529 U.S. 848 (2000)
On February 23, 1998, Dewey Jones tossed a Molotov cocktail through a window into a home in Fort Wayne, Indiana, owned and occupied by his cousin.1 No one was injured in the ensuing fire, but the blaze severely damaged the home.2
A federal grand jury returned a three-count indictment charging Jones with arson under 18 U.S.C. § 844(i), using a destructive device during and in relation to a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), and making an illegal destructive device under 26 U.S.C. § 5861(f).3 Jones was tried in the Northern District of Indiana and convicted by a jury on all three counts.4
The District Court sentenced Jones to a total prison term of 35 years, to be followed by five years of supervised release, and ordered him to pay $77,396.87 in restitution to the insurer of the damaged home.5 Jones appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, which affirmed the judgment of the District Court.6
Jones had argued before the District Court and on appeal that the statute, when applied to the arson of a private residence, exceeds Congress's authority under the Commerce Clause.7 The Supreme Court granted certiorari after noting divisions among the Courts of Appeals on the statute's coverage of noncommercial buildings and on the constitutionality of such applications.8
Whether 18 U.S.C. § 844(i) applies to the arson of an owner-occupied private residence?9
Section 844(i) requires that the damaged or destroyed property must itself have been used in commerce or in an activity affecting commerce, meaning active employment for commercial purposes rather than a passive, passing, or past connection to commerce.10
No. The statute's key qualifier is the word 'used,' which signifies active employment for commercial purposes.11
Applying this rule to the established facts, Dewey Jones tossed a Molotov cocktail into a home in Fort Wayne, Indiana, owned and occupied by his cousin as a private residence.12 The home served as the center of family life for everyday living by the cousin and his family, with no commercial undertaking or home office involved.13
The mortgage from an Oklahoma lender, casualty insurance from a Wisconsin insurer, and natural gas service from out-of-state sources represent only passive connections, not active employment in commerce-affecting activity.14 The residence therefore falls outside the statute's reach.15
Section 844(i) does not apply to the arson of an owner-occupied private residence not used for any commercial purpose.16
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Stevens concurs in the construction of the statute but emphasizes the kinship between the presumption against federal preemption of state law and the reluctance to authorize federal intervention in local law enforcement in marginal cases.17 He notes that the 35-year federal sentence far exceeded the 10-year maximum for the comparable state offense under Indiana law, illustrating how such federal statutes can displace state policy choices.18 He reiterates the principle that unless Congress conveys its purpose clearly, it will not be deemed to have significantly changed the federal-state balance in criminal prosecutions, and federal criminal laws overlapping state authority should be interpreted narrowly unless congressional intention to assert jurisdiction is plain.19
Whether application of 18 U.S.C. § 844(i) to the arson of an owner-occupied private residence is constitutional?20
Where a statute is susceptible of two constructions, one of which raises grave and doubtful constitutional questions and the other of which avoids them, the duty is to adopt the latter construction.21 This canon is reinforced by the rule of lenity and the presumption against altering the federal-state balance in criminal law without clear congressional statement.22
No. The Court does not reach a direct yes-or-no answer on constitutionality because the statute is construed not to apply.23 Under the avoidance canon, the expansive reading urged by the Government would render virtually every arson a federal offense.24 This would raise serious questions under United States v. Lopez regarding regulation of traditionally local criminal conduct lacking a commercial character.25 The Court therefore adopts the narrower reading that limits the statute to property actively used in commerce.26
This avoids the constitutional issue.27 It also applies the rule of lenity and the presumption that Congress does not intend to displace state authority over paradigmatic common-law crimes such as arson without clear language.28
The Court avoids deciding the constitutional question by construing the statute not to reach owner-occupied private residences.29
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Thomas joins the Court's opinion but expressly reserves judgment on whether the federal arson statute, as construed, is constitutional in its application to all buildings used for commercial activities.30