468 U.S. 705 (1984)
In 1980 Drug Enforcement Administration agents learned that respondents James Karo, Richard Horton, and William Harley had ordered fifty gallons of ether from Government informant Carl Muehlenweg.1
With Muehlenweg's consent, agents substituted a can containing a beeper for one in the shipment and had all ten cans painted uniformly.2 Karo picked up the ether on September 20, 1980.3 Agents used both visual surveillance and beeper signals to track the can as it moved among residences in Albuquerque including Karo's house, Horton's house, and Horton's father's house.4
The signal later led agents to a commercial storage facility.5 There agents obtained a subpoena for rental records identifying locker 143 rented by Horton.6 Agents confirmed the can's presence through the beeper and the odor of ether.7 The can was subsequently moved to a second storage facility whose locker 15 was rented by Horton and Harley under an alias.8
On February 6, 1981, agents observed via closed-circuit video the removal of the cans from the second locker.9 The cans were loaded onto Horton's pickup truck.10 The truck traveled public highways to a house in Taos rented by Horton, Harley, and Michael Steele.11 Using the beeper, agents determined that the can remained inside the Taos house even after the truck departed.12 On February 7, the beeper revealed that the ether can was still on the premises.13 Agents noticed that the windows of the house were wide open on a cold windy day.14 On February 8, agents obtained a warrant to search the Taos residence based in part on beeper information.15 The warrant was executed on February 10, 1981.16 Horton, Harley, Steele, and Evan Roth were arrested.17 Cocaine and laboratory equipment were seized.18 Respondents were indicted under 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 846.19 The District Court granted their pretrial suppression motion.20 The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the suppression order as to most respondents.21 The Supreme Court granted certiorari.22
Whether the warrantless installation of a beeper in a container of chemicals with the consent of the original owner violates the Fourth Amendment rights of the buyer to whom the container is subsequently transferred?23
No. In 1980, DEA agents investigating a suspected conspiracy to manufacture and distribute cocaine learned that respondents James Karo, Richard Horton, and William Harley had ordered fifty gallons of ether from Government informant Carl Muehlenweg.2728 With Muehlenweg's consent, agents substituted a can containing a beeper for one in the shipment and had all ten cans painted uniformly before Karo picked up the ether on September 20, 1980.29 The can into which the beeper was placed belonged to the Government at the time of installation, and Muehlenweg consented to the placement.30 The transfer to Karo did not interfere with any possessory interest in a meaningful way and conveyed no information.31
The warrantless installation of the beeper did not violate the Fourth Amendment rights of the respondents.32
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Chief Justice Burger And Justice Rehnquist
Justice O’Connor joined the majority in concluding that the installation of the beeper with consent did not implicate Fourth Amendment concerns.33 She emphasized that the subsequent transfer of the container with the unactivated beeper to one who is unaware of the beeper's presence is also unobjectionable.34 It is when the beeper is activated to track the movements of the container that privacy interests are implicated.35
In her view these privacy interests are unusually narrow, narrower than suggested by the Court.36 O’Connor stressed that activation of the beeper infringes on no reasonable expectation of privacy if the container is moved on public highways or in places where the owner has no reasonable expectation that its movements will not be tracked.37
Joined by Justice Brennan And Justice Marshall
Justice Stevens agreed that the installation of the beeper in the can before it was delivered to respondents was not a search or seizure.38 He joined the conclusion that the actual placement of the beeper into the ether can violated no one's Fourth Amendment rights.39 Stevens noted that the Court of Appeals had not described the transfer as either a search or a seizure.40
He viewed the attachment of the beeper as a seizure because it infringed the owner's right to exclude others from the property and converted the property to government use.41 Stevens would have required a warrant before installing an electronic device on a private citizen's property absent exigent circumstances.42
Whether the warrantless monitoring of a beeper inside a private residence violates the Fourth Amendment?43
The monitoring of a beeper inside a private residence constitutes a search under the Fourth Amendment because it reveals information about the interior of the home that could not be obtained without physical intrusion.44
Yes. The monitoring of the beeper while it was inside the Taos residence revealed that the ether can was located inside the house, a fact that could not have been obtained by visual surveillance from outside.45 This information was used in the warrant affidavit and the monitoring occurred without a warrant.46 The beeper told agents that a particular article was located at a particular time in the private residence.47
