415 U.S. 164 (1974)
In February 1971, William Matlock was indicted for robbing a federally insured bank in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113.1 A week later he filed a motion to suppress evidence seized from a home in Pardeeville, Wisconsin, where he had been living.2
Suppression hearings followed in the District Court.3 On November 12, 1970, Matlock was arrested in the yard in front of the home leased by Mr. and Mrs. Marshall.4 Living in the home were Mrs. Marshall, several of her children including her daughter Gayle Graff, Graff's three-year-old son, and Matlock.5
Three arresting officers went to the door, were admitted by Graff, told her they were looking for money and a gun, and asked if they could search the house.6 Graff consented voluntarily to the search of the house, including the east bedroom on the second floor which she said was jointly occupied by Matlock and herself.7 The east bedroom was searched and $4,995 in cash was found in a diaper bag in the only closet in the room.8
Graff made statements to the officers that she and Matlock occupied the east bedroom together, shared the dresser, and had slept together regularly in the room including the early morning of November 12.9 Other evidence showed Matlock and Graff had lived together in a one-bedroom apartment in Florida from April to August 1970, lived at the Marshall home from August to November 12, 1970, were seen going up or down stairs together, and that the east bedroom contained evidence it was lived in by a man and a woman.10
At the suppression hearings the District Court excluded as inadmissible hearsay Graff's out-of-court statements about joint occupancy as well as statements by both Graff and Matlock that they were husband and wife.11 The court concluded the remaining evidence was insufficient to prove to a reasonable certainty that Graff and Matlock were living together in the east bedroom at the time of the search.12 The Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court judgment in all respects.13 The Supreme Court granted certiorari.14
Whether the out-of-court statements of the third-party consenter and the respondent regarding joint occupancy of the searched premises are admissible at a suppression hearing?15
Yes. The District Court excluded as inadmissible hearsay Graff's out-of-court statements about joint occupancy as well as statements by both Graff and Matlock that they were husband and wife.18 The statements were in fact made.19 They were consistent with one another and against penal interest under Wisconsin law.20
They were corroborated by other evidence including the Florida cohabitation and the condition of the east bedroom.21 Graff was available for cross-examination at the suppression hearings, reducing any risk of prejudice from hearsay.22
The out-of-court statements of the third-party consenter and the respondent regarding joint occupancy are admissible at a suppression hearing.23
Whether the evidence presented by the United States with respect to the voluntary consent of a third party to search the living quarters of the respondent was legally sufficient to render the seized materials admissible in evidence at the respondent's criminal trial?24
When the prosecution seeks to justify a warrantless search by proof of voluntary consent, it may show that permission to search was obtained from a third party who possessed common authority over or other sufficient relationship to the premises or effects sought to be inspected.25 The consent of one who possesses common authority over premises is valid as against the absent, nonconsenting person with whom that authority is shared.26
Yes. Graff consented voluntarily to the search of the house, including the east bedroom on the second floor which she said was jointly occupied by Matlock and herself.27 With the admissibility of Graff's statements to the officers and Matlock's own out-of-court admissions that they were husband and wife, it appears the Government sustained its burden of proving by the preponderance of the evidence that Graff's voluntary consent to search the east bedroom was legally sufficient to warrant admitting the $4,995 found in the diaper bag.28
The case is remanded for the District Court to reconsider the sufficiency of the evidence in light of this decision.29
It appears that with the statements admitted the Government sustained its burden of proving by the preponderance of the evidence that Graff's voluntary consent was legally sufficient, but the case is remanded for the District Court to reconsider the sufficiency of the evidence.30
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Douglas dissented because the officers had opportunity to obtain a search warrant yet conducted none.31 The absence of a warrant makes the search impermissible regardless of consent.32 He emphasized that the Fourth Amendment requires judicial scrutiny before searches of permanent premises when there is time to secure a warrant and no grave emergency exists.33
The District Court found no exigent circumstances.34 Douglas relied on precedents such as Johnson v. United States requiring that inferences of probable cause be drawn by a neutral magistrate rather than by officers in the field.35 He concluded that Mrs. Graff's consent provided an inadequate substitute for the protections of a warrant.36
Justice Brennan would not limit the remand to the determination of joint occupancy authority.37 He would also require a determination that Graff consented knowing that she was not required to consent.38 An individual cannot effectively waive this constitutional right if totally ignorant of the fact that such invasions of privacy would otherwise be prohibited.39
Brennan reiterated his view from Schneckloth v. Bustamonte that citizens cannot meaningfully waive a precious constitutional guarantee without awareness of its existence.40