136 S. Ct. 2056 (2016)
In December 2006, an anonymous tipster contacted the South Salt Lake City police department's drug-tip line to report narcotics activity at a particular residence, specifying that the activity involved a white male and providing a physical description of the man and his car.1 Detective Douglas Fackrell was assigned to investigate the tip and conducted intermittent surveillance of the home over the course of about a week.2 During this period, Fackrell observed visitors who would frequently enter the residence and leave after short periods of time, a pattern consistent with drug dealing in his experience.
One of the visitors was Edward Strieff.3 Officer Fackrell observed Strieff exit the house and walk toward a nearby convenience store.4 In the store's parking lot, Fackrell detained Strieff without reasonable suspicion, identified himself as a police officer, and asked what Strieff was doing at the residence.5 As part of the stop, Fackrell requested Strieff's identification, and Strieff produced his Utah identification card.6 Fackrell relayed the information to a police dispatcher, who reported that Strieff had an outstanding arrest warrant for a traffic violation.7
Fackrell arrested Strieff pursuant to the warrant.8 When Fackrell searched Strieff incident to the arrest, he discovered a baggie of methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia.9 The State of Utah charged Strieff with unlawful possession of a controlled substance and possession of drug paraphernalia.10 Strieff moved to suppress the evidence, arguing that it was obtained by exploitation of an unlawful investigatory stop.11 The trial court denied the motion to suppress.12
The Utah Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's denial of the suppression motion.13 The Utah Supreme Court reversed.14 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.15
Whether the attenuation doctrine applies when an officer makes an unconstitutional investigatory stop, learns during that stop that the suspect is subject to a valid arrest warrant, and then arrests the suspect and seizes evidence during a search incident to arrest?16
Under the attenuation doctrine, evidence obtained after unconstitutional police conduct is admissible if the connection between the illegality and the evidence is remote or interrupted by an intervening circumstance, so that the interest protected by the Fourth Amendment would not be served by suppression; the doctrine is guided by the three factors from Brown v. Illinois: (1) temporal proximity between the unconstitutional conduct and the discovery of evidence, (2) the presence of intervening circumstances, and (3) the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct.17
Yes. The first factor of temporal proximity between the stop and the discovery of the warrant favors suppression because only minutes elapsed.18 The second factor of intervening circumstances strongly favors admissibility because the valid pre-existing arrest warrant for a traffic violation, discovered when Fackrell relayed Strieff's identification to the dispatcher, was entirely unconnected to the stop and compelled the arrest, breaking the causal chain.19 The third factor of purpose and flagrancy of misconduct favors admissibility because Fackrell's conduct was at most negligent, based on an anonymous tip and observations of short-term visitors at the suspected drug house, with no evidence of systemic or recurrent misconduct or any purpose other than investigating the tip.20
The evidence discovered on Strieff's person is admissible because the unlawful stop was sufficiently attenuated by the discovery of the warrant.21
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justice Ginsburg
Justice Sotomayor dissents on the ground that the discovery of a pre-existing warrant does not cleanse the taint of an unconstitutional stop.22 The warrant check was part and parcel of the officer's illegal expedition for evidence rather than an unforeseeable intervening circumstance.23 She emphasizes that the officer's sole reason for stopping Strieff was investigative.24
Outstanding warrants are common and routinely checked in such stops.25 Her bottom line is that the drugs must be excluded because they were obtained by exploiting the illegal stop.26
Joined by Justice Ginsburg
Justice Kagan dissents on the ground that none of the Brown factors supports attenuation here because temporal proximity favors suppression given the minutes between the stop and the search.27 The officer's conduct was purposeful rather than merely negligent as he admitted stopping Strieff solely to investigate the house.28 The warrant was a foreseeable and routine result of any pedestrian stop rather than an unforeseeable intervening event.29
She concludes that the majority's decision invites officers to make suspicionless stops in the hope that a warrant will turn up, undermining the deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule.30