570 U.S. 421 (2013)
Maetta Vance, an African-American woman, began working for Ball State University in 1989 as a substitute server in the University Banquet and Catering division of Dining Services.1 In 1991, the university promoted her to a part-time catering assistant position. In 2007, she was selected for a full-time catering assistant role.2
During the time in question, Saundra Davis, a white woman, worked as a catering specialist in the same division.3 The parties agree that Davis lacked authority to hire, fire, demote, promote, transfer, or discipline Vance.4
In late 2005 and early 2006, Vance filed internal complaints with Ball State and charges with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission alleging racial harassment by Davis.5 She described incidents in which Davis glared at her, slammed pots and pans, intimidated her, blocked her on an elevator while smiling, and gave her weird looks.6
Vance filed suit in 2006 in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana. She alleged that Davis was her supervisor and that Ball State was liable for a racially hostile work environment under Title VII.7 Both parties moved for summary judgment. The District Court granted summary judgment to Ball State on September 10, 2008. It concluded that Davis was not a supervisor because she could not take tangible employment actions against Vance and that Ball State was not negligent.8
The Seventh Circuit affirmed in 646 F. 3d 461. It applied its precedent that supervisor status requires the power to hire, fire, demote, promote, transfer, or discipline. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the conflict among the circuits over the definition of supervisor.9
Whether an employee is a supervisor for purposes of vicarious liability under Title VII only if empowered by the employer to take tangible employment actions against the victim?10
Under Title VII, an employer is vicariously liable for harassment by a supervisor if the harassment culminates in a tangible employment action. If no tangible action is taken, the employer may escape liability by establishing an affirmative defense. The defense requires showing that the employer exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct harassing behavior and that the plaintiff unreasonably failed to take advantage of preventive or corrective opportunities.11 An employee is a supervisor for purposes of vicarious liability only if empowered by the employer to take tangible employment actions against the victim, such as hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment with significantly different responsibilities, or a decision causing a significant change in benefits.12
Yes. The parties agree that Davis lacked authority to hire, fire, demote, promote, transfer, or discipline Vance. Because Davis possessed none of the powers that define a supervisor under the standard adopted by the Court, she is a co-worker rather than a supervisor.13 Ball State therefore may be held liable only upon a showing of negligence in controlling working conditions.14
The District Court and Seventh Circuit correctly determined that Ball State responded reasonably to the incidents of which it was aware.15 The Ellerth and Faragher framework draws a sharp line between co-workers and supervisors based on authority to effect tangible employment actions, and this case falls squarely on the co-worker side of that line.16
The judgment of the Seventh Circuit is affirmed because Davis was not Vance's supervisor under the definition that ties supervisory status to the authority to take tangible employment actions, and Ball State was not negligent.17
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Thomas concurred separately. Although he maintains that Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U. S. 742 (1998), and Faragher v. Boca Raton, 524 U. S. 775 (1998), were wrongly decided, he joined the Court's opinion in this case.18
In his view, the definition of supervisor adopted by the majority, which requires authority to take tangible employment actions, supplies the narrowest and most workable rule for determining vicarious liability under Title VII when an employee engages in harassment.19
Joined by Justices Breyer, Sotomayor, And Kagan
Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justices Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan, dissented.20 She argued that the authority to direct an employee's daily work activities establishes supervisory status under Title VII in accordance with the EEOC Guidance.21 In her view the majority's limitation to employees formally empowered to take tangible employment actions diminishes the force of Ellerth and Faragher, ignores workplace realities in which employees who control daily assignments wield significant power, and disserves Title VII's objective of preventing workplace discrimination.22
She would follow the EEOC definition and reverse the judgment of the Seventh Circuit.23