446 U.S. 544 (1980)
Sylvia Mendenhall arrived at the Detroit Metropolitan Airport on a commercial airline flight from Los Angeles early in the morning on February 10, 1976.1 Two agents of the Drug Enforcement Administration observed her as she disembarked from the airplane.2 The agents noted that she was the last passenger to leave the aircraft, appeared very nervous, completely scanned the gate area, proceeded past the baggage claim without claiming any luggage, and changed airlines for her connecting flight.3
The agents approached Mendenhall as she walked through the concourse, identified themselves as federal agents, and asked to see her identification and airline ticket.4 Mendenhall produced her driver's license in the name of Sylvia Mendenhall and an airline ticket issued in the name of Annette Ford.5 When asked about the name discrepancy, she stated that she just felt like using that name and that she had been in California for only two days.6
The agents returned her documents and asked if she would accompany them to the airport DEA office for further questioning, which she did.7 At the DEA office, the agents asked Mendenhall if she would allow a search of her person and handbag and told her that she had the right to decline the search if she desired.8 She responded "Go ahead" and handed over her purse.9 A female police officer arrived and, after confirming consent, conducted a search in a private room.10 Mendenhall removed her clothing and handed over two small packages, one containing heroin.11
Mendenhall was arrested and a grand jury indicted her for possessing heroin with intent to distribute.12 She moved to suppress the heroin, claiming it was obtained in violation of her Fourth Amendment rights.13 The District Court denied the motion after an evidentiary hearing, and she was convicted on stipulated facts following a waiver of jury trial.14 The Court of Appeals reversed the conviction, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.15
Whether the respondent was seized within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment when the DEA agents approached her in the airport concourse and asked her questions?16
A person has been seized within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment only if, in view of all of the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave.17
No. The events took place in the public concourse of an airport.18 The agents wore no uniforms and displayed no weapons.19 They did not summon the respondent to their presence, but instead approached her and identified themselves as federal agents.20 They requested, but did not demand, to see her ticket and her driver's license.21
The respondent produced the ticket and the driver's license, which were then inspected by the agents.22 The respondent was not told that she was under arrest, nor was her movement restricted in any way.23 She was not physically touched by the agents.24 She was asked if she would accompany the agents to the office for further questioning, and she said that she would.25
The entire encounter lasted only a few minutes.26 A reasonable person would have felt free to decline the agents' requests or otherwise terminate the encounter.27
The respondent was not seized when the DEA agents approached her in the airport concourse and asked her questions.28
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by The Chief Justice And Mr. Justice Blackmun
Justice Powell concurs in the judgment and in Parts I and II of the opinion.29 He agrees that the respondent was not seized when the DEA agents approached her in the airport and asked her questions.30 Because she was not seized, the subsequent search was valid if her consent was voluntary.31
The District Court found that the consent was voluntary, and that finding is not clearly erroneous.32 That is sufficient to decide this case.33 He does not join Part III because the plurality's discussion of the reasonable suspicion standard is unnecessary to the decision of this case.34
Joined by Mr. Justice Brennan, Mr. Justice Marshall, And Mr. Justice Stevens
Justice White dissents, concluding that a reasonable person in the respondent's position would not have felt free to leave or to refuse the officers' requests.35 He would hold that the respondent was seized when the agents first approached her and that the seizure was not supported by reasonable suspicion.36 All evidence obtained thereafter should have been suppressed as fruit of the illegal seizure.37
The display of authority is such that most persons would feel obliged to comply, and the respondent was not told that she had a right to refuse to answer questions or to leave.38
Whether the respondent voluntarily consented to accompany the agents to the DEA office for further questioning?39
The question whether the respondent's consent to accompany the agents was in fact voluntary or was the product of duress or coercion, express or implied, is to be determined by the totality of all the circumstances, and is a matter which the Government has the burden of proving.40
Yes. The District Court specifically found that the respondent accompanied the agents to the office voluntarily in a spirit of apparent cooperation.41 The government's evidence showed that the respondent was not told that she had to go to the office but was simply asked if she would accompany the officers.42 There were neither threats nor any show of force.43
The respondent had been questioned only briefly, and her ticket and identification were returned to her before she was asked to accompany the officers.44 Although the respondent was 22 years old and had not been graduated from high school, the totality of the evidence in this case was plainly adequate to support the District Court's finding that the respondent voluntarily consented to accompany the officers to the DEA office.45
The respondent voluntarily consented to accompany the agents to the DEA office for further questioning.46
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Mr. Justice Brennan, Mr. Justice Marshall, And Mr. Justice Stevens
Justice White would hold that the respondent was seized when the agents first approached her, making any subsequent consent to accompany them the product of an illegal detention.47 The evidence of consent is flimsy and the Court of Appeals properly understood that consent cannot be presumed from acquiescence to authority.48 The respondent in fact had no choice in the matter once the agents requested that she accompany them.49
There was no evidence in the record to support the District Court's speculation that Ms. Mendenhall accompanied the agents voluntarily in a spirit of apparent cooperation.50
Whether the respondent voluntarily consented to the search of her handbag and person?51
A search conducted pursuant to a valid consent is constitutionally permissible.52 The question whether a consent to a search was in fact voluntary or was the product of duress or coercion, express or implied, is a question of fact to be determined from the totality of all the circumstances.53 The government has the burden of proving that the consent was, in fact, freely and voluntarily given.54
Yes. The District Court found that the respondent freely and voluntarily consented to the search of her handbag and her person.55 That finding is supported by the record.56 The respondent was 22 years old and had had 11 years of schooling.57
She was not under the influence of drugs or alcohol.58 She was not threatened or physically restrained.59 She was asked if she would consent to a search, and she said that she would.60 The agents then searched her handbag and asked if they could search her person.61
She said that they could.62 It is especially significant that the respondent was twice expressly told that she was free to decline to consent to the search, and only thereafter explicitly consented to it.63
The respondent voluntarily consented to the search of her handbag and person.64
Whether the heroin discovered during the search was admissible in evidence against the respondent?65
Because the respondent was not seized, the subsequent search of her handbag and her person was with her valid consent.66 The heroin found was admissible in evidence.
Yes. The Court of Appeals held that the respondent's consent was invalid because it was the product of an illegal seizure.67 Because the respondent was not seized, the Court of Appeals' holding on the consent issue cannot stand.68 The District Court's finding that the consent was voluntary is amply supported by the record.69 The heroin was properly admitted in evidence.70
The heroin discovered during the search was admissible in evidence against the respondent.71