307 U.S. 174
In 1995 Samuel Mullet purchased land in Jefferson County, Ohio.1 That land became the Bergholz Amish community in 2001 when a sufficient number of ordained ministers qualified it as a separate Amish church district.2 The new community appointed Mullet as its bishop.3 As bishop, Mullet controlled all aspects of life in the Bergholz compound and had the ability to order the shunning of community members who failed to follow the tenets of their Amish faith.4
In 2006 Mullet excommunicated several church members who questioned Bergholz community practices and his leadership.5 Included in the group were Lavern and Mattie Troyer, whose son Aden was married to Mullet's daughter Wilma, as well as Melvin and Anna Shrock, whose son Emanuel was married to Mullet's daughter Linda.6 The excommunications led to family divisions, including a divorce and a custody dispute.7 Amish bishops from across the country met and voted unanimously to reverse the excommunications.8
From September 6 to November 9, 2011, several Bergholz community members committed five separate attacks on nine different individuals connected to the community by family or religious ties.9 The assailants sliced off the men's beards and cut the women's hair.10 The victims were seen as Amish hypocrites by the assailants.11
A federal grand jury indicted sixteen members of the Bergholz community for violating and conspiring to violate the Hate Crimes Prevention Act, as well as other charges.12 At trial, the government presented evidence that the assaults were motivated by the victims' religion, while the defendants presented evidence of personal and family disputes as alternative motives.13 The jury convicted all sixteen defendants of at least one hate-crime violation.14
The district court instructed the jury that the victims' religion need only be a significant motivating factor even if other reasons existed.15 The defendants twice requested a but-for causation instruction, which the court rejected.16 The defendants appealed their convictions to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.17
Whether the district court erred in instructing the jury that a victim's religion need only be a significant motivating factor rather than a but-for cause of the assault to satisfy the motive element of 18 U.S.C. § 249(a)(2)(A)?18
The phrase 'because of' in 18 U.S.C. § 249(a)(2)(A) requires but-for causation, meaning the victim's actual or perceived religion must be the reason the defendant decided to act or the straw that broke the camel's back.19
Yes. The district court instructed the jury that the motive element could be satisfied by showing that a person's actual or perceived religion was a significant motivating factor for a defendant's action even if he or she had other reasons for doing what he or she did as well.20 The defendants twice requested a but-for causation instruction before and at the close of trial, and the court rejected both requests.21 Burrage v. United States confirms that statutes using 'because of' in criminal contexts demand but-for causality rather than a lesser standard such as significant factor.22
Applied to the established facts, the defendants preserved the objection by renewing their but-for request at the end of trial, yet the court adhered to the significant-factor formulation.23
The district court erred in instructing the jury on the motive element of the hate crime statute.24
Related opinions on this issue
Judge Sargus agreed that the phrase 'because of' requires but-for causation under Burrage.25 He concluded that the instructional error was harmless.26 Overwhelming and uncontested evidence showed the victims' Amish religion was a but-for cause of the beard and hair cuttings.27
The defendants knew the cuttings would inflict harm precisely because of the victims' religious beliefs about beards and hair.28 Judge Sargus also noted that the statute targets conduct and requires only a causal connection between the assailant's conduct and the victim's protected class, not proof of faith-based animus.29
Whether any instructional error on the motive element was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt?30
An instructional error on an element is harmless only if it appears beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to the verdict obtained. This requires that the jury verdict would have been the same absent the error.31
No. The error was not harmless because motive was the central factual debate at trial and the defendants presented substantial evidence of alternative non-religious motives including family discord, bad parenting, custody disputes, and personal conflicts.32 The jury convicted on only four of five assaults despite identical methods of attack, indicating that religious symbolism in the assaults did not automatically establish religious motive.33
Applied to the established facts, the defendants offered evidence that the Miller attack stemmed from parental criticism and wedding snubs, the Shrock attack from family criticism and calling the sheriff, the Hershberger attack from the custody dispute over Wilma's children, and the Myron Miller attack from the horse-and-buggy dispute.34
The instructional error on the motive element was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.35
Related opinions on this issue
Judge Sargus concluded that the error was harmless.36 The proper but-for inquiry asks whether the prohibited conduct would have occurred but for the victims' Amish religion.37 The record contained overwhelming evidence that the defendants chose to cut beards and hair precisely because of the victims' religious beliefs.38
There was no evidence that the defendants would have acted the same way against non-Amish victims.39 Judge Sargus emphasized that the existence of other contributing causes does not undermine the but-for link to the victims' religion.40
Whether the evidence was sufficient to support the defendants' convictions such that retrial would not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause?41
To permit retrial without violating the Double Jeopardy Clause, the government must have presented evidence at the first trial sufficient for a rational trier of fact to find the defendants guilty beyond a reasonable doubt when the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution.42
Yes. The government presented evidence that the defendants knowingly and intentionally agreed to commit the assaults, including that the crimes followed the same pattern and method, occurred close in time, involved meetings before and after the attacks, and featured repeated participation by many defendants.43 Evidence also established bodily injury from cuts and bruises and aiding-and-abetting conduct such as Linda Shrock covering Anna Shrock's mouth.44
Applied to the established facts, this evidence supports the conspiracy convictions and the substantive hate-crime convictions for each defendant.45
The evidence was sufficient to support the defendants' convictions, permitting retrial without violating the Double Jeopardy Clause.46