533 U.S. 218 (2001)
Imports are taxed under the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States.1
Between 1989 and 1993 the Mead Corporation imported day planners consisting of three-ring binders with pages for daily schedules, phone numbers and addresses, calendars and similar items.2 During that period Customs repeatedly classified the day planners under the duty-free "other" subcategory of HTSUS subheading 4820.10.3
In January 1993 Customs changed its position and issued a Headquarters ruling letter classifying the day planners as "Diaries . . . , bound" subject to a 4.0 percent tariff under subheading 4820.10.20.4 After Mead protested, Customs Headquarters issued a second, more detailed ruling letter that considered two definitions of "diary" from the Oxford English Dictionary and the Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding System Explanatory Notes to Heading 4820 before reaching the same conclusion.5
Mead filed suit in the Court of International Trade.6 The Court of International Trade granted the Government's motion for summary judgment.7
While Mead's appeal was pending in the Federal Circuit, the Supreme Court decided United States v. Haggar Apparel Co.8 The Federal Circuit requested supplemental briefing on the impact of that decision.9 The Government argued that classification rulings deserve Chevron deference.10 The Federal Circuit reversed, holding that classification rulings should not receive Chevron deference.11 The Supreme Court granted certiorari.12
Any of the 46 port-of-entry Customs offices or Customs Headquarters may issue ruling letters.13 Most contain little or no reasoning and simply describe goods and state the appropriate category and tariff.14 A few, like the Headquarters ruling here, set out a rationale in detail.15 Ruling letters respond to transactions of the moment, are binding only on the person to whom they are addressed until modified or revoked, and other importers are warned against relying on them.16 At the time this action arose they could be modified without notice and comment under most circumstances.17
Whether a tariff classification ruling by the United States Customs Service qualifies for Chevron deference?18
Administrative implementation of a particular statutory provision qualifies for Chevron deference when it appears that Congress delegated authority to the agency generally to make rules carrying the force of law.19 The agency interpretation claiming deference must have been promulgated in the exercise of that authority.20 Delegation of such authority may be shown in a variety of ways, as by an agency's power to engage in adjudication or notice-and-comment rulemaking, or by some other indication of a comparable congressional intent.21
No. The authorization for classification rulings and Customs's practice in making them present a case far removed from notice-and-comment process or other circumstances suggesting that Congress thought of classification rulings as deserving Chevron deference.22 The terms of the congressional delegation give no indication that Congress meant to delegate authority to Customs to issue classification rulings with the force of law.23 Ruling letters respond to transactions of the moment, are binding only on the person to whom they are addressed until modified or revoked, and other importers are warned against relying on them. In this case the Headquarters ruling letter classifying Mead's day planners was issued without notice and comment and could be modified without notice and comment under most circumstances.24
The fact that any of the 46 port-of-entry Customs offices may issue such letters and that 10,000 to 15,000 of them are issued each year further demonstrates that they lack the force of law contemplated by Chevron.25
A tariff classification ruling by the United States Customs Service does not qualify for Chevron deference.26
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Scalia dissented. He contended that the majority's approach makes an avulsive change in judicial review of federal administrative action.27 Previously a reasonable agency application of an ambiguous statutory provision had to be sustained so long as it represented the agency's authoritative interpretation.28
Henceforth such an application can be set aside unless it appears that Congress delegated authority to the agency generally to make rules carrying the force of law.29 Scalia argued that the new doctrine is neither sound in principle nor sustainable in practice.30 The principal effect will be protracted confusion.31
Another practical effect will be an artificially induced increase in informal rulemaking.32 Worst of all, the majority's approach will lead to the ossification of large portions of our statutory law.33 Scalia would have adhered to the original formulation of Chevron and deferred to the reasonable interpretation the Customs Service has given to the statute it is charged with enforcing.34
Whether such a ruling is eligible to claim respect according to its persuasiveness under Skidmore?35
Under Skidmore an agency's interpretation may merit some deference whatever its form.36 This is given the specialized experience and broader investigations and information available to the agency.37 The value of uniformity in its administrative and judicial understandings of what a national law requires is also considered.38 The weight accorded to an administrative judgment in a particular case will depend upon the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to control.39
Yes. There is room at least to raise a Skidmore claim here where the regulatory scheme is highly detailed and Customs can bring the benefit of specialized experience to bear on the subtle questions in this case.40 A classification ruling in this situation may therefore at least seek a respect proportional to its power to persuade.41 Such a ruling may surely claim the merit of its writer's thoroughness, logic, and expertness, its fit with prior interpretations, and any other sources of weight.42
The second Headquarters ruling letter considered two definitions of diary from the Oxford English Dictionary.43 It also considered the Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding System Explanatory Notes to Heading 4820 before reaching the same conclusion that the day planners were bound diaries subject to tariff.44
The tariff classification ruling is eligible to claim respect according to its persuasiveness under Skidmore.45