739 F.2d 994 (5th Cir. 1984)
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit considered the case of United States v. Lyons on appeal.1 The majority opinion reexamined the test for insanity in criminal cases.2 It accepted the defense for those who lack substantial capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of their conduct.3 It denied the defense to those who suffer a mental disease or defect that causes them to lack the ability to control their conduct.4
Judge Alvin B. Rubin dissented from this decision. He was joined by Circuit Judge Tate.5 The dissent was prompted by the majority's reliance on new policy considerations.6 These included the risk of fabrication and moral mistakes when experts testify about capacity to control behavior.7 The majority also cited one doctor's testimony before a congressional committee that the volitional test is superfluous for most psychotic persons.8
The dissent points to empirical data showing that insanity pleas are rarely made and even more rarely successful.9 One study found the plea entered in only 0.47 percent of cases.10 It notes that successful acquittees are usually hospitalized for extended periods.11 The dissent further references a decision from the Second Circuit in United States v. Torniero that cabined the volitional test to prevent abuse.12
Whether the insanity defense should extend to defendants whose mental disease or defect causes them to lack the ability to control their conduct?13
The insanity defense must include the cognitive prong for those who lack substantial capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of their conduct.14 It must also include the volitional prong for those whose mental disease or defect causes them to lack the ability to control their conduct.15 This is because an adjudication of guilt constitutes a moral judgment of blameworthiness that presupposes a free agent capable of choosing between right and wrong.16
Yes. The facts establish that the majority limited the defense to cognitive impairment while excluding volitional impairment caused by mental disease.17 Yet the empirical record demonstrates the plea occurs in only 0.47 percent of cases.18 Successful acquittees remain hospitalized rather than being released.19
The Torniero guidelines further show that the volitional prong can be confined by requiring respected medical authority for the disorder and relevance to the charged offense.20 These concrete circumstances confirm that excluding the volitional prong would punish individuals lacking moral responsibility and undermine the ethical foundation that guilt requires blameworthiness.21
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Circuit Judge Tate
Judge Rubin dissented on the ground that the majority's distinction between cognitive and volitional impairments rests on faulty premises and erodes the moral integrity of the criminal justice system.24 He explained that guilt embodies a moral judgment of blameworthiness presupposing that man possesses understanding and liberty of will.25 Punishment without the capacity to choose is therefore punishment without fault.26
Rubin observed that the majority's concerns over fabrication, jury confusion, and moral mistakes lack empirical support because the plea is rarely invoked, rarely succeeds, and when successful leads to extended hospitalization rather than release.27 He cited the Second Circuit's Torniero decision as proof that the volitional test can be cabined through requirements of recognized medical authority and relevance to the offense.28 Rubin concluded that the majority's change would produce little practical benefit to society while conflicting with fundamental moral predicates and risking undeserved punishment of individuals whose illness prevents lawful behavior.29