140 S. Ct. 2412 (2020)
In the summer of 2018, the New York County District Attorney’s Office opened an investigation into business transactions involving multiple individuals whose conduct may have violated state law.1
A year later, the office acting on behalf of a grand jury served a subpoena duces tecum on Mazars USA, LLP, the personal accounting firm of President Donald J. Trump, directing production of financial records relating to the President and his businesses, including tax returns and related schedules from 2011 to the present.2
The President, acting in his personal capacity, sued the district attorney and Mazars in Federal District Court to enjoin enforcement of the subpoena.3 He sought a declaratory judgment that the subpoena is invalid and unenforceable while the President is in office and a permanent injunction against any enforcement action.4
The District Court abstained from exercising jurisdiction and dismissed the case based on Younger v. Harris, and in the alternative held that the President was not entitled to injunctive relief.5 The Second Circuit held that Younger abstention was inappropriate because the doctrine’s core justification of preventing friction between States and the Federal Government is diminished when state and federal actors are already in conflict.6
On the merits, the Court of Appeals agreed with the District Court’s denial of a preliminary injunction, concluding that presidential immunity does not bar enforcement of a state grand jury subpoena directing a third party to produce non-privileged material even when the subject matter under investigation pertains to the President.7 It rejected the argument that a state grand jury subpoena must satisfy a heightened showing of need.8
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide whether Article II and the Supremacy Clause categorically preclude, or require a heightened standard for, the issuance of a state criminal subpoena to a sitting President.9
Whether Article II and the Supremacy Clause categorically preclude the issuance of a state criminal subpoena to a sitting President?10
Article II and the Supremacy Clause do not categorically preclude the issuance of a state criminal subpoena to a sitting President.11 Historical precedent from Burr and Nixon establishes that Presidents are subject to judicial process in criminal matters.12 The three asserted burdens of diversion, stigma, and harassment do not justify absolute immunity.13
No. The rule applies directly to the established facts.14 The New York County District Attorney’s Office served the subpoena duces tecum on Mazars USA, LLP for the President’s personal financial records including tax returns from 2011 to the present.15 This occurred in connection with an investigation into business transactions.16 The President sued in his personal capacity seeking declaratory and injunctive relief.17
Two centuries of practice confirm that a properly tailored subpoena does not impair Article II functions even when the President is under investigation.18
Article II and the Supremacy Clause do not categorically preclude enforcement of the subpoena.19
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Joined by Justice Gorsuch
Justice Kavanaugh concurred in the judgment.20 He agreed that a President does not possess absolute immunity from a state criminal subpoena.21 Kavanaugh would have applied the Nixon demonstrated-specific-need standard to balance the State’s interest in criminal investigation against the President’s Article II interest in performing duties without undue interference.22
He observed that the majority’s standards address similar concerns such as bad faith, malice, relevance, overbreadth, and interference with official duties.23 Kavanaugh noted that lower courts will need to examine why the State wants the information, how much it needs it, whether it could be obtained elsewhere, and whether compliance would unduly burden the President’s official duties.24 This approach ensures protection for the Presidency while accommodating legitimate investigative needs.25
Justice Thomas dissented and would have vacated and remanded for application of the Burr standard.26 Under that standard the President may obtain relief from enforcement if his duties as chief magistrate demand his whole time for national objects.27 He reached the no-absolute-immunity conclusion on originalist grounds drawn from the constitutional text and Marshall’s opinion in Burr.28
Thomas emphasized that enforcement relief remains available when official duties preclude compliance.29 He stressed that courts must respect the demands on the President’s time and recognize their own limitations in reviewing assertions about foreign affairs or national defense.30
Justice Alito dissented and agreed that not all state criminal subpoenas should be barred.31 He argued that a heightened standard is required when the President is a target or subject.32 The risk of harassment by more than 2,300 local prosecutors and the potential for interference with presidential duties demand greater protection than ordinary grand-jury rules provide.33
Alito stressed federalism concerns and the need to prevent States from undermining the functioning of the Executive Branch.34 He concluded that the Court’s approach leaves the Presidency with insufficient safeguards against politically motivated subpoenas.35
Whether a state grand jury subpoena seeking a President’s private papers must satisfy a heightened need standard?36
A state grand jury subpoena seeking a President’s private papers need not satisfy a heightened need standard.37 Burr distinguishes private papers from official communications.38 No showing has been made that heightened protection is necessary for Article II functions.39 The public interest in fair law enforcement favors comprehensive access to evidence.40
No. The rule applies to the established facts.41 The subpoena sought private financial records and tax returns from Mazars rather than official executive communications.42 The Second Circuit rejected the heightened-need argument advanced by the United States as amicus.43 The Supreme Court held that the President retains the same state-law challenges available to other citizens.44 He also retains the ability to raise constitutional objections in federal court without needing to meet an additional threshold of essentiality or last-resort necessity.45
The subpoena need not satisfy a heightened need standard.46
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justice Gorsuch
Justice Kavanaugh would have required the Nixon demonstrated-specific-need standard for state criminal subpoenas to a President.47 He observed that future cases will determine how much difference exists between the majority opinion’s standards and the Nixon test.48 Kavanaugh stressed that lower courts must assess the State’s need for the information and any undue burden on official duties.49
He noted that the majority opinion appropriately takes account of concerns about bad faith, relevance, and interference.50 In his view the Nixon standard provides a tried-and-true test that accommodates both criminal-process interests and Article II interests of the Presidency.51
Justice Thomas agreed with the majority’s rejection of a heightened-need standard.52 The constitutional question in this case is whether the President is able to perform the duties of his office, whereas a heightened need standard addresses a logically independent issue.53 He would leave questions of need to state law while focusing relief on enforcement when duties preclude compliance.54
Thomas reached this position on originalist grounds and emphasized that the Burr standard already supplies the necessary protection without imposing an additional threshold on the grand jury.55
Justice Alito dissented and would have required a heightened standard asking whether the information is critical, necessary now, and unavailable from other sources.56 He argued that the Court’s approach leaves the Presidency with no real protection against the more than 2,300 local prosecutors who might use subpoenas for harassment.57 Alito stressed that prior cases involving presidential subpoenas always applied special heightened standards.58
He concluded that the subpoena at issue should not be enforced unless the prosecutor provides a reasonably specific explanation of need and timing.59