433 U.S. 72 (1977)
In 1972 respondent Willie Sykes was convicted after a jury trial in the Circuit Court of DeSoto County, Florida, of third-degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment.1
The murder occurred on January 8, 1972, when Sykes fatally shot Willie Gilbert outside his trailer home.2 At trial the prosecution introduced through the testimony of two police officers a statement Sykes made after his arrest in which he admitted shooting Gilbert from the front porch of his trailer.3
Although Sykes had been read his Miranda rights at the police station and declined counsel, no objection was made at trial to the admission of the statement on the ground that Sykes had not understood the warnings or that it was involuntary.4 The trial judge did not hold a hearing on the issue.5
Sykes appealed his conviction but did not challenge the admissibility of the statements.6 He later filed unsuccessful motions to vacate and petitions for habeas corpus in state courts, raising involuntariness for the first time in those collateral proceedings.7 The Florida Supreme Court affirmed the conviction.8
Sykes then filed a petition for habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida.9 He asserted that the statements were inadmissible because he had not understood the Miranda warnings.10 The district court ruled that a hearing on voluntariness was required and stayed the writ to allow the state court to hold such a hearing, finding no bar from the failure to object at trial.11
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's order, holding that the failure to object did not bar federal review absent a deliberate bypass.12 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider the availability of federal habeas corpus review in this context.13
Whether federal habeas corpus review is available to a state prisoner who failed to make a contemporaneous objection at trial to the admission of a statement allegedly obtained in violation of Miranda v. Arizona?14
No. The established facts show that respondent Sykes was convicted after a jury trial in Florida state court of third-degree murder.17 At trial the prosecution introduced through police testimony a post-arrest statement in which Sykes admitted shooting the victim.18 No objection was made at trial to the admission of the statement on Miranda grounds, and the trial judge held no hearing on voluntariness.19 Sykes appealed without challenging the statement and first raised involuntariness in unsuccessful state collateral proceedings.20
The district court and Fifth Circuit permitted federal habeas review under Fay v. Noia despite the default.21 The Francis v. Henderson cause-and-prejudice standard governs because the contemporaneous-objection rule is an adequate and independent state ground that serves comity and finality interests equally applicable to Miranda claims.22 Sykes advanced no cause for the default and the other evidence of guilt was overwhelming, negating prejudice.23 Federal habeas review is therefore unavailable.24
Federal habeas corpus review is not available without a showing of cause and prejudice.25
Related opinions on this issue
Chief Justice Burger concurred to emphasize that the deliberate-bypass standard of Fay v. Noia was never designed for errors alleged to have been committed during trial.26 Trial decisions such as whether to object are entrusted to counsel rather than the defendant personally, rendering the knowing-and-intelligent-waiver standard inapplicable.27 The cause-and-prejudice rule properly respects the attorney's on-the-spot responsibility for tactical choices during the trial itself.28
Burger stressed that the Fay standard originated in cases where the defendant personally decided whether to appeal or waive counsel, not in routine trial objections handled by counsel.29
Justice Stevens concurred in the judgment, noting that the holding is consistent with how federal courts have actually applied Fay.30 Competent counsel could have made a deliberate decision not to object because the statement was consistent with Sykes's trial testimony and had some potential mitigating value.31 The record shows no basis for claiming that the trial violated any standard of fundamental fairness, so collateral attack is properly disallowed regardless of how the rule is phrased.32
Stevens observed that the statement's consistency with trial testimony and possible impeachment value supported a tactical choice by counsel.33
Whether the cause-and-prejudice standard applies to bar federal habeas review of a Miranda claim when the state procedural default consists of the failure to object contemporaneously at trial?34
Yes. The established facts demonstrate that Florida's contemporaneous-objection rule required Sykes to challenge the statement at trial or not at all, and his failure constituted an independent and adequate state procedural ground.37 The Court extended the Francis rule because a contemporaneous-objection rule enables the record to be made when recollections are fresh, allows the trial judge to make factual determinations, and promotes finality by encouraging resolution of claims in the state trial.38 Sykes offered no explanation for the failure to object and the remaining evidence of guilt was substantial, eliminating any possibility of actual prejudice.39
The cause-and-prejudice standard therefore applies and bars review of the Miranda claim.40
The cause-and-prejudice standard applies to bar federal habeas review of the Miranda claim.41
Related opinions on this issue
Justice White concurred in the judgment on the ground that the alleged error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.42 The Court's own assessment that the other evidence of guilt negates any possibility of prejudice is tantamount to a harmless-error finding sufficient to foreclose the writ even without a procedural default.43 He added that the deliberate-bypass rule affords adequate protection to state interests when counsel is aware of the facts and law yet decides not to object for professional reasons.44
White noted that the harmless-error doctrine independently bars relief and that counsel's professional judgment should not be second-guessed absent plain error.45
Joined by Justice Marshall
Justice Brennan dissented, arguing that the deliberate-bypass standard of Fay v. Noia should continue to govern.46 The ordinary procedural default stems from counsel's inadvertence or negligence rather than a tactical decision, and closing the federal courthouse door to punish a lawyer's mistake is both senseless and misdirected.47 The cause-and-prejudice test leaves unresolved how to treat defaults attributable purely to attorney error and risks denying any judicial consideration of constitutional claims.48
Brennan maintained that Fay properly distinguishes intentional forfeitures from inadvertent ones and that the new standard undermines federal protection of constitutional rights.49
Justice Blackmun dissented for the reasons stated in his dissent in Francis v. Henderson.50 The rule announced by the Court today will have the effect of denying federal habeas corpus relief in many cases where constitutional violations have occurred.51 This is inconsistent with the historic role of the Great Writ.52
Blackmun viewed the decision as an unwarranted contraction of the writ's availability that conflicts with its traditional function of correcting constitutional errors in state convictions.53 He believed the approach would prevent relief in numerous instances involving constitutional violations.54