is excessive it is appropriate to examine awards in similar cases and determine whether the award is within a reasonable range, not merely tally high and low awards. The court should examine the particular facts and circumstances of other cases and compare them to the instant case; the court may also look beyond § 1983 cases to awards under comparable law.
Plaintiff cites only two cases with substantial awards, but an examination of other circuit and district court cases demonstrates that upholding a $700,000 compensatory award for emotional distress would be unprecedented. For example, the Second Circuit affirmed a remittitur of nearly $498,000 for pain and suffering to $5,000 in an age discrimination case where the evidence of emotional distress was scant. In other cases involving race discrimination and related claims, awards upheld or remitted by the courts have been far smaller than $700,000. A survey of cases reveals awards often in the range of a few thousand to, in extraordinary circumstances, up to $100,000 for emotional distress where there was evidence of suicide attempts or hospitalization.
In addition to comparing awards, the court must examine whether there is adequate evidentiary support for the emotional distress award. It is appropriate to reduce an award where evidence as to the magnitude and duration of emotional injury is sparse in order to guard against awards based on speculation. Here Mr. Trivedi introduced very limited evidence on emotional distress: his own testimony that he felt "starved of professional growth" and that the discrimination made him feel insulted, indignant, unhappy, and emotionally upset. These conclusory statements, without corroborating evidence of counseling, physical manifestations, or other indicia of severe distress, are insufficient to support a $700,000 award.
Given the facts presented at trial, I find that $50,000 is a generous award, represents the maximum that does not shock the judicial conscience in this case, and is not out of line with comparable cases.
When a court grants a new trial as an alternative to remittitur it must determine whether to grant a new trial on all issues or only on a discrete issue such as damages. A partial new trial may be proper only when the issue to be retried is so distinct and separable from the others that a trial of it alone may be had without injustice. The determination rests on the separability of the issues.
In Wheatley v. Beetar the Second Circuit ordered a new trial on damages after a bifurcated trial where liability was supported by substantial evidence. The instant case is different: Mr. Trivedi did not introduce comparable uncontroverted evidence of liability. Here the amount of damages is integrally linked to liability because a jury would need to consider causation between Mr. Cooper's actions and Mr. Trivedi's injuries and the extent of harassment to determine an appropriate award.
For these reasons, a new trial on damages cannot be separated from a new trial on liability; any new trial must encompass both issues.
Prior to trial the parties agreed that, should the jury find for the plaintiff on the failure to promote claim, the Court would decide whether and to what extent the plaintiff was entitled to back pay, based on the evidence at trial. The parties agree that those promoted in 1994 have not yet received any pay increases because the legislature has not funded them. Plaintiff requests an award of $3,000 per year with interest from April 1994 until any retroactive payment, while defendant contends it is the State's policy not to make retroactive payments and that plaintiff cannot require Mr. Cooper to pay back pay.
I find that plaintiff is not entitled to any award of back pay. Plaintiff presented no evidence at trial that he would have received additional money for a promotion, since others promoted in 1994 have not received salary increases to date and the Office of Mental Health has indicated it will not make retroactive salary increases. Plaintiff himself admitted it would be unjust to award him back pay when others who were promoted in 1994 will not receive retroactive raises.
I will not grant judgment as a matter of law on either ground preserved at trial because the jury was justified in rendering a verdict for the plaintiff. I do not find that the jury based their verdict on sheer surmise and conjecture, nor do I find that a reasonable and fair-minded person could not have found for the plaintiff on liability. Given the importance of credibility findings to the jury's verdict, I will not grant defendant's motion for a new trial on liability. I do find, however, that the compensatory damages award of $700,000 for pain and suffering is excessive given the typical awards in this area and the evidence presented at trial. Therefore, I will remit the award to $50,000, which plaintiff may accept in lieu of a new trial. If plaintiff elects a new trial, that trial must address both the defendant's liability for creating a hostile work environment and damages on that claim since those issues are interwoven.
It is hereby ORDERED that plaintiff's attorney may file with the Clerk of the Court on or before December 30, 1996, an acceptance of a remittitur of $650,000, for a final judgment of $50,000 for all damages connected with this case.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that if plaintiff's attorney does not file an acceptance of the remittitur on or before December 30, 1996, a new trial on liability and damages for the hostile work environment claim will commence on a date to be set by the Court.
SO ORDERED.