497 U.S. 720 (1990)
Respondents Marsha B. Kokinda and Kevin E. Pearl, volunteers for the National Democratic Policy Committee, set up a table on the sidewalk near the entrance of the Bowie, Maryland Post Office to solicit contributions, sell books and subscriptions to the organization's newspaper, and distribute literature addressing a variety of political issues.1
The postal sidewalk provides the sole means by which customers of the post office may travel from the parking lot to the post office building and lies entirely on Postal Service property.2 The District Court for the District of Maryland described the layout of the Bowie post office as a freestanding building with its own sidewalk and parking lot located on a major highway.3
During the several hours that respondents were at the post office, postal employees received between 40 and 50 complaints regarding their presence.4 The Bowie postmaster asked respondents to leave, which they refused to do.5 Postal inspectors arrested respondents, seizing their table as well as their literature and other belongings.6
Respondents were tried before a United States Magistrate in the District of Maryland and convicted of violating 39 CFR § 232.1(h)(1).7 Respondent Kokinda was fined $50 and sentenced to 10 days' imprisonment.8 Respondent Pearl was fined $100 and received a 30-day suspended sentence.9
Respondents appealed their convictions to the District Court, which affirmed holding that the postal sidewalk was not a public forum and that the Postal Service's ban on solicitation is reasonable.10 A divided panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed.11 The Supreme Court granted certiorari because the decision below conflicts with other decisions by the Courts of Appeals.12
Whether the sidewalk located entirely on United States Postal Service property adjacent to the Bowie, Maryland Post Office constitutes a public forum?13
Government property is a traditional public forum if by long tradition or government fiat it has been devoted to assembly and debate such as streets and parks.14 A designated public forum exists if the government intentionally opens it for public discourse.15 Otherwise it is a nonpublic forum where speech regulation is permissible if reasonable and viewpoint neutral.16
No. The sidewalk at the Bowie Post Office was constructed solely to assist postal patrons to negotiate the space between the parking lot and the front door of the post office.17 It lies entirely on Postal Service property as described in the District Court layout of the freestanding building with its own sidewalk and parking lot on a major highway.18 Respondents Kokinda and Pearl set up a table there to solicit contributions, sell books and subscriptions, and distribute literature.19 The Postal Service has not opened the sidewalk for expressive activity.20
The location and purpose distinguish it from municipal sidewalks traditionally open to expressive activity.21 The mere physical characteristics and public access do not dictate forum analysis as the sidewalk leads only from the parking area to the post office entrance.22
The sidewalk is a nonpublic forum.23
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Kennedy concurs in the judgment that the regulation is valid.24 He observes that many postal patrons use facilities from necessity rather than choice.25 The wide range of activities permitted on the postal sidewalk creates a powerful argument that it is more than a nonpublic forum.26
Objective characteristics of the property and its customary use by the public may control the case even if the government intends limitations.27 He concludes that the regulation satisfies traditional time, place, and manner standards regardless.28
Joined by Justice Marshall And Justice Stevens
Justice Brennan dissents on the ground that the sidewalk is a public forum.29 It is indistinguishable from any other public sidewalk open and accessible to the general public and is the only means by which customers can enter or exit the post office. The plurality's distinctions based on purpose and location are unsupportable under settled doctrine that all public sidewalks are traditional public forums without the need for particularized inquiry into their precise nature.
Streets, sidewalks, and parks are considered public forums without more. He would apply strict scrutiny to the regulation and invalidate it as not narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest.
Justice Stevens joins Justice Brennan's dissent.30 He agrees that the sidewalk is a public forum.31 The regulation is an unconstitutional restriction on speech.32
By joining the dissent, Justice Stevens emphasizes that the Postal Service's categorical prohibition on solicitation cannot stand under First Amendment scrutiny when applied to expressive activities on a traditional public forum sidewalk adjacent to the post office.33 His position diverges from the majority's classification of the sidewalk as a nonpublic forum, instead requiring strict scrutiny for this restriction on speech.
Whether the Postal Service regulation prohibiting solicitation on postal premises is valid under the First Amendment as applied to respondents' activities?34
In a nonpublic forum a regulation of speech is valid if it is reasonable in light of the purpose served by the forum.35 It must not be an effort to suppress expression merely because public officials oppose the speaker's view.36 The government's decision to restrict access need only be reasonable though not necessarily the most reasonable limitation.37
Yes. The regulation prohibiting solicitation is reasonable because solicitation is inherently disruptive of postal business.38 It requires those solicited to decide whether to contribute, reach for a wallet, or produce a credit card.39 The Postal Service has long experience with the administrative burdens of managing such activities on its property.40
During the several hours respondents Kokinda and Pearl were at the Bowie Post Office, postal employees received between 40 and 50 complaints. The postmaster asked them to leave before arresting them for violating 39 CFR § 232.1(h)(1) after they refused.41 The regulation is viewpoint neutral as it applies to all solicitation regardless of message.42 It leaves open alternative channels such as solicitation by mail or on adjacent public sidewalks.43
The Postal Service enacted the categorical ban after finding case-by-case exceptions unworkable and disruptive to its mission of efficient mail delivery.44
The regulation is valid as applied to respondents' activities.45
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Kennedy concurs in the judgment.46 He concludes that even assuming the sidewalk is a public forum the regulation qualifies as a valid content-neutral time, place, and manner restriction.47 It is narrowly drawn to serve the significant governmental interest in protecting the integrity of postal transactions and facilitating customers' postal business.
The regulation goes no further than prohibiting personal solicitations for immediate payment of money. It leaves open ample alternative channels for respondents to engage in political speech and distribute literature without in-person solicitation for immediate payment on the premises. This approach balances the needs of postal patrons with the exercise of vital rights of expression.
Joined by Justice Marshall And Justice Stevens
Justice Brennan dissents and concludes that the regulation is invalid even under the reasonableness standard applicable to nonpublic forums.48 The distinction between solicitation and other permitted speech such as leafleting or soapbox oratory is not reasonable because other activities present the same risk of disruption to postal operations. The Postal Service has failed to show why existing rules against obstruction and disturbance are inadequate to address any potential issues.
The categorical ban is therefore unreasonable as it burdens substantially more speech than necessary and relies on speculation rather than evidence of actual disruption from solicitation on exterior sidewalks.
Justice Stevens joins Justice Brennan's dissent. He agrees that the regulation is an unconstitutional restriction on speech as applied to respondents' activities on the sidewalk.49 Justice Stevens emphasizes that the Postal Service's ban on solicitation is invalid because it sweeps too broadly and fails to meet even the reasonableness standard for nonpublic forums.50
His joinder highlights the view that the distinction drawn by the regulation between solicitation and other forms of speech is not reasonable and that the regulation burdens substantially more speech than necessary to serve the government's interests.51