570 U.S. 338, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 186 L. Ed. 2d 503 (2013)
The University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center, a teaching hospital affiliated with the University of Texas, hired Naiel Nassar, a physician of Middle Eastern descent, first as a medical resident in 2001 and later as an assistant professor in the Department of Internal Medicine in 2006.1 Nassar's direct supervisor was Dr. Michael Levine, the Chief of Infectious Disease Medicine, and he also worked with Dr. Brian Becherer, the Medical Director of the hospital's employee health clinic.2
In 2007 and 2008, Nassar complained to his supervisors that he was being subjected to discrimination and harassment by Levine on the basis of his religion and ethnic heritage.3 In July 2008, Nassar was offered and accepted a position as a full-time faculty member in the Department of Internal Medicine. In August 2008, Nassar resigned from his faculty position in a letter stating that the primary reason for his departure was the hostile work environment created by Levine's harassment.4
After Nassar resigned, Becherer sent a letter to the state medical board reporting that Nassar had resigned while under investigation for professional misconduct involving alleged improper billing practices.5 Nassar filed suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas alleging two claims under Title VII: status-based discrimination on the basis of his race, religion, and national origin, and retaliation for complaining about Levine's conduct.6
The case proceeded to trial before a jury. The District Court instructed the jury that Nassar could prevail on his retaliation claim if he showed that retaliation was a motivating factor in the hospital's decision to send the letter to the medical board.7 The jury found for Nassar on both claims and awarded him $3,000 in backpay and $400,000 in compensatory damages, which the District Court reduced to $300,000 pursuant to the statutory cap.8 The hospital appealed to the Fifth Circuit, which affirmed the retaliation verdict on the theory that the motivating-factor standard applied. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.9
Whether Title VII retaliation claims must be proved according to traditional principles of but-for causation rather than the lessened causation test stated in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(m)?10
Title VII retaliation claims require proof that the desire to retaliate was the but-for cause of the challenged employment action. The motivating-factor standard in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(m) applies only to status-based discrimination claims under § 2000e–2(a) and not to retaliation claims under § 2000e–3(a). The ordinary meaning of 'because of' in § 2000e–3(a) requires but-for causation, consistent with Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc., 557 U.S. 167 (2009), and Congress's decision in the 1991 Act to limit the lessened standard to status-based claims.11
Yes. The text of § 2000e–2(m) addresses only status-based discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin and says nothing about retaliation, which is governed by the separate provision in § 2000e–3(a). The Court's precedents confirm that status-based discrimination claims are not equated with retaliation claims.12
The University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center hired Naiel Nassar, a physician of Middle Eastern descent, first as a medical resident in 2001 and later as an assistant professor in the Department of Internal Medicine in 2006, where his direct supervisor was Dr. Michael Levine.13 In 2007 and 2008, Nassar complained to supervisors that Levine subjected him to discrimination and harassment on the basis of his religion and ethnic heritage.14 In July 2008, Nassar accepted an offer for a full-time faculty position but resigned in August 2008, citing in his letter the hostile work environment created by Levine's harassment as the primary reason.15
After the resignation, Dr. Brian Becherer sent a letter to the state medical board reporting that Nassar had resigned while under investigation for professional misconduct involving alleged improper billing practices.16 Nassar then filed suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas alleging both status-based discrimination and retaliation under Title VII.17 At trial, the District Court instructed the jury that Nassar could prevail on the retaliation claim by showing that retaliation was a motivating factor in the decision to send the letter. The jury found for Nassar on both claims, awarding $3,000 in backpay and $400,000 in compensatory damages (later reduced to $300,000).18 The Fifth Circuit affirmed the retaliation verdict under the motivating-factor standard.19
Because the correct standard for the retaliation claim is but-for causation rather than the motivating-factor test, the jury instruction was erroneous.20 The facts demonstrate that the University took the challenged action after Nassar's protected complaints, but the plaintiff must prove that the desire to retaliate was the but-for cause, not merely a motivating factor.21
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with the but-for causation standard for Title VII retaliation claims.22
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justices Breyer, Sotomayor, And Kagan
Justice Ginsburg dissented, joined by Justices Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan.23 She argued that the majority's decision drives an unwarranted wedge between Title VII's ban on status-based discrimination and its ban on retaliation.24 This approach is contrary to precedent recognizing that retaliation for complaining about discrimination is itself a form of status-based discrimination.25
Ginsburg maintained that § 2000e–2(m) covers retaliation claims because retaliation is an unlawful employment practice. The provision refers to any employment practice motivated by a protected characteristic.26 She criticized the majority for undermining Congress's intent in the 1991 Act to strengthen protections against workplace discrimination.
She also noted that the decision creates practical difficulties for trial courts and juries by imposing different causation standards in the same case.27 Ginsburg would have affirmed the Fifth Circuit and applied the motivating-factor standard to retaliation claims.28