2 F.3d 81 (4th Cir. 1993)
Christopher Clarke and Jane Latimer lived in Norwalk, Connecticut, while Michael Clarke, Christopher's brother, lived in Durham, North Carolina.1 In early 1992, Latimer transported a toolbox between the brothers on several occasions.2 On April 6, 1992, Christopher Clarke offered Latimer $1,000 to drive to Durham with the toolbox placed in the trunk of a Toyota rental car that was delivered to her that evening along with the money.3
The following day, Virginia State Trooper Mark Wilkinson observed the Toyota parked at a rest area off I-95 in Prince William County and approached after noting the headlights were on.4 Latimer consented to a search of the vehicle after showing a rental agreement that did not match the car or her name.5 Wilkinson located the toolbox in the wheelwell, pried it open, and discovered a brown paper bag containing 567.8 grams of crack cocaine inside.6
Latimer was arrested and agreed to cooperate with authorities by calling Michael Clarke to set up a meeting at a Durham motel, where she delivered the toolbox and Michael was arrested.7 Michael Clarke was indicted in the Middle District of North Carolina for possession with intent to distribute cocaine base.8 He moved to suppress the crack cocaine, and at the suppression hearing he testified that he had directed his brother Christopher to purchase the toolbox and arrange for Latimer to deliver the cocaine.9
Christopher Clarke was indicted for conspiracy with intent to distribute and possession with intent to distribute fifty grams or more of cocaine base.10 At his trial, Michael Clarke refused to testify and was declared unavailable by the district court.11 The district court admitted Michael's testimony from the suppression hearing under Fed.R.Evid. 804(b)(5) after determining it possessed a high degree of reliability and trustworthiness because he had no motive to lie or implicate his brother for any ulterior purpose.12 Christopher Clarke was convicted on both counts of the indictment and appealed.13
Whether prior testimony inadmissible under Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(1) can be admitted under 804(b)(5) if it has equivalent guarantees of trustworthiness?14
Fed.R.Evid. 804(b)(5) permits admission of a statement not specifically covered by the other exceptions but having equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness. A statement is not specifically covered if it does not meet all the requirements for admissibility under one of the prior exceptions.15
Yes. Michael's testimony from the suppression hearing was inadmissible under 804(b)(1) because Christopher Clarke had no opportunity and similar motive to develop the testimony by cross-examination.16 However, the testimony had equivalent guarantees of trustworthiness because Michael was questioned by his own counsel and cross-examined by the government, a contemporaneous transcript was prepared, he made the statement voluntarily under oath, he knew the statement could not be used against him at trial removing incentive to lie, he could be prosecuted for perjury, and he did not need to implicate his brother to establish standing as he could have referred to an anonymous source.17
The district court did not err in admitting the testimony under Fed.R.Evid. 804(b)(5).18
Whether the consent search of the rental vehicle and locked toolbox violated the Fourth Amendment?19
A person with authority to consent to a search may do so. When Christopher Clarke hired Latimer to transport the toolbox containing drugs, he took the risk that she would consent to a search of the car and the toolbox.20
No. Latimer consented to the search of the Toyota rental car after being approached by the trooper. As the courier entrusted with transporting the toolbox to Michael Clarke, she possessed authority to consent to the search of that container even though it was locked. The very purpose of retaining Latimer was to transport drugs in the container, and the officer reasonably construed her consent to extend to an item over which she plainly possessed a right of access and control.21
The search did not violate the Fourth Amendment.22
Whether admission of a nontestifying codefendant's redacted statement, referenced in the prosecution's opening statement, violated the Confrontation Clause?23
Admission of a nontestifying codefendant's statement implicating the defendant violates the Confrontation Clause under Bruton. Redaction may cure the problem. Any error is subject to harmless error analysis.24
No. Clarke argued that his Confrontation Clause rights were violated by the admission of an incriminating statement made by nontestifying codefendant Monique Christie. Although the prosecution's opening statement identified Clarke as the friend mentioned in the redacted statement, any error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Christie's statement was plainly cumulative to the properly admitted testimony from Michael Clarke's suppression hearing.25
Any potential violation was harmless.26
Whether the defendant's sentencing challenge was precluded by his stipulation to the weight of the cocaine?27
A defendant is bound by his stipulation to the weight of the cocaine.28
Yes. Clarke stipulated to the weight of the cocaine at sentencing. This stipulation directly precludes his challenge to the sentencing determination regarding the quantity of drugs involved in the offense. The court found no basis to relieve Clarke from the binding effect of his own stipulation on the record.29
The sentencing challenge is precluded by the stipulation.30