529 U.S. 598 (2000)
In September 1994 Christy Brzonkala enrolled as a student at Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University.1 Within thirty minutes of meeting fellow students Antonio Morrison and James Crawford, both members of the varsity football team, Brzonkala alleges that the two men assaulted and repeatedly raped her.2 Morrison allegedly told Brzonkala after the attack that she had better not have any diseases.3 He later announced in a dormitory dining room that he liked to get girls drunk and made other vulgar remarks about women.4
Brzonkala became severely emotionally disturbed and depressed after the incident.5 She sought assistance from a university psychiatrist who prescribed antidepressant medication.6 She stopped attending classes and withdrew from the university.7 In early 1995 she filed a complaint against Morrison and Crawford under the university's Sexual Assault Policy.8 Virginia Tech conducted a hearing under its Sexual Assault Policy and a second hearing under its Abusive Conduct Policy.9 The first found Morrison guilty of sexual assault and suspended him for two semesters.10 The second hearing again found him guilty but changed the offense description to using abusive language.11 University officials later set aside the punishment.12
In December 1995 Brzonkala sued Morrison, Crawford, and Virginia Tech in the United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia.13 Her complaint alleged that the attack violated 42 U.S.C. §13981, the civil remedy provision of the Violence Against Women Act of 1994, which creates a federal cause of action for compensatory and punitive damages against persons who commit crimes of violence motivated by gender.14 She also asserted Title IX claims against the university.15
The district court dismissed the Title IX claims for failure to state a claim.16 It also dismissed the §13981 claim on the ground that Congress lacked authority to enact the provision under either the Commerce Clause or Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.17 A divided panel of the Fourth Circuit reversed in part, but the en banc Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's conclusion that Congress lacked constitutional authority to enact §13981.18
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine the constitutionality of the civil remedy provision.19
Whether Congress had authority under the Commerce Clause to enact the civil remedy provision of the Violence Against Women Act of 1994?20
Congress may regulate under the Commerce Clause the use of the channels of interstate commerce, the instrumentalities of interstate commerce or persons or things in interstate commerce, and those activities having a substantial relation to interstate commerce.21 To determine whether an activity substantially affects interstate commerce, courts examine whether the statute regulates economic enterprise, contains an express jurisdictional element limiting its reach, includes express congressional findings regarding effects on interstate commerce, and whether the link between the regulated activity and interstate commerce is attenuated.22
No. The civil remedy provision of 42 U.S.C. §13981 does not regulate the channels or instrumentalities of interstate commerce.23 Gender-motivated crimes of violence are not economic activity in any sense.24 The statute contains no jurisdictional element establishing a connection to interstate commerce.25 Although supported by congressional findings, those findings rely on the aggregate effect of noneconomic violent conduct on interstate commerce, a method of reasoning rejected because it would permit Congress to regulate virtually any activity.26
The link between gender-motivated violence and interstate commerce is attenuated and lacks the required proximate causal connection.27
Congress lacked authority under the Commerce Clause to enact the civil remedy provision of the Violence Against Women Act of 1994.28
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Thomas concurs in the judgment that the statute is unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause.29 He writes separately to express his view that United States v. Lopez was correctly decided.30 The Court should continue to limit Congress' power under the Commerce Clause to those activities that have a substantial effect on interstate commerce.31
Thomas acknowledges that the substantial effects test is in tension with the original understanding of the Clause and with early case law.32 Yet he maintains that the test remains necessary to preserve constitutional boundaries between national and local authority.33 He urges the Court to adhere to Lopez rather than expand federal power further through aggregation of noneconomic conduct.34
Joined by Stevens, Ginsburg, And Breyer, Jj.
Justice Souter dissents from the Commerce Clause holding.35 He argues that the congressional findings make clear that gender-motivated violence has a substantial effect on interstate commerce.36 Victims of such violence are often unable to work, travel, or engage in commercial activity.37
The aggregate effect of such violence on the national economy is substantial according to the extensive legislative record compiled over four years of hearings.38 Souter contends that the decision ignores these findings and returns to a narrow view of the Commerce Clause that the Court abandoned decades ago in favor of the substantial effects test and rational basis review of congressional judgments.39
Joined by Stevens, J., Joined, And In Which Souter And Ginsburg, Jj., Joined As To Part I
Justice Breyer joins Justice Souter's dissent in substantial part on the Commerce Clause issue.40 He writes separately to emphasize that the economic and noneconomic distinction is difficult to apply and unworkable as a constitutional test for limiting congressional power.41 Breyer notes that Congress followed adequate procedures to protect federalism values through extensive hearings, state attorney general support, and tailoring of the remedy.42
He argues that the Court should not displace Congress' primary role in striking the state-federal balance under the rational basis approach to substantial effects, as judges lack the institutional capacity to draw workable categorical lines in an integrated national economy.43
Whether Congress had authority under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to enact the civil remedy provision of the Violence Against Women Act of 1994?44
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment gives Congress power to enforce the Amendment's substantive guarantees by appropriate legislation.45 The Fourteenth Amendment prohibits only state action, not private conduct.46 Legislation under Section 5 must be corrective in nature, aimed at state actors, and exhibit congruence and proportionality between the injury to be prevented and the means adopted.
No. The civil remedy is aimed at individuals who have committed gender-motivated violence rather than at state actors.47 The remedy is not corrective in nature because it applies uniformly throughout the Nation and is not limited to states that have engaged in unconstitutional conduct.48 The Fourteenth Amendment does not give Congress the power to regulate private conduct.49
Congress lacked authority under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to enact the civil remedy provision of the Violence Against Women Act of 1994.50
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Thomas concurs in the judgment that the statute is unconstitutional under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment as well.51 He joins the majority opinion in full.52 Thomas agrees that Congress lacked authority under both the Commerce Clause and Section 5.53
His separate writing focuses on preserving limits under the Commerce Clause but endorses the full majority analysis rejecting Section 5 power over private conduct.
Joined by Stevens, Ginsburg, And Breyer, Jj.
Justice Souter dissents on the Commerce Clause ground and does not reach the Section 5 question in his opinion.54 He focuses his analysis entirely on the substantial effects test under the Commerce Clause and the extensive legislative record supporting it.55 Souter leaves open whether the remedy could be sustained under Section 5, emphasizing instead that the Commerce Clause alone provides ample authority given the documented national economic impacts.56
Joined by Stevens, J., Joined, And In Which Souter And Ginsburg, Jj., Joined As To Part I
Justice Breyer doubts the majority's reasoning rejecting Section 5 authority.57 He notes that Congress acted to remedy state actors' failures to provide adequate remedies for gender-motivated violence, as documented in task force reports from twenty-one states and congressional hearings.58 The statutory remedy does not in any sense purport to determine what constitutes a constitutional violation.59
It intrudes little upon either States or private parties.60 It may lead state actors to improve their own remedial systems, primarily through example.61 He would uphold the statute under Section 5 as well as the Commerce Clause, viewing it as a permissible response to state court inadequacies rather than an attempt to regulate purely private conduct.62