528 U.S. 562 (2000)
Respondent Grace Olech and her late husband Thaddeus asked petitioner Village of Willowbrook (Village) to connect their property to the municipal water supply.1 The Village at first conditioned the connection on the Olechs granting the Village a 33-foot easement.2 The Olechs objected, claiming that the Village only required a 15-foot easement from other property owners seeking access to the water supply.3 After a 3-month delay, the Village relented and agreed to provide water service with only a 15-foot easement.4
Olech sued the Village, claiming that the Village's demand of an additional 18-foot easement violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.5 She asserted that the 33-foot easement demand was "irrational and wholly arbitrary."6 She further claimed that the Village's demand was actually motivated by ill will resulting from the Olechs' previous filing of an unrelated, successful lawsuit against the Village.7 She also alleged that the Village acted either with the intent to deprive Olech of her rights or in reckless disregard of her rights.8
The District Court dismissed the lawsuit pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a cognizable claim under the Equal Protection Clause.9 Relying on Circuit precedent, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed.10 The Supreme Court granted certiorari.11
Whether the Equal Protection Clause gives rise to a cause of action on behalf of a "class of one" where the plaintiff did not allege membership in a class or group?12
Our cases have recognized successful equal protection claims brought by a "class of one."13 The plaintiff must allege that she has been intentionally treated differently from others similarly situated.14 There must be no rational basis for the difference in treatment.15 See Sioux City Bridge Co. v. Dakota County, 260 U. S. 441 (1923); Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. Commission of Webster Cty., 488 U. S. 336 (1989).16 In so doing, we have explained that the purpose of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is to secure every person within the State's jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned by express terms of a statute or by its improper execution through duly constituted agents.17
Yes. Olech's complaint can fairly be construed as alleging that the Village intentionally demanded a 33-foot easement as a condition of connecting her property to the municipal water supply.18 The Village required only a 15-foot easement from other similarly situated property owners.19 The complaint also alleged that the Village's demand was irrational and wholly arbitrary.20
The Village ultimately connected her property after receiving a clearly adequate 15-foot easement.21 These allegations, quite apart from the Village's subjective motivation, are sufficient to state a claim for relief under traditional equal protection analysis.22
The Equal Protection Clause gives rise to a cause of action on behalf of a class of one where the plaintiff alleges intentional differential treatment without a rational basis. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is therefore affirmed.23
Related opinions on this issue
The Solicitor General and the village of Willowbrook have expressed concern lest we interpret the Equal Protection Clause in this case in a way that would transform many ordinary violations of city or state law into violations of the Constitution.24 It might be thought that a rule that looks only to an intentional difference in treatment and a lack of a rational basis for that different treatment would work such a transformation.25 Zoning decisions, for example, will often, perhaps almost always, treat one landowner differently from another.26
This case, however, does not directly raise the question whether the simple and common instance of a faulty zoning decision would violate the Equal Protection Clause.27 That is because the Court of Appeals found that in this case respondent had alleged an extra factor as well.28 In my view, the presence of that added factor in this case is sufficient to minimize any concern about transforming run-of-the-mill zoning cases into cases of constitutional right.29