80 U.S. 128 (1871)
During the Civil War, Y. F. Wilson owned cotton in an insurgent state that came into the possession of agents of the Treasury Department as captured or abandoned property under the Abandoned and Captured Property Act of March 12, 1863.1 The agents sold the cotton and paid the proceeds into the Treasury of the United States.2
He took, and has not violated, the amnesty oath under the President’s proclamation.3 Wilson died, and Klein, as administrator of his estate, filed suit in the Court of Claims seeking recovery of the net proceeds from the cotton.4 On May 26, 1869, the Court of Claims rendered judgment in favor of the administrator.5 The United States appealed, and the appeal was filed in the Supreme Court on December 11, 1869.6
In the related case of United States v. Padelford, which presented similar facts involving captured and abandoned property and a presidential pardon, the Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Claims judgment on April 30, 1870.7 Congress then passed the appropriation act of July 12, 1870, containing a proviso that addressed suits for proceeds of abandoned and captured property pending in the Court of Claims and on appeal to the Supreme Court.8
Whether the proviso relating to suits for the proceeds of abandoned and captured property in the Court of Claims, contained in the appropriation act of July 12th, 1870, debars the defendant in error from recovering the proceeds of cotton belonging to Y. F. Wilson, deceased?9
The Constitution vests the judicial power of the United States in one Supreme Court and such inferior courts as Congress may establish, with appellate jurisdiction subject to such exceptions and regulations as Congress shall make; Congress may not, however, prescribe rules of decision for the judicial department in pending cases or direct courts to disregard the legal effect of presidential pardons, which the Executive alone may grant without legislative impairment.10
No. The Court of Claims rendered judgment for Klein on May 26, 1869, and the appeal reached this court on December 11, 1869, before enactment of the July 12, 1870 proviso.11 Wilson had taken the amnesty oath under the successive presidential proclamations, which this court in the Padelford case had already held entitled the owner to restoration of the proceeds under the Abandoned and Captured Property Act.12 The proviso commands that acceptance of such a pardon be treated as conclusive evidence of disloyalty, strips jurisdiction upon proof of the pardon, and directs dismissal of pending appeals, thereby attempting to dictate the outcome of a specific controversy rather than leaving the courts free to apply their own rules to new legislative facts.13
The proviso does not debar recovery; the judgment of the Court of Claims must be affirmed because the statute impermissibly invades both judicial and executive authority.14
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Miller concurs that the proviso is unconstitutional insofar as it attempts to prescribe to the judiciary the effect to be given to an act of pardon or amnesty by the President.15 This power of pardon is confided to the President by the Constitution, and the legislative branch cannot impair its force or effect in a judicial proceeding in a constitutional court.16 He dissents from the majority's treatment of property rights under the Abandoned and Captured Property Act.
Under that act, the government becomes the absolute owner of the proceeds when property of a disloyal owner is sold and paid into the treasury.17 No remaining interest exists that a subsequent pardon could restore.18 The statute intended restoration only to loyal citizens and transfer of title to the government in the case of those who gave active support to the rebellion.19