410 U.S. 1 (1973)
A special grand jury was convened in the Northern District of Illinois in February 1971 to investigate possible violations of federal criminal statutes relating to gambling.1 In the course of its investigation, the grand jury received in evidence voice recordings that had been obtained pursuant to court orders.2
The grand jury subpoenaed approximately 20 persons, including the respondent Dionisio, seeking to obtain from them voice exemplars for comparison with the recorded conversations that had been received in evidence.3 Each witness was advised that he was a potential defendant in a criminal prosecution.4 Each was asked to examine a transcript of an intercepted conversation, and to go to a nearby office of the United States Attorney to read the transcript into a recording device.5 The witnesses were advised that they would be allowed to have their attorneys present when they read the transcripts.6 Dionisio and other witnesses refused to furnish the voice exemplars.7
The Government then filed separate petitions in the United States District Court to compel Dionisio and the other witnesses to furnish the voice exemplars to the grand jury.8 The petitions stated that the exemplars were essential and necessary to the grand jury investigation.9 They would be used solely as a standard of comparison to determine whether the witness was the person whose voice was intercepted.10 Following a hearing, the District Judge ordered them to comply with the grand jury's request.11 When Dionisio persisted in his refusal to respond to the grand jury's directive, the District Court adjudged him in civil contempt and ordered him committed to custody until he obeyed the court order, or until the expiration of 18 months.12
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed.13 In view of a clear conflict between this decision and one in the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, the Supreme Court granted the Government's petition for certiorari.14
Whether compelling a grand jury witness to furnish voice exemplars violates the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination?15
The Fifth Amendment protects only against compelled testimonial or communicative evidence.16 It does not shield the production of real or physical evidence such as voice exemplars when they are sought solely for identification of physical characteristics rather than for the content of any statement.17
No. The established facts show that the grand jury directed Dionisio and the other witnesses to read a transcript of an intercepted conversation into a recording device at the United States Attorney's office.18 The Government petitions expressly limited the use of these exemplars to a standard of comparison to determine whether the witness was the person whose voice had been intercepted on the court-ordered recordings.19 This procedure required Dionisio to produce his voice solely as an identifying physical characteristic, exactly as in the production of handwriting or fingerprints.20 It involved no communication of facts or testimony about his guilt.21
The District Court correctly recognized that such production does not implicate the privilege.22 The Supreme Court confirmed that Wade and Gilbert control the outcome on these facts.23
Compelling a grand jury witness to furnish voice exemplars does not violate the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.24
Whether the Fourth Amendment requires a preliminary showing of reasonableness before a grand jury witness can be compelled to furnish voice exemplars?25
No. The established facts establish that Dionisio received a grand jury subpoena along with nineteen other witnesses and was directed to appear at the United States Attorney's office to create a voice recording.28 The initial compulsion to appear before the grand jury does not constitute a Fourth Amendment seizure.29 Every citizen owes a civic duty to provide evidence to a grand jury.30 The subpoena involves none of the force, stigma, or abrupt detention that marks an arrest or investigatory stop.31
The subsequent directive to produce the exemplar creates no protected privacy interest.32 The tone and manner of a voice are constantly exposed to the public in daily interactions in the same way as facial features or handwriting.33 On these facts, the Court of Appeals erred in imposing a reasonableness requirement that has no foundation in the Fourth Amendment.34
The Fourth Amendment does not require a preliminary showing of reasonableness before a grand jury witness can be compelled to furnish voice exemplars.35
Whether the fact that approximately twenty witnesses were subpoenaed renders the grand jury's directive to produce voice exemplars unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment?36
The number of witnesses called by a grand jury is irrelevant to the reasonableness of the directive issued to any individual witness.37 The grand jury possesses broad investigative authority to pursue every available clue and to examine all witnesses in any proper manner until it determines whether a crime has been committed.38
No. The established facts reveal that the grand jury subpoenaed approximately twenty persons, including Dionisio, to obtain voice exemplars for comparison with the intercepted conversations already in evidence.39 The Court of Appeals treated the number of subpoenas as creating a dragnet effect that violated the Fourth Amendment.40 That number is immaterial because the grand jury may have needed to identify multiple voices on the recordings or may have summoned twenty witnesses simply to identify a single voice.41 The grand jury's task requires it to run down every clue and to examine witnesses without external limits on the scope of its inquiry.42
Nothing in the facts suggests that the directive to Dionisio became unreasonable merely because others received identical directives.43
The fact that approximately twenty witnesses were subpoenaed does not render the grand jury's directive to produce voice exemplars unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.44