564 U.S. 338 (2011)
In 2001, three current or former female employees of Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.—Betty Dukes, Christine Kwapnoski, and Edith Arana—filed a lawsuit in the Northern District of California alleging that the company had discriminated against them and other women in pay and promotions.1
Wal-Mart, the nation’s largest private employer with approximately 3,400 stores across the country and more than one million employees, delegated pay and promotion decisions to local store managers who exercised broad discretion in a largely subjective manner.2 The plaintiffs claimed that this discretion was exercised disproportionately in favor of men, resulting in lower pay and fewer promotions for female employees.3
They sought to represent a class of approximately 1.5 million current and former female employees who had worked at any Wal-Mart domestic retail store since December 26, 1998.4 To support their motion for class certification, the plaintiffs presented statistical evidence from experts Dr. Richard Drogin and Dr. Marc Bendick showing pay and promotion disparities between men and women, anecdotal evidence consisting of about 120 affidavits from female employees describing discriminatory experiences at only 235 of the company's 3,400 stores, and the testimony of sociologist Dr. William Bielby who analyzed Wal-Mart’s corporate culture.5
Betty Dukes began working at a Pittsburg, California store in 1994 as a cashier and was later promoted to customer service manager before being demoted; she alleged retaliation and that male greeters were paid more.6 Christine Kwapnoski worked at Sam’s Club stores and claimed a male manager yelled at female employees and told her to “doll up.”7 Edith Arana worked at a Duarte, California store from 1995 to 2001.8 She was denied opportunities for management training despite repeated requests.9
The District Court certified the class under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2), finding that the plaintiffs had presented significant evidence of a company-wide pattern of discrimination.10 The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, sitting en banc, substantially affirmed the certification order.11 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review whether the class certification was consistent with Rule 23(a) and (b)(2).12
Whether the plaintiffs satisfied the commonality requirement of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a)(2) when seeking certification of a class of approximately 1.5 million current and former female employees?13
Rule 23(a)(2) requires a plaintiff to show that there are questions of law or fact common to the class.14 The claims must depend upon a common contention capable of classwide resolution, meaning determination of its truth or falsity will resolve an issue central to the validity of each claim in one stroke.15 Significant proof that the employer operated under a general policy of discrimination is necessary to bridge the gap between individual claims and a classwide proceeding.16
No. In 2001 three current or former female employees of Wal-Mart filed suit alleging sex discrimination in pay and promotions under Title VII.17 Wal-Mart delegated pay and promotion decisions to local managers exercising broad subjective discretion across its 3,400 stores and more than one million employees.18 The plaintiffs sought to represent a class of 1.5 million current and former female employees and supported certification with statistical evidence from Drs. Drogin and Bendick, approximately 120 anecdotal affidavits, and Dr. Bielby's testimony on corporate culture.19
These materials failed to identify any specific employment practice or common mode of exercising discretion that could produce a common answer to why any class member was disfavored.20 The only identified policy was the grant of discretion itself, which is the opposite of a uniform practice, and the evidence did not demonstrate that all managers exercised that discretion in a discriminatory manner.21
The plaintiffs did not satisfy the commonality requirement of Rule 23(a)(2).22
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justices Breyer, Sotomayor, And Kagan
Justice Ginsburg concurred in the judgment on backpay but dissented on commonality.23 She maintained that the plaintiffs easily satisfied Rule 23(a)(2) by presenting substantial nationwide statistical evidence of persistent gender-based pay and promotion disparities together with anecdotal evidence showing a corporate culture that permitted bias to infect employment decisions.24 In her view the common contention was whether Wal-Mart's policy of unfettered managerial discretion produced a pattern or practice of gender discrimination.25
She faulted the majority for demanding that plaintiffs prove their case at the certification stage rather than merely showing that the claims could be litigated productively on a classwide basis.26 Ginsburg emphasized that even a single common question suffices under Rule 23(a)(2) and that the delegation of discretion itself constituted a uniform policy capable of classwide resolution.27
Whether the plaintiffs' claims for backpay could be certified under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2)?28
Rule 23(b)(2) authorizes class certification when the defendant has acted on grounds that apply generally to the class so that final injunctive or corresponding declaratory relief is appropriate respecting the class as a whole.29 Individualized monetary claims such as backpay are not incidental to injunctive relief.30 Therefore they may not be certified under the rule because they require separate determinations of each class member's eligibility and the reasons for particular employment decisions.31
No. The plaintiffs sought backpay in addition to injunctive and declaratory relief.32 Because backpay awards turn on individualized inquiries into each employee's circumstances and the lawful or unlawful reasons for each employment decision, they cannot be resolved by a single classwide injunction.33 The Ninth Circuit's proposed sampling procedure that would extrapolate from a random set of claims would deprive Wal-Mart of its right to litigate statutory defenses to individual claims, violating the Rules Enabling Act.34
The plaintiffs' backpay claims could not be certified under Rule 23(b)(2).35
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justices Breyer, Sotomayor, And Kagan
Justice Ginsburg joined the majority's holding that the backpay claims were improperly certified under Rule 23(b)(2).36 She agreed that monetary relief that is not merely incidental to injunctive or declaratory relief cannot be included in a (b)(2) class.37 Ginsburg noted that a putative class of this type may be certifiable under Rule 23(b)(3) if the plaintiffs can show that common class questions predominate over issues affecting individuals.38 She added that a class action must be superior to other modes of adjudication.39
She reserved the predominance and superiority questions for consideration on remand.40