473 U.S. 667 (1985)
In October 1977 respondent Hughes Anderson Bagley was indicted in the Western District of Washington on fifteen counts of violating federal narcotics and firearms statutes.1
On November 18, 1977, twenty-four days before trial, Bagley filed a discovery motion requesting the names and addresses of government witnesses, their prior criminal records, and any deals, promises or inducements made to witnesses in exchange for their testimony. The government's response identified James F. O'Connor and Donald E. Mitchell as its two principal witnesses and stated that each had been paid $250 for information and expenses.2 It produced forms signed by both men entitled "Contract for Purchase of Information and Payment of Cash Reward" showing the $250 payments.3
O'Connor and Mitchell were state law-enforcement officers employed by the Milwaukee Railroad as private security guards.4 Between April and June 1977 they assisted the federal Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms in an undercover investigation of Bagley.5 At the December 1977 bench trial O'Connor and Mitchell testified that they had observed Bagley selling a handgun to a third person and test-firing several weapons.6 The district court found Bagley guilty on the narcotics charges, acquitted him on the firearms charges, and sentenced him to a total of twenty years' imprisonment, all but two years of which were suspended.7
In mid-1980 Bagley filed requests under the Freedom of Information Act and the Privacy Act and received copies of additional ATF contracts that O'Connor and Mitchell had signed on May 3, 1977.8 Each contract was entitled "Contract for Purchase of Information and Payment of Lump Sum Therefor."9 The printed portion stated that the vendor would provide information to ATF and that upon accomplishment of the objective the United States would pay a sum commensurate with services and information rendered.10
The typewritten description stated that each man would provide information regarding violations committed by Bagley, purchase evidence for ATF, work undercover, assist in gathering evidence, and testify against the violator in federal court. The contracts also provided for monthly payments of $300 up to a maximum of $3,000 and a $2,500 reward for information leading to arrest and conviction.11 On the basis of the newly obtained contracts Bagley moved under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to vacate his sentence, alleging that the government's failure to disclose the contracts violated his right to due process.12 After an evidentiary hearing before a magistrate, the district court denied the motion, finding beyond a reasonable doubt that disclosure of the agreements would have had no effect on its finding of guilt.13 The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed.14 The Supreme Court granted certiorari.15
Whether impeachment evidence falls within the Brady rule requiring disclosure of evidence material to guilt or punishment?16
Yes. In the present case the prosecutor failed to disclose the ATF contracts signed by O'Connor and Mitchell that provided for payments contingent on accomplishing the objective of the investigation.19 These contracts gave the witnesses a direct personal stake in Bagley's conviction and could have been used to impeach their credibility on the narcotics charges for which Bagley was convicted after the bench trial.20
Impeachment evidence falls within the Brady rule.21
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by The Chief Justice
Justice White joined the Court's opinion except for Part II and wrote separately to state his understanding of the materiality standard.22 He agreed that the reasonable probability standard applies to cases in which the Government has failed to disclose impeachment evidence.23 The fact that the evidence at issue is impeachment evidence rather than exculpatory evidence does not change the analysis.24
In either case the question is whether the undisclosed evidence could reasonably be taken to put the whole case in such a different light as to undermine confidence in the verdict.25 He viewed the standard as the same one previously applied in Strickland v. Washington.26
Whether the Court of Appeals applied the correct standard of materiality when it reversed the convictions based on the nondisclosure of impeachment evidence?27
The evidence is material only if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different.28 A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.29 The Court of Appeals applied a reasonable possibility standard that is inconsistent with United States v. Agurs.30
No. The Court of Appeals reversed without finding materiality under the correct standard. Instead it treated the nondisclosure as requiring automatic reversal.31 The district court had found beyond a reasonable doubt that disclosure of the agreements would have had no effect on its finding of guilt.32 This was because the witnesses' testimony on the narcotics charges was brief.33 The cross-examination had not sought to discredit the facts of distribution.34
The Court of Appeals did not apply the correct standard of materiality.35
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justice Brennan
Justice Marshall dissented from the adoption of the reasonable probability standard, arguing that it is too lenient and fails to protect the defendant's right to a fair trial. He would have retained the Agurs standard of whether the suppressed evidence might have affected the outcome of the trial.36 He concluded that the undisclosed contracts were material because the government's entire case on the two distribution counts for which Bagley received prison sentences hinged on the testimony of O'Connor and Mitchell.37
The possibility of a reward gave the witnesses a personal stake in the conviction and an incentive to testify falsely.38 He would have affirmed the Court of Appeals judgment reversing the convictions.39
Justice Stevens joined Justice Marshall's dissent in full and would have affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals. He argued that the majority improperly rewrote the Brady rule for specific-request cases. Under the established standard, suppression of evidence responsive to a specific discovery request requires reversal if there is any reasonable likelihood that the evidence could have affected the outcome.
The contracts here were unquestionably material because they provided the only basis for impeaching the government's key witnesses on the distribution counts. Stevens criticized the new reasonable-probability test as too lenient toward prosecutors and inconsistent with Brady's core protection of the adversary process.
Whether the prosecution's failure to disclose evidence of inducements offered to its principal witnesses violated the respondent's due process rights?40
No. Although the government failed to disclose the contracts in response to Bagley's specific discovery motion requesting deals or inducements, the district court found that the evidence would not have affected the outcome of the trial.44 The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and remanded for application of the reasonable probability standard to determine whether the inducements held out to O'Connor and Mitchell were material.
The prosecution's failure to disclose does not automatically violate due process absent a finding of materiality under the reasonable probability standard.45