383 U.S. 715 (1966)
Paul Gibbs was hired in the summer of 1960 by Grundy Company, a wholly owned subsidiary of Tennessee Consolidated Coal Company, to serve as mine superintendent for a new mine at Gray's Creek and to haul the coal produced there under a separate contract.1 This arrangement occurred amid ongoing rivalry between the United Mine Workers of America and the Southern Labor Union for representation of coal miners in the southern Appalachian fields.2
On August 15 and 16, 1960, armed members of UMW Local 5881 prevented the mine from opening through threats and violence, including beating an organizer for the rival union, after learning that jobs they believed had been promised to them were going to others.3 George Gilbert, the UMW field representative for the area, was attending an Executive Board meeting in Middlesboro, Kentucky, when the violence occurred and did not return until late on August 16.4
Upon his return he received instructions from international union superiors to establish a limited picket line, prevent any further violence, and ensure the strike did not spread.5 No further violence took place at the mine site, a picket line was maintained for nine months, and no further attempts were made to open the mine during that period.6 Gibbs lost his superintendent position and never performed the haulage contract.7
He claimed to have lost other trucking contracts and mine leases in nearby areas as a result of a concerted union plan against him.8 He filed suit against the international UMW only, not against Local 5881 or its members, in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee.9
Jurisdiction over the federal claim rested on alleged secondary boycotts under section 303 of the Labor Management Relations Act.10 Jurisdiction over the state law claim for unlawful conspiracy and boycott was premised on the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction.11 At trial the district court refused to submit claims of pressure on mining firms other than Grundy to cease doing business with Gibbs.12 The jury returned a verdict finding violations of both section 303 and state law and awarded $60,000 in damages under the employment contract, $14,500 under the haulage contract, and $100,000 in punitive damages.13 On post-trial motion the court set aside the haulage contract award for lack of proof of damages and sustained a remitted award on the state law claim alone.14 The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.15
Whether a federal district court may exercise pendent jurisdiction over a state law tort claim arising from the same operative facts as a substantial federal claim under section 303 of the Labor Management Relations Act?16
Pendent jurisdiction, in the sense of judicial power, exists whenever there is a claim arising under the Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority, and the relationship between that claim and the state claim permits the conclusion that the entire action before the court comprises but one constitutional case.17 The federal claim must have substance sufficient to confer subject matter jurisdiction on the court.18 The state and federal claims must derive from a common nucleus of operative fact.19 But if, considered without regard to their federal or state character, a plaintiff's claims are such that he would ordinarily be expected to try them all in one judicial proceeding, then, assuming substantiality of the federal issues, there is power in federal courts to hear the whole.20 That power need not be exercised in every case in which it is found to exist, as pendent jurisdiction is a doctrine of discretion whose justification lies in considerations of judicial economy, convenience and fairness to litigants.21
Yes. The federal claims under section 303 based on secondary pressures on Grundy relative to the haulage contract were substantial.22 The district court submitted those claims to the jury.23 The jury returned verdicts against the United Mine Workers on them.24 The court considered the haulage contract claim proved as to liability though it failed for lack of proof of damages.25 The state law claim for unlawful conspiracy and boycott and the federal claims derived from a common nucleus of operative fact consisting of the armed prevention of the mine opening by Local 5881 members on August 15 and 16, 1960, the subsequent nine-month picket line, and Paul Gibbs's resulting loss of his superintendent position and haulage contract with Grundy Company.26 The claims reflected alternative remedies for the same conduct.27 The verdict sheet authorized only one award of damages.28 The interrelationship with the federal doctrine of preemption provided a special reason for exercising pendent jurisdiction.29
Although the federal claims ultimately failed, they were not so remote that only the state claim was tried.30 The district court did not exceed its discretion in proceeding to judgment on the state claim.31
The district court properly entertained jurisdiction over the state law claim under the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction.32
Whether state tort remedies for interference with contractual relations in a labor dispute may extend to damages caused by peaceful union activity when violence occurred at the outset of the dispute?33
States may grant compensation for the consequences, as defined by the traditional law of torts, of conduct marked by violence and imminent threats to the public order, but state remedies must be carefully limited to the direct consequences of such conduct.34 Where the consequences of peaceful and violent conduct are separable, recovery may be had only for the latter, and damages resulting from associated peaceful picketing or other union activity are not recoverable under state law.35
No. The tort claimed was a conspiracy to interfere with Gibbs's contractual relations.36 The complaint alleged an unlawful conspiracy and boycott without limitation to interference by violence.37 Counsel argued to the jury that the conspiracy was to impose the UMW and its standard contract on the coal fields.38 The jury instructions stressed the unlawfulness of the picketing rather than violence as such while defining conspiracy broadly to include an agreement to do a lawful thing by unlawful means.39
The instructions did not focus the jury's attention upon violence or threats of violence as the essential predicate of any recovery.40 They permitted liability for all acts done in concert with the common purpose whether or not the union had authorized, participated in, or ratified the particular acts.41 The state and federal claims arose from the same nucleus of operative fact.42 The instructions failed to limit recovery to the direct consequences of the violence on August 15 and 16.43 Therefore, the state tort remedies improperly extended to damages caused by peaceful union activity.44
State tort remedies for interference with contractual relations in a labor dispute may not extend to damages caused by peaceful union activity when violence occurred at the outset of the dispute.45
Whether section 6 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act applies to state law claims in federal court and requires clear proof of a union's actual participation in, authorization of, or ratification of unlawful acts before imposing liability?46
No officer or member of any association or organization, and no association or organization participating or interested in a labor dispute, shall be held responsible or liable in any court of the United States for the unlawful acts of individual officers, members, or agents, except upon clear proof of actual participation in, or actual authorization of, such acts, or of ratification of such acts after actual knowledge thereof.47 The statute requires proof by a substantial margin, more than a bare preponderance of the evidence, and applies to federal court adjudications of state tort claims arising out of labor disputes.48
Yes. Section 6 applies to the state law claims because Congress left the provision applicable to cases not arising under the Labor Management Relations Act.49 The driving force behind the section was the fear that unions might be destroyed if held liable for damage done by acts beyond their practical control.50 The international union was not shown by clear proof to have authorized or participated in the violence of August 15 and 16, 1960.51
George Gilbert was attending an Executive Board meeting in Middlesboro, Kentucky, when the violence occurred.52 The union was not even aware of Grundy's plan to open the Gray's Creek mine until after the violence had occurred.53 The violence subsided immediately upon Gilbert's return with explicit instructions to establish a limited picket line, prevent any further violence, and ensure the strike did not spread.54 There was no clear proof of ratification because the union's post-violence actions consisted of controlling the strike, suppressing violence, reducing the picket line to a very few, and preventing spread to other mines.55
The mere fact of continued picketing or involvement in the dispute does not constitute ratification under the statute.56
Section 6 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act applies to the state law claims and requires reversal of the judgment for lack of clear proof of the union's responsibility for the unlawful acts.57
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Harlan concurs in the reversal under section 6 but interprets the statute as directing it against a particular type of inferential proof of authority or ratification unacceptable to those who framed the law.58 For him, the gist of the statute is that in the usual instance a union's carrying on of its normal strike functions is not in itself proof of authorization or ratification of the wrongdoing.59 Its failure to take affirmative action to dispel misconduct likewise does not constitute such proof.60 In this case, apart from a few quite ambiguous episodes, there was nothing to bring the violence home to the union except that the union continued through its picketing the threat that the earlier violence would be renewed and did not repudiate the violence or promise to oppose its renewal.61
This approximates what the statute was designed to forbid.62