536 F.2d 216 (8th Cir. 1976)
Defendants Charles Gould and Joseph Carey were convicted in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa on charges of conspiring to import cocaine and actually importing cocaine from Colombia into the United States.1 Both received concurrent five-year sentences on each count plus a three-year special parole term.2 David Miller, who had been charged as a co-defendant, pled guilty before trial and testified for the government. Barbara Kenworthy, Miller's sister and an unindicted co-conspirator, also testified.3
In February 1975 Kenworthy and Miller successfully smuggled cocaine from South America into the United States.4 Three months later, in May 1975, Gould, Carey, and Kenworthy traveled to Colombia. They purchased cocaine and packed it inside two pairs of hollowed-out platform shoes.5 Upon Kenworthy's arrival at the Miami airport, a customs agent x-rayed the shoes and seized approximately two pounds of cocaine.6 Kenworthy was then interrogated by DEA agents. She agreed to cooperate and participated in a controlled delivery of a cocaine substitute to Miller in Des Moines, Iowa. Miller was arrested after execution of a search warrant.7
At trial, two government experts testified that the powder removed from the shoes consisted of approximately 60 percent cocaine hydrochloride. The other testified that it consisted of 53 percent cocaine.8 Miller testified in detail about his participation in the May 1975 smuggling but invoked his Fifth Amendment privilege when asked about the February 1975 trip.9 The district court prohibited questioning on the February incident before the jury. It denied the defense request to strike Miller's direct testimony.10
The district court took judicial notice that cocaine hydrochloride is a schedule II controlled substance. It instructed the jury that if it found the substance was cocaine hydrochloride, then it was a schedule II controlled substance under federal law.11 Gould and Carey appealed their convictions to the Eighth Circuit. They raised challenges to the judicial notice instruction and the refusal to strike Miller's testimony.12
Whether the District Court erred in taking judicial notice that cocaine hydrochloride is a schedule II controlled substance and instructing the jury that the fact must be accepted as conclusive?13
Courts may take judicial notice of legislative facts.14 Legislative facts are general scientific or statutory classification facts that apply universally and do not relate to the immediate parties.15 Federal Rule of Evidence 201(g), requiring a discretionary jury instruction, applies only to adjudicative facts.16
No. The District Court judicially noticed that cocaine hydrochloride is a schedule II controlled substance under 21 U.S.C. § 812.17 This classification is a legislative fact consisting of a universal scientific proposition derived from the statutory schedule and common knowledge rather than a fact concerning who did what in the May 1975 smuggling by Gould and Carey.18 The government experts testified that the powder seized from Kenworthy's shoes was 60 percent cocaine hydrochloride and 53 percent cocaine. This supplied the specific substance finding for the jury while the legal classification itself remained a matter of statutory interpretation outside Rule 201(g).19
The District Court did not err in taking judicial notice of the legislative fact or in instructing the jury that the fact must be accepted as conclusive.20
Whether the District Court erred in refusing to strike the direct testimony of co-conspirator Miller after he invoked his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination regarding a prior February 1975 smuggling trip?21
When a witness properly invokes the Fifth Amendment privilege on a collateral matter relating only to credibility, the defendant's Sixth Amendment confrontation right is not violated.22 The witness's direct testimony on the charged offense need not be stricken if the defendant had a full opportunity to cross-examine on the substantive events.23
No. Miller invoked the Fifth Amendment only as to the February 1975 smuggling trip.24 This was a collateral credibility issue in which Gould and Carey played no role.25 Miller testified in detail and underwent probing cross-examination about the charged May 1975 importation involving the platform shoes and the controlled delivery to Des Moines.26 The district court therefore acted within its discretion by upholding the privilege and refusing to strike the direct testimony.27
The limitation did not hamper impeachment on bias or interest regarding the May events.28
The District Court did not err in refusing to strike Miller's direct testimony.29