513 U.S. 196 (1995)
On August 1, 1991, San Diego Narcotics Task Force agents arrested Gordon Shuster after discovering a methamphetamine laboratory at his residence in Rainbow, California.1 Shuster agreed to cooperate with the agents. He placed a call to respondent Gordon Mezzanatto's pager a few hours later.2 When Mezzanatto returned the call, Shuster told him that a friend wanted to purchase a pound of methamphetamine for $13,000.3 Shuster arranged to meet Mezzanatto later that day.4
At the meeting, Shuster introduced an undercover officer as his friend.5 Mezzanatto produced a brown paper package containing approximately one pound of methamphetamine from his car.6 He also presented a glass pipe containing methamphetamine residue and asked the officer if he wanted to take a hit.7 The officer gave a prearranged arrest signal after leaving the car to retrieve the money.8 Mezzanatto was arrested and charged with possession of methamphetamine with intent to distribute in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1).9
On October 17, 1991, Mezzanatto and his attorney asked to meet with the prosecutor to discuss cooperating with the Government.10 At the beginning of the meeting, the prosecutor stated that Mezzanatto would have to agree that any statements made could be used to impeach contradictory testimony at trial if the case proceeded that far.11 Mezzanatto conferred with counsel and agreed to proceed under those terms.12 He then admitted knowing the package contained methamphetamine while claiming he had dealt only in ounce quantities and had not visited Shuster's residence for at least a week.13
The Government confronted Mezzanatto with surveillance evidence showing his car on Shuster's property the day before the arrest. It terminated the meeting for failure to provide completely truthful information.14 Mezzanatto was later tried on the charge. He took the stand in his own defense.15 He testified that he thought Shuster used the laboratory to manufacture plastic explosives for the CIA and that he did not know the package contained methamphetamine.16
Over defense objection, the prosecutor cross-examined Mezzanatto about inconsistent statements from the October 17 meeting.17 The prosecutor called an attending agent to recount those statements.18 The jury found Mezzanatto guilty. The District Court sentenced him to 170 months in prison.19 A Ninth Circuit panel reversed over Chief Judge Wallace's dissent in 998 F. 2d 1452 (1993).20 The Supreme Court granted certiorari because the decision conflicted with the Seventh Circuit's ruling in United States v. Dortch, 5 F. 3d 1056 (1993).21
Whether Federal Rule of Evidence 410 and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(e)(6) may be waived by a criminal defendant so that statements made during plea discussions can be used to impeach the defendant's testimony at trial?22
Absent some affirmative indication of Congress' intent to preclude waiver, statutory provisions including evidentiary rules are subject to waiver by voluntary agreement of the parties.23
Yes. The plea-statement Rules were enacted against a background presumption that legal rights generally, and evidentiary provisions specifically, are subject to waiver by voluntary agreement of the parties.24 On October 17, 1991, Mezzanatto conferred with counsel and agreed to the prosecutor's condition that statements made during the meeting could be used to impeach contradictory trial testimony.25 Mezzanatto then admitted knowing the package contained methamphetamine.26
At trial Mezzanatto denied that knowledge and claimed he thought the laboratory produced plastic explosives for the CIA. The prosecutor cross-examined him on the prior inconsistent statements and called an attending agent to recount them. Enforcement of such a waiver agreement enhances rather than discredits the truthseeking function of trials.27
The agreement to waive the exclusionary provisions of the plea-statement Rules is valid and enforceable.28
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by O'connor, Breyer
Justice Ginsburg filed a concurring statement in which Justices O'Connor and Breyer joined.29 She observed that the Court holds a waiver allowing the Government to impeach with statements made during plea negotiations is compatible with Congress' intent to promote plea bargaining.30 It may be, however, that a waiver to use such statements in the case in chief would more severely undermine a defendant's incentive to negotiate and thereby inhibit plea bargaining.31
As the Government has not sought such a waiver, the Court does not here explore this question.32
Joined by Stevens
Justice Souter, joined by Justice Stevens, dissented.33 He maintained that the Rules serve the federal judicial system's interest in promoting reasonable plea agreements through conditions of unrestrained candor.34 Recognizing waivers diminishes the zone of candor Congress deemed necessary and conflicts with the intent revealed in the Advisory Committee's Notes.35
The majority's approach will likely render the Rules dead letters because prosecutors already routinely demand waiver as a condition of plea discussions, and the demanded waiver will in time function as a waiver of trial itself.36