The warrantless monitoring of a beeper inside a private residence violates the Fourth Amendment.48
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Chief Justice Burger And Justice Rehnquist
Justice O’Connor agreed that the monitoring of a beeper inside a private residence constitutes a search that requires a warrant.49 She stressed that such monitoring revealed information about the interior of the home that could not have been obtained without a physical intrusion.50 O’Connor wrote separately to emphasize that the decision does not mean all electronic surveillance requires a warrant.51
She noted that the critical distinction is monitoring inside a private residence, which reveals information that could not have been obtained without physical intrusion.52 Such monitoring is a search requiring a warrant supported by probable cause.53
Joined by Justice Brennan And Justice Marshall
Justice Stevens joined the conclusion that monitoring inside a private residence is a search requiring a warrant.54 He would have held that the beeper surveillance infringed privacy interests more broadly whenever property was concealed from public view. Stevens explained that the beeper enabled the agents to learn facts that were not exposed to public view.55
The beeper alone told agents when the container was taken into private residences and storage areas.56 He viewed the concealment of personal property from public view as giving rise to Fourth Amendment protection even outside a home.
Whether the warrantless monitoring of a beeper inside a commercial storage facility violates the Fourth Amendment?57
The warrantless monitoring of a beeper inside a commercial storage facility does not violate the Fourth Amendment.67
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Chief Justice Burger And Justice Rehnquist
Justice O’Connor agreed that the monitoring of the beeper in the commercial storage facility did not violate the Fourth Amendment.68 She noted that respondents had no reasonable expectation of privacy in a facility open to the public.69 O’Connor observed that the same principle applies to monitoring on public roads.70
She stressed that the location of the container defeats any expectation that its movements will not be tracked when it is in places open to the public.71 The same is true of monitoring in a commercial storage facility open to the public.72
Joined by Justice Brennan And Justice Marshall
Justice Stevens dissented on this point and would have held that respondents had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the storage locker they had rented.73 He argued that the manager lacked authority to consent to entry for purposes of locating the can inside the locker.74 Stevens would have suppressed all evidence obtained after the first private residence.75
He viewed the beeper as revealing the precise location of the can inside the locker, information that could not have been obtained without entering the locker.76 This constituted a search requiring a warrant.77
Whether evidence seized from a residence pursuant to a warrant is admissible when the supporting affidavit includes information obtained from prior beeper monitoring inside private areas?78
Evidence seized pursuant to a warrant is admissible if the warrant is supported by probable cause from independent untainted sources even if some information in the affidavit was obtained unlawfully.79
Yes. The warrant affidavit contained sufficient untainted information from visual surveillance of the truck on public highways, the odor of ether, and other observations to establish probable cause independent of the beeper monitoring inside the Taos residence.80 The months-long tracking of the evidence provided ample independent grounds.81
The evidence seized from the residence is admissible.82
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Chief Justice Burger And Justice Rehnquist
Justice O’Connor agreed that the evidence obtained from the subsequent searches was not tainted by the illegal monitoring inside the first residence.83 She noted that the warrant for the search of the house at 6213 Kosik Place was based on information obtained from independent sources.84 O’Connor concluded that the decision below must be reversed.85
She agreed with the Court that the warrant was based on information from visual surveillance and informants independent of the illegal monitoring.86
Joined by Justice Brennan And Justice Marshall
Justice Stevens would have affirmed the suppression of all evidence because he viewed the initial illegal monitoring as tainting all subsequent uses of the beeper.87 He would not have conducted a de novo review of the warrant affidavit.88 Stevens stated that the question of independent probable cause was not raised in the petition for certiorari and has not been briefed by the parties.89
He believed the Court should not have engaged in examining whether sufficient untainted information supported the warrant.90 Instead, that inquiry should be made in the first instance by the trial court after the parties have had an opportunity to argue the issue.