480 F.2d 76
The appellants Ballan and Ramirez, along with sixteen others, were charged in a single count indictment returned on September 16, 1971, with conspiracy to import, receive, conceal and transport marijuana in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 176a.1 The acts charged against the appellants extended over a period of time from approximately March to November of 1970.2
Defendants were found guilty by a jury on June 19, 1972, and sentence was pronounced the next morning on June 20, 1972.3 Ramirez received a sentence of seven years and a fine of $15,000.00, while Ballan was sentenced to five years and a fine of $5,000.00.4 The sentences were imposed under Sec. 176a, which was repealed effective May 1, 1971.5
Ballan made timely objections to the fruits of the search of the purse of co-defendant Bowers.6 The first search was for weapons and took place immediately upon her arrest, during which the incriminating documentary evidence was observed but not removed.7 A short time later during booking procedures, a second search was made and the documentary evidence was seized and introduced at trial against defendant Ballan.8
Whether the government can initiate a prosecution after the effective date of repeal for alleged criminal acts occurring prior thereto?9
The general saving statute, 1 U.S.C. § 109, and the special saving clauses of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, Sections 702 and 1103, save prosecutions for violations of the law occurring before the repeal of the statute.10
Yes. The acts charged against the appellants extended over a period of time from approximately March to November of 1970, before the repeal effective May 1, 1971.11 The indictment was returned on September 16, 1971, after the repeal.12 These prosecutions for violations of the law occurring before were saved by the general saving statute, 1 U.S.C. Sec. 109, and the special saving clauses of the Act, Sections 702 and 1103.13
The government can initiate a prosecution after the effective date of repeal for alleged criminal acts occurring prior thereto.14
Whether assuming that the first proposition is answered adversely to appellants they cannot be punished under the repealed provisions but must be punished under the new and less severe penalty provisions?15
Sentencing is part of prosecution, and the mandatory minimum sentence under the old act must be imposed on offenders who violated the law before May 1, 1971, as the sentences were properly imposed under the provisions of the repealed Act, as saved.16
No. While it may be argued that if the prosecution had begun after May 1, 1971, punishment should be under the new Act, the rationale of Bradley supports the conclusion that the sentences were properly imposed under the provisions of the repealed Act, as saved.17 As stated in Bradley, the mandatory minimum sentence of five years must therefore be imposed on offenders who violated the law before May 1, 1971.18
Appellants can be punished under the repealed provisions rather than the new and less severe penalty provisions.19
Related opinions on this issue
Judge Hufstedler dissents solely from the disposition of the second issue.20 In her view, the majority's negative response is contrary to the teaching of Bradley v. United States.21 Section 1103(a) provides that prosecutions for any violation of law occurring prior to the effective date shall not be affected by the repeals made by it or abated by reason thereof.22
The keystone of the Bradley rationale is its construction of the word prosecutions as clearly imports a beginning and an end.23 The beginning of a prosecution is the return of an indictment.24 These indictments were returned after section 176a had been repealed.25 There was no prosecution to be saved by section 1103(a).26 Any prosecution under section 176a begun after repeal carries with it the milder penalties of the successor statute.27 She would vacate the sentence and remand for resentencing under the new statute.28
Whether sentencing under the harsher penalties of the repealed act amounts to cruel and unusual punishment proscribed by the Eighth Amendment?29
No. Ramirez alone raises the Eighth Amendment violation because of sentencing under the harsher provisions of the repealed Act.33 The sentence imposed on Ramirez was well within and below the maximum sentence which could have been imposed.34 He is in the same class as all persons convicted and sentenced under the repealed provisions.35 Sentences under Sec. 176a were not cruel and unusual punishment prior to repeal.
Sentencing under the harsher penalties of the repealed act does not amount to cruel and unusual punishment proscribed by the Eighth Amendment.36
Whether Ballan has standing to challenge the legality of the search of his wife's purse?37
A defendant lacks standing to challenge the legality of a search of his wife's purse under the Fourth Amendment.38
No. Ballan made timely objections to the fruits of the search of the purse of co-defendant Bowers.39 The first search was for weapons and took place immediately upon her arrest. The incriminating documentary evidence was observed, but not removed. A short time later and during booking procedures, a second search was made and the documentary evidence was seized and introduced at trial against defendant Ballan.
Ballan does not have standing to challenge the legality of the search of his wife's purse.40
Ballan does not have standing to challenge the legality of the search of his wife's purse